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Abstract 
 
This work explores how current embodied theories of cognition can account 
for the comprehension of narrative texts. Theoretically, this thesis develops a 
framework for the study of narrative text comprehension by linking current 
advances in embodied theories of cognition, discourse processing, and 
neurosciences. Experimentally, two experiments are reported in which 
participants were required to read passages of text implying emotional states. 
The coherence of critical sentences in relation to the preceding text was 
manipulated in terms of both the emotional adjectives used and the sensory-
motor component. In the first experiment, three tasks were used to index the 
effect of the manipulations on the critical sentences. The first was an on-line 
naming task in which response times to name emotional labels which matched 
the implied emotional state of the texts were recorded. Lexical decision and 
episodic recognition tasks were completed subsequently as measures of the 
impact of the critical sentence manipulation on off-line processes. The results 
suggest a trend consistent with the notion that readers use both language-
based and sensory-motor knowledge to understand characters’ emotions. 
However, during the on-line processing language-based knowledge seems to 
play a guiding role in comprehension, while during the off-line comprehension 
sensory-motor knowledge seems to do so. The second experiment used 
backward masking in the naming task with the aim of providing a more 
sensitive index of the effect of the text manipulations on on-line processing. 
The backward masking paradigm also enabled error data to be analysed in 
addition to response times. Results from this experiment were not statistically 
significant. Taken together, the experiments indicate that this is a promising 
area of research, but that future work requires the development of specific 
tasks that are sensitive enough to index how sensory-motor knowledge works 
for the processing of abstract concepts in narrative contexts.  
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embodied cognition. 
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Abstract 
 
This work explores how current embodied theories of cognition can account for the 
comprehension of narrative texts. Theoretically, this thesis develops a framework for 
the study of narrative text comprehension by linking current advances in embodied 
theories of cognition, discourse processing, and neurosciences. Experimentally, two 
experiments are reported in which participants were required to read passages of text 
implying emotional states. The coherence of critical sentences in relation to the 
preceding text was manipulated in terms of both the emotional adjectives used and 
the sensory-motor component. In the first experiment, three tasks were used to index 
the effect of the manipulations on the critical sentences. The first was an on-line 
naming task in which response times to name emotional labels which matched the 
implied emotional state of the texts were recorded. Lexical decision and episodic 
recognition tasks were completed subsequently as measures of the impact of the 
critical sentence manipulation on off-line processes. The results suggest a trend 
consistent with the notion that readers use both language-based and sensory-motor 
knowledge to understand characters’ emotions. However, during the on-line 
processing language-based knowledge seems to play a guiding role in comprehension, 
while during the off-line comprehension sensory-motor knowledge seems to do so. 
The second experiment used backward masking in the naming task with the aim of 
providing a more sensitive index of the effect of the text manipulations on on-line 
processing. The backward masking paradigm also enabled error data to be analysed in 
addition to response times. Results from this experiment were not statistically 
significant. Taken together, the experiments indicate that this is a promising area of 
research, but that future work requires the development of specific tasks that are 
sensitive enough to index how sensory-motor knowledge works for the processing of 
abstract concepts in narrative contexts.  
 
Keywords: narrative text, text comprehension, characters’ emotions, embodied 
cognition. 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Discourse studies see text comprehension as a process that requires 
from readers the use of linguistic and generic knowledge. The first sort of 
knowledge assists in coping with discursive properties of texts, such as 
anaphora, subject-verb-object structures, and so on. On the other hand, 
generic knowledge assists in coping with the pragmatic content of what is 
referred to in the narratives, such as how people usually behave under certain 
circumstances. The interaction of these sources of knowledge leads to 
comprehension of discourse. Also, it is recognized that comprehension 
processes, as a high-level cognitive operation, entail memory systems, 
attentional processes, perceptual processes, and inferential processes in 
order to integrate those sources of knowledge. 
All of these components, which are part of the comprehension process, 
have been studied thoroughly by recent research in discourse processing, in 
relation to specific narrative dimensions. For example, there are several 
studies dedicated to particular narrative dimensions such as space and 
causation, but just a few dedicated to time and characters’ emotions. The 
study of emotion comprehension has attracted the attention of discourse 
researchers with regard to what sort of inferences enable emotion 
comprehension, what are the differences between the reader’s and 
characters’ emotions, and what emotions are elicited by the text structure, 
for instance. Nevertheless, little attention has been paid to how generic 
knowledge influences the comprehension of characters’ emotions.  
Current proposals from cognitive science argue that language 
comprehension requires from people the use of experience-based knowledge, 
particularly sensory-motor knowledge, to parse language in general. It has 
been suggested that sensory-motor knowledge supports the comprehension of 
concrete concepts such as actions and objects, but it is still controversial as 
to how that knowledge accounts for the comprehension of abstract concepts 
such as emotions and time. 
This thesis studies by means of two experiments how experience-based 
and language-based knowledge interact during the comprehension of 
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narratives to lead to their comprehension. In particular, it addresses how 
people understand narratives’ emotional dimension using sensory-motor 
knowledge.  
The relevance of this work relates to its implications for both discourse 
comprehension and cognitive science theories in that there is still scant 
research about how readers comprehend emotions in narrative texts, while 
the matter of how these kinds of abstract concepts are understood remains an 
open debate in cognitive science.  
Given these features, it is necessary to explain the process of 
language/discourse comprehension, especially in the case of emotions, and 
the cognitive process that sustains the comprehension of abstract concepts. 
Putting these ideas together, it is possible to model an explanatory framework 
that accounts for language comprehension, and particularly, for the 
comprehension of abstract concepts in the context of narratives. 
This work is organized in the following way: Chapter 2 presents the 
issue of language and discourse comprehension. In so doing, memory sources, 
inference making, and representational levels are some of the main ideas 
addressed. Specifically, it is argued that narrative texts are powerful devices 
to elicit high-level mentations.  
Chapter 3 accounts for emotion comprehension as a core topic both for 
discourse study and cognitive science. This chapter presents how emotions are 
comprehended in everyday situations and fictional contexts. Finally, it is 
shown how they share common basic cognitive processes in both realms. 
Chapter 4 explains the methodological procedure for the first 
experiment which aims to see how language-based and experience-based 
knowledge interact to lead to text comprehension. Chapter 5 shows the 
results obtained. Finally, Chapter 6 puts forward a discussion and conclusion. 
Chapters 7, 8, and 9 report the method, results, and discussion respectively of 
the second experiment which is based on a methodological attempt to obtain 
stronger data. A general discussion is presented in Chapter 10. 
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Chapter 2. Discourse and language processing. The case of narratives. 
 
It is widely accepted in cognitive science that discourse processing 
requires the mental construction of the state of affairs described in any 
discursive expression (de Vega, Díaz, & León, 1999; Elosúa, 2000; Graesser, 
Olde, & Klettke, 2002; Holliday, Hamilton, Luthra, Oddy, & Weekes, 2005; 
Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). However, to construct a reliable mental 
representation of the linguistic input, the reader has to interrelate cognitive 
systems, such as memory systems, with cognitive processes, such as 
inferential operations and elaborative processes (Mar, 2004). For the purpose 
of this thesis, comprehension is understood as the construction of a 
meaningful representation of text by means of the interaction among the 
aforementioned cognitive systems; it is a dynamic process in that all these 
cognitive systems must be related to each other and must be present during 
the construction of mental representations. 
Below, memory systems, inferential operations, and elaborative 
processes are considered more in detail. The construction of situation models 
is then emphasized as a core process in comprehension for reaching the 
meaning of what is referred to in the discursive input (e.g., Elosúa, 2000). 
Finally, a summary of discourse comprehension processes and a critique of 
current research in the area are provided. Ideas from current theories of 
cognition, particularly embodied theories such as Barsalou’s (1999) theory of 
perceptual symbol systems, underlie the concepts considered herein, 
particularly in relation to the construction of situation models. 
 
2.1. Cognitive components of discourse processing 
The discourse genre that has attracted the most attention of discourse 
researchers is narrative discourse (Graesser, Millis, & Zwaan, 1997). The study 
of narrative discourse has yielded important ideas about how people 
understand language, as its study enables researchers to understand how 
readers use the cognitive systems mentioned above to build a mental 
representation or situation model of the situation referred to in the narratives. 
Another appeal of this kind of discourse is that it presents human life-based 
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experiences, that is, fictional characters living situations in typical scenarios. 
Additionally, narrative discourse follows a prototypical structure, i.e., 
introduction, complication, and resolution (Dixon & Bartolussi, 2001; Gárate 
Larrea, 1994), which is tantamount to the manner in which people relate 
anecdotes to themselves and each other. Also, narrative discourse is 
commonly found in texts, such as novels, stories, and fables (Garrido 
Domínguez, 1993). In this thesis, narrative text and narrative discourse are 
considered as analogous. Taking into account the above-mentioned, narrative 
discourse is an important device to understand how human cognition operates 
using fictional-experience-based situations. 
Although text comprehension has been emphasized so far, the more 
general issue of language comprehension in everyday-life situations is also 
addressed by the ideas raised here. Recently Garrod and Pickering (2004) have 
proposed a model for dialogue comprehension. This model states that 
speakers have to align their mental representations in order to achieve 
mutual comprehension, namely, the alignment of their situation models of the 
conversation topic. This proposal is also supported by psychonarratology, 
which states that in narrative processing readers perceive the narrator as a 
conversational partner (Bortolussi & Dixon, 2003). Therefore, it is possible 
that by explaining the central assumptions in discourse comprehension, 
language comprehension, in general, would be benefited from this 
perspective. As will be seen, empirical research demonstrates that that is the 
case. 
The informational flow between reader and discourse requires the 
active use of knowledge and inferential and elaboration processes (Mar, 2004). 
Each component has a particular task and purpose; nevertheless they must 
interact to create a representation of the situation referred to in the 
discourse. This representation is known as a mental model or situation model, 
and its principal purpose is to enable an interpretation of the linguistic input 
and to carry out higher-level cognitive processes, such as inferences (Rickheit 
& Sichelschmidt, 1999). Usually, discourse comprehension has been 
characterized by three levels of text processing, namely, surface text, text 
base, and situation model (e.g., Kintsch & Rawson, 2005). The focus of this 
 4
thesis is at the level of the situation model because it is the final product of 
comprehension that demands interaction between generic knowledge and 
linguistic knowledge. 
To build a situation model, the reader uses information stored in his or 
her memory and information provided by the narrative. The linguistic and 
world knowledge enable the reader to understand the situations referred to in 
the text, whereas the textual information serves as a set of linguistic 
instructions about how the mental model should be constructed (Zwaan & 
Madden, 2004). Figure 2.1 shows the general components of discourse 
processing. 
 
Cognitive system: Text features: 
  
- world + linguistic knowledge 
stored in memory systems 
- coherence + cohesion 
- specific content 
- inferential processes - grammatical structure 
- simulation processes    - length 
- idiom  
 
Figure 2.1. Basic components of discourse processing. On the side of the reader, memory 
resources, inferential, and elaboration processes permit the building of a mental 
representation. On the side of the text, linguistic information offers itself as an external 
entity to be processed that has particular features that influence the reader’s mentations. 
Likewise, the reader assesses the discourse properties and determines its quality. 
 
 
Reader  Text 
 - etc. 
Situation model 
Interactive process wherein the text 
influences reader’s cognitive process, and 
reader’s representations assess text 
properties 
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Figure 2.1 illustrates the mechanics of discourse comprehension, that is, 
the interaction between text and reader is driven by two types of input; 
namely, text features and the reader’s mental representations. Recently, 
Bortolussi and Dixon (2003) provided a detailed account of both readers’ 
mental constructions and text features necessary to consider in order to carry 
out an experimental study of narrative processing. As Figure 2.1 shows, texts 
have features that influence the mental representations of the comprehender. 
Texts must be i) objective, in that textual traces (e.g., syntactic 
constructions, style, etc.) can be identified, ii) precise, in that texts can be 
defined, iii) stable, in that enduring properties of the text do not vary with 
reader or reading situation, iv) relevant, in that textual features are 
meaningful for the reader, and v) tractable, in that textual features can be 
altered. On the other hand, readers’ constructions must be i) direct, in that 
their responses can be collected, ii) replicable, in that other researchers can 
measure the same reader constructions, and iii) concise, in that results can be 
communicated in an efficient manner. Although the original methodological 
program proposed by Bortolussi and Dixon (2003; Dixon & Bortolussi, 2001) is 
based on the use of direct questionnaires more than reaction times, the 
distinction that they offer between text features and reader’s constructions is 
crucial for carrying out textual experiments using literary-like texts. This new 
methodological approach to narrative processing highlights the mental 
representations achieved through manipulations of textual properties, for 
example, by manipulating text coherence at the global or local level. In this 
manner, a central feature of text comprehension is that an interaction 
between textual features and readers’ mental representations must happen to 
construct a situation model of the narratives. This interaction will be 
exemplified when the effects of some text features on the comprehension of 
emotions in narratives are discussed in the next chapter. Nevertheless, the 
present work emphasizes the cognitive systems for discourse comprehension 
since, as will be seen later, current theories in cognitive science stress the 
important role that experience-based knowledge plays in language 
comprehension. 
 
 6
2.1.1. Memory Systems 
The memory systems have the task of registering incoming information, 
maintaining it, and accessing it when required. Broadly, memory systems can 
be conceptualized as consisting of long-term and short-term stores (Baddeley, 
2005). In the context of discourse processing, long-term memory (LTM) 
contains linguistic and world knowledge based on experience. The experience-
based knowledge covers not only general knowledge of the world, but also 
particular memories or incidents or episodic memory (Graesser & Wiemer-
Hastings, 1999: Tulving, 1999). Also, this memory system has information 
regarding reading experience in general, and experience with narrative texts 
in particular.  
LTM is composed of two subcomponents that store long-term memories, 
specifically, semantic memory (SM) and episodic memory (EM). By and large, 
semantic memory is involved in acquiring and using knowledge about the 
world, whilst episodic memory permits the remembering of previous specific 
experiences (Baddeley, 2005). EM is a recent evolutionary achievement in 
human cognition, and its importance hinges on its virtue of adding affects to 
memories, something that SM lacks (Tulving, 1999). For this, EM is a necessary 
cognitive system to give meaning to memories, via access to autobiographical 
records. 
In a classic study, Thorndyke (1977) demonstrated how memory is 
influenced by discourse characteristics. As mentioned earlier, texts have a 
particular grammar, that is to say, introduction, complication, and resolution. 
Thorndyke manipulated text structure in his first experiment, in such a way 
that some texts kept the canonical structure and other texts did not. After 
reading the texts participants completed recall, summarization, and 
recognition tasks. Participants scored very poorly for those texts for which 
canonical structure was altered. When Thorndyke altered the content of the 
stories in a second experiment, for instance by changing the set of characters 
and their actions, participants remembered more accurately those passages 
for which the content was more verisimilar and plausible (see also Black, 
Freeman, & Johnson-Laird, 1986). The crucial role of memory in text 
comprehension has also been demonstrated in educational settings (Elosúa, 
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García-Madruga, Gutiérrez, Luque, & Gárate, 2002; Elosúa & Martínez Romero, 
2002) and in traumatic brain injury patients (Holliday et al., 2005). 
Conversely, the purpose of short-term memory (STM, or working 
memory [WM]) is to keep active a limited amount of information for a brief 
period of time (Kneepkens & Zwaan, 1994). When the cognitive system is 
presented with incoming information, LTM and STM are interconnected by the 
functioning of the episodic buffer (EB). This new temporary store holds 
representations that integrate phonological, visual, and spatial information, 
and importantly, information not covered by the slave systems, like sensory-
motor information. EB is episodic in that it binds information into a unitary 
episodic representation. These features make EB a memory component that 
enhances storage and retrieval, and therefore offers a more dynamic view of 
LTM in the comprehension of novel information.  
Baddeley (2000) proposes that the episodic buffer plays an important 
role in merging incoming information with LTM. By means of a multimodal 
temporal representation, the episodic buffer enables the memory systems to 
maintain, for a short time, an active informational chunk filled with details 
proper of the situation at issue and with previous knowledge stored in the LTM, 
especially episodic memories.  
The role of the EB is consonant with current cognitive theories that 
advocate a dynamic view of cognition, mainly of memory (see Glenberg, 1997; 
Nelson, 1999). As mentioned above, the EB can access stored episodic 
memories and integrate these with the incoming information currently active 
in STM. Memories stored in the episodic LTM are about specific events built on 
the basis of direct or vicarious experience with the world, and they flesh out 
the incoming information with specific modalities, e.g., emotional, spatial, 
and temporal. Given that LTM is organized by functional significance of 
personal experiences, this memory system works to take a more active role in 
the construction of mental representations (see Glenberg, 1997), that is, LTM 
acts not only as a storage system but as a source from which to retrieve 
meaningful information.  
It is evident that memory plays a pivotal role in narrative discourse 
comprehension. Particularly, the interaction between EM and STM, via the EB, 
 8
is central to the construction of situation models. Although the memory 
systems are essential for knowledge acquisition in that they encode, store, 
and retrieve information, this information would be useless if there were not 
integration processes, that is, processes to create new information from old 
records. 
 
2.1.2. Integration Processes 
The information stored in memory must be coordinated and re-
arranged, usually by addition or deletion of some memory traces. To do so, 
the cognitive system must draw inferences, so that generic knowledge is 
applied to the linguistic indications provided in the discourse, and, as a result, 
the mental representation is sufficiently coherent and explicative (Gutiérrez-
Calvo, 1999).  
This phase of the comprehension process could be regarded as a 
purification process, for unnecessary information is weeded out and relevant 
information is called for complementing the representation formed so far 
(e.g., Kintsch, 1988; Kintsch & Rawson, 2005).  The role of inferential 
processes is to link concepts to each other in order to produce new 
information necessary to understand properties that are implicit, therefore, 
via inferencing, the integration processes occur. For instance, from the 
sentence “Mark stopped on the footpath looking at Mary without batting an 
eyelid; his day now was a brilliant day”, the reader can infer that Mark really 
likes Mary, that her presence is enough to change Mark’s normal day into a 
good one, and so on. These kinds of inferences can only be drawn by resorting 
to general knowledge and they provide coherence at a global level.  
In addition to experience-based inferences, discourse comprehension 
also depends on lower level inferences based on textual input. Using the same 
example, the pronoun “his” in the sentence above is linked to Mark and not to 
Mary, since our linguistic knowledge tell us that “his” is normally attached to 
male names, not female ones. This inference is done in order to give local 
coherence to the sentence by connecting the pronoun “his” to one of the 
main characters. It is clear then that inferencing requires the integration of 
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experience-based knowledge at the top-down level plus language-based 
knowledge at the bottom-up level. 
Consequently, without inferential processes there is no possibility of 
establishing coherence, or causal relations, or of resolving anaphors. In sum, 
without inferences, there is no comprehension (García-Madruga, Elosúa, 
Gutiérrez, Luque, & Gárate, 1999). This idea not only applies to text 
comprehension, but also to everyday reasoning in language comprehension. 
Radvansky and Copeland (2004) demonstrated that mental processes 
used in formal and everyday reasoning share common characteristics. These 
investigators asked participants to perform an operation span test, a situation 
memory test, a categorical syllogism task, a spatial integration task, and an 
altered inference task. These tasks tapped cognitive processes used in 
language comprehension and formal reasoning. The results showed that 
integration and inferencing were related to narrative comprehension. 
According to the authors, integration is when the information from two 
premises is integrated into a common mental model. Inferencing involved 
deriving a conclusion from a mental model that is not stated by the premises. 
It is worth noting that these two processes are core processes in formal logical 
reasoning as well and therefore defined in those terms. Although the 
coordination of alternative models, the third feature in formal reasoning, was 
not related to narrative text comprehension, the overall picture supported 
the claim that the study of everyday reasoning aids understanding formal 
logical reasoning, and vice versa. As mentioned previously, by finding 
commonalities between everyday reasoning and discourse comprehension it 
can be asserted that the cognitive processes used in discourse comprehension 
are extensible to more general ways of reasoning and that knowledge 
acquired in both realms assists mutually.   
The inferential processes lead to the construction of a situation model 
(Johnson-Laird, 1980; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). This construction is a 
mental micro-world or small-scale model of the situation referred to in the 
narrative that includes spatial, interpersonal, emotional, temporal, and 
causal attributes (see Belinchón, Rivière, & Igoa, 1992). The situation model 
comprises the following three dimensions: 
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i) The central plot: characters performing action to achieve goals, 
events that present obstacles, conflicts among characters. 
ii) Elements that enrich the plot: spatial settings, descriptions of 
actions, properties and traits of the characters, time of events. 
iii) Characters’ mental states: characters’ feelings, thoughts, 
knowledge, and beliefs (Graesser et al., 2002; Zwaan, 1999). 
Some of these dimensions have been studied exhaustively. For instance, 
in a classic paper Bower & Morrow (1990) reviewed research about how 
readers build mental representations of situations referred to in texts. Their 
focus was on the spatial dimension of texts. In one of the reviewed works 
(Morrow, Greenspan, & Bower, 1987, as cited in Bower & Morrow, 1990), 
participants were asked to memorize the layout of two different buildings, a 
warehouse and a research centre. After memorizing the maps, they read a set 
of stories that took place either in the research scenario or in the warehouse. 
Each story introduced a new character who had different purposes and 
therefore performed different actions in each scenario. Also, the stories 
described the characters’ thoughts and plans as they moved from one room to 
another in each scenario. Researchers measured participants’ time to answer 
questions about the locations of objects. Pairs of test object-words were 
presented on a computer screen after subjects read line-by-line fragments of 
the stories. Subjects had to decide if the two objects were in the same room 
or different ones by pressing the buttons labelled as “same” and “different.” 
The results showed that reaction times went from fastest to slowest in the 
following order: objects located in the current fictional place of the character, 
objects located in the closest room to the current one, objects in any other 
room, and finally objects located in any room of the other building. The 
researchers concluded that readers kept track of the situations referred to in 
the narrative and that they updated the situation model accordingly as the 
plot unfolded. Similar findings have been demonstrated for other dimensions 
of narrative such as time (e.g., Kelter, Kaup, & Claus, 2004), and emotions 
(e.g., Marmolejo-Ramos & Jiménez, 2006a, 2006b); nevertheless, emotion 
comprehension in texts has received scant attention. 
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2.1.3. Elaborative Processes 
Although a situation model contains enough information as regards the 
situation referred to in the narrative, current theories in cognitive science 
claim for a more dynamic view of cognition, i.e., an embodied perspective on 
situation models. 
Embodied theories of cognition claim that in lieu of amodal, arbitrary 
and abstract representation of meaning, mental representations of meaning 
are constituted by linking cognition and perception, which permits the 
cognitive system to build multimodal, grounded, and concrete representations 
of meaning (Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg, 1997). In doing so, simulation plays an 
important role since it allows the mind to create dynamic mental 
representations of the chain of events referred to in narratives. Therefore, an 
embodied perspective of situation models would enable the cognitive system 
to operate in a “safe mode” with grounded representations to simulate 
actions, perception, and anticipations of future events (Hesslow, 2002).   
This new perspective on situation models has recently received 
empirical support. Neuropsychological evidence shows that simulation of 
actions, for instance mentally simulating hands movement, elicit the 
activation of the primary motor cortex (Hesslow, 2002). Indeed, in joint 
action, subjects activate motor areas in order to anticipate and understand 
others’ actions (Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006). Neurological research 
recently demonstrates that this sort of brain activity is pervasive even in 
people who have sustained a traumatic brain injury and who are in vegetative 
state. Owen et al. (2006) report the case of a patient who had a traumatic 
brain injury after being involved in a road traffic accident. These researchers 
used fMRI techniques to pick up her brain activity during the presentation of 
spoken instructions to perform mental imagery tasks (e.g., “imagining playing 
tennis”). Results showed that when the patient’s brain activity was compared 
with that of healthy volunteers, no significant differences between the 
patient and healthy people arose in the cortical areas normally employed to 
process spoken language. Remarkably, there was a strong activation of 
supplementary motor areas that control motor responses (see also Miller, 
2006; Naccache, 2006). 
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 In the case of story comprehension, Mar (2004) reports several brain-
imagery studies that show that specific brain areas activate when processing 
narratives, and interestingly, motor cortex areas are active when reading 
narratives that entail mental inferences. Also, Mar states that the medial 
prefrontal cortex, lateral prefrontal cortex, temporoparietal region, anterior 
temporal region (including temporal poles), and posterior cingulate cortex are 
brain areas implicated in narrative comprehension, and indeed, production. In 
this order, they are in charge of ordering and selecting information, 
computing theory-of-mind operations, attributing mental states, constructing 
mental states, and modulating emotion appraisals during recall of past 
experiences. Mar finally concludes that neuroscientific research does support 
an embodied perspective for text comprehension; in particular, predictions 
derived from behavioural data suggest this.  
For instance, in a behavioural study Zwaan, Madden, Yaxley, and 
Aveyard (2004) asked participants to listen to sentences describing the motion 
of a ball towards or away from the observer (e.g., “The pitcher hurled the 
softball to you”). After the sentence was presented, a picture of an object 
was shown for 500 ms followed by another image. The two pictures matched 
or mismatched with the event mentioned in the sentence. Researchers found 
that subjects responded faster, via a keyboard, when the implied movement 
of the balls matched the movement depicted in the sentence. These data 
support the idea that language comprehension requires dynamic mental 
simulations and support embodied cognition assumptions. This sort of 
behavioural research suggests that language processing relies heavily on 
knowledge constructed in sensory-motor interaction with the environment 
(see also Kaup, Lüdtke, & Zwaan, 2006). 
These results support current ideas about embodied frameworks. In 
particularly, they suggest that knowledge is grounded in representations 
created through interactions between humans and objects in particular 
situations, and that that knowledge allows action in the world and the 
simulation of objects and situations when they are not present (see Barsalou, 
1999; Glenberg, 1997). If it is taken into account that simulation processes 
allow the re-creation of actions, perceptions, and anticipations, whenever the 
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reader is to understand fictional situations, he or she is to activate motor 
areas in the brain as if they were performing situation-related actions. Also, 
the reader has the capacity to account for simulated perceptual entities, for 
instance by responding faster or slower to word-objects that are part or not of 
a spatial setting. Most importantly for an up-to-date discourse processing 
theory, it seems that readers can elicit actions and perceptions that would 
happen if an action were actually performed, in the case of, for example, the 
anticipation of events (see Hesslow, 2002). The evidence illustrated so far 
indicates that, from a behavioural (e.g., Zwaan et al., 2004) and a 
neurological (e.g., Mar, 2004) point of view, this is what does take place while 
reading narratives. 
 
2.2. Embodied situation models as the highest comprehension level in 
discourse processing 
It is generally agreed that text comprehension comprises basically 
three representational levels: surface level, text-base, and situation model 
(Kintsch, 1988; Kintsch & Rawson, 2005). In broad terms, the surface level 
accounts for the verbatim linguistic form of the text, i.e., how the text is 
grammatically and syntactically composed, its style and rhetoric. The text 
base accounts for the propositional network of the semantic content of the 
text, i.e., the main ideas or what is said in the text; finally, the situation 
model is a representation of the situation referred to in the text (Kneepkens 
& Zwaan, 1994). Hence, the situation model is the highest representational 
level achieved when comprehending discourse. 
In the previous section an updated version of situation models was 
discussed that postulates that situation models must be embodied so that 
knowledge is based in a perception-cognition interaction. Furthermore, it was 
argued that memory systems must have a more dynamic role in knowledge 
establishment, especially in that memory for specific events must be used to 
understand new information. The stored information is then used through 
inferential processes in order to create new information. Finally, a situation 
model can be simulated on condition that the information stored in memory is 
employed dynamically (the role of the EB), particularly language and generic 
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knowledge. Given these features and the current findings in narrative 
neuroscience (e.g., Mar, 2004), a sketch of a neurocognitive system loop for 
narrative comprehension is proposed here, as shown in Figure 2.2 
 
 
Neurocognitive 
system Sensory 
experience 
 
Figure 2.2. Narrative comprehension neurocognitive loop. The main cognitive system stressed 
in this thesis revolves around the loop A. However, it is worth noting that loop A is ingrained 
in a major neurocognitive system that supports it (loop B); specifically, memory systems, 
integration processes (inference), and elaborative processes (simulation) have a neuronal 
substratum which in turn entails a neuronal activity. The specific neuropsychological aspects 
of this loop are explained in detail elsewhere (Marmolejo-Ramos, 2006). Nevertheless, in 
broad terms, this argues that the construction of an embodied situation model relies on the 
coordinated operations among the components in loop A. The connection with the 
environment is vital for acquiring experience-based knowledge (a) and language-based 
knowledge (b) via sensory experience. 
 
If this loop is correct, then, for instance, knowledge acquired by 
interactions with the world must be called for and its influence would be 
reflected in simulation processes that sustain the situation model construction. 
Specifically, if a reader is presented with fictional situations that entail 
actions that are mutually exclusive in that they recruit the same sensory-
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motor systems, reading times would be affected since the construction of
coherent mental representation is interrupted. This idea is supported in a 
recent study. 
de Vega
 a 
, Robertson, Glenberg, Kaschak, and Rinck (2004) investigated 
how te
 
 a 
t of 
 temporal adverb 
has an
n’s 
 
er” 
 second experiment de Vega et al. (2004) depicted actions requiring 
the sam
on 
xt comprehension is influenced by interaction between the properties 
of actions and the temporal relations expressed by adverbs. In Experiment 1 
short narratives describing a character performing two actions that involved 
similar or different sensory-motor systems were read by participants. The 
actions were presented as simultaneous or successive by means of using the
temporal adverbs “while” and “after.” A typical passage in this experiment 
was like the following: “The artist was looking forward to getting to work on
portrait. While/After unlocking the studio door, he carefully painted a 
woman’s face. The portrait was finished, and it was beautiful.” This sor
passage was used to test if reading times were impaired by using either the 
temporal adverb “while” or “after” when they implied that the main 
character was employing the same sensory-motor systems.  
Passages like the following were created to test if the
y effect when the actions performed implied different sensory-motor 
systems: “The artist was looking forward to getting to work on a portrait. 
While/After holding a pipe between his teeth, he carefully painted a woma
face. The portrait was finished, and it was beautiful.” The researchers found 
slower reading times, both in Spanish and English, for sentences depicting 
actions recruiting the same sensory-motor system and including the adverb
“while”; nevertheless this was not the situation for sentences implying 
different sensory-motor systems regardless of the use of “while” or “aft
adverbs. 
In a
e sensory-motor systems but where one of the actions was presented 
as a mental plan. The temporal adverbs were used in this second experiment 
as well. Passages like this were created: “The shop assistant had a day off, 
which she spent at home. While/After she wrote/had written a letter, she 
thought of driving a nail into the wall. Then she hung a self-painted picture 
the nail.” Researchers found that comprehension, in German, was equally 
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easy with “while” and “after” adverbs when one of the actions was describ
as a mental plan. As their major conclusion, de Vega et al. claimed that 
comprehension is guided by syntax and embodied constraints within mult
non-interacting mental spaces. In other words, this research reveals that 
actions and mental plans are simulated and that the resulting situation mo
is affected if the actions at issue cannot be meshed given experience-based 
constraints. 
In this
ed 
iple 
del 
 same vein of ideas, a model of discourse processing ought to 
predic
nceptual knowledge 
to sim
 
art 
cts 
ed of part verification varied 
with th ic 
 
 
.” 
t that an embodied situation model must be filled with perceptual 
entities relevant for the fictional events. This has also been recently 
demonstrated by Borghi, Glenberg, and Kaschak (2004). 
The researchers hypothesized that if people use co
ulate action in the world, then people’s interaction with physical 
objects will be reflected in the speed of retrieval and the content that is
retrieved. To examine this, three experiments were designed in which a p
verification procedure was employed. In this sort of tasks participants receive 
a word for a concept (e.g., horse), or a sentence as in the Borghi et al. 
experiments, followed by a word for a property (e.g., mane), then subje
must to verify if the property is true of the concept (Pecher, Zeelenberg, & 
Barsalou, 2003; Solomon & Barsalou, 2004). 
Experiments 1 and 2 revealed that spe
e perspective imposed on the object in accordance with the linguist
information referring to the object (e.g., “you are driving a car” or “you are 
fuelling a car”). The verification task times were faster for words naming 
parts of the object that were closer to the current fictional position of the
reader. For instance, when readers read the sentence “you are driving the 
car,” probe words such as “horn,” “steering wheel,” or “gear” were verified
faster than words such as “trunk,” “fuel gauge,” or “back seat.” Inverse 
results were obtained when the main sentence was “you are fuelling a car
These results enabled the researchers to determine that people construct 
fine-grained spatial information for concepts, and that these concepts 
become available according to the linguistically suggested perspective. 
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Borghi et al. (2004) reported a third experiment which was designed to 
explore whether spatial information is based on perception-action codes, 
namely, whether an object is defined by how it enables interactions of 
particular types given its intrinsic properties, or its affordances (see Gibson, 
Adolph, & Eppler, 1999). In this experiment, parts were chosen with the 
intention that actions directed toward them required movement upward (e.g., 
the roof of the car) or downward (e.g., the wheels of the car). Orthogonally, 
responding “yes” required an upward or a downward movement to a response 
button. Researchers found that participants’ response times were slower 
when there was an incompatibility with the part’s location (e.g., responding 
downward to verify that a car has a roof) than when they were to respond in a 
direction compatible with the part’s location. The authors then concluded 
that people build spatial conceptual knowledge based on potential real-based 
actions with the world, or, to put it in another way, that affordances are used 
in addition to merely spatial facts. 
The evidence presented to sustain an embodied perspective on 
situation models seems to be compelling, particularly, in that this proposes a 
dynamic view of narrative comprehension and language understanding. Most 
germane to this framework is that this grounds knowledge in perceptual 
experience, which implies a strong link between experience-based and 
linguistic-based knowledge for the construction of internal mental 
representations.  
 
2.3. Chapter summary and conclusions 
An updated view of discourse processing is presented herein. The 
empirical evidence supports an embodied view of situation model 
construction. Nevertheless, for the situation model to be built, it is necessary 
to align memory, inferential, and simulation processes. Although the research 
presented supports a linkage between cognition and perception for the 
comprehension of narratives, there are still some flaws that require 
examination. 
On one hand, most of the current research on text comprehension from 
an embodied view of cognition, has revolved around concrete narrative 
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dimensions such as space and causality (actions). On the other hand, there is 
scant work on abstract narrative dimensions such as time and emotions. 
Finally, recent research has been limited to sentence processing and/or very 
simplistic sequences of events, and has not tested richer linguistic units such 
as narrative-like plots, thus underestimating the role of text features on 
comprehension.  
For these reasons, the present work is designed to offer some 
suggestions to address the aforementioned issues. Specifically, this work seeks 
to explain how abstract narrative dimensions, particularly emotional appraisal, 
are intertwined with perceptual information, especially actions. Also, in this 
work text features are understood as the set of linguistic instructions that 
guide simulation. As a result, this works aims to test how readers comprehend 
characters’ emotional states in narratives by relating knowledge-based 
components and language-based components. This is done under an embodied 
theory of discourse processing. 
This question is re-stated in the following chapter once the processes 
sustaining emotion comprehension are clarified. Of special relevance is to 
determine whether comprehension of emotions in real, every-day-life 
situations, and fictional contexts, such as narratives, share similar cognitive 
processes (this will take place in the next chapter too). Provided that that is 
the case, the embodied model of discourse processing depicted in this chapter 
can be extended to include the processing of emotional information. 
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Chapter 3. Emotion comprehension in real and fictional contexts 
 
3.1. Emotions as abstract concepts 
Understanding how abstract concepts, like emotions, are processed is a 
critical issue for validating embodied theories of narrative processing (e.g., 
Barsalou, 1999); however, this remains relatively unexplored thus far. In reply 
to Barsalou’s target article, Wiemer-Hastings and Graesser argue that 
perceptual symbol systems (Barsalou’s embodied theory) do not account for 
abstract concept representation since abstract concepts do not have 
perceivable referents. Yet, if abstract concepts are grounded in context, their 
meaning representation can be achieved while contexts frame the simulation 
and provide clear referents. More to the point, in response to the same target 
article, Charland comments that Barsalou underestimates the pivotal part 
that emotions play in embodied theories of cognition. Charland claims that 
emotions must be considered as a specialized information processing system 
in themselves with both perceptual and cognitive components.  
Studies investigating the processing of abstract concepts in text have 
revealed that they are more difficult than other concepts for participants to 
understand (Schwanenflugel, 1991). For example, behavioural 
(Schwanenflugel, 1991) and brain (Sabsevitz, Medler, Seidenberg, & Binder, 
2005) studies have demonstrated that processing times are longer for abstract 
than for concrete concepts; this has been examined by using naming and 
lexical decision tasks both for words and sentences. Furthermore, 
developmental studies show that abstract words are acquired later than 
concrete words, and brain research points out that while concrete concepts 
are processed bilaterally in the brain, right and left hemisphere, abstract 
concepts are processed unilaterally in the left hemisphere (Binder, Westbury, 
McKiernan, Possing, & Medler, 2005; Schwanenflugel, 1991). To conclude, 
insofar as brain studies have presented abstract and concrete words in 
isolation to contend that abstract concepts lack perceptual-based 
representations, this idea can be criticized; however, if abstract and concrete 
words are presented in meaningful linguistic contexts (see Schwanenflugel, 
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1991; Wiemer-Hastings and Graesser in Barsalou’s article), then, they will be 
perceptually grounded. 
All in all, understanding the processing of abstract concepts, as 
emotions are, aids to flesh out embodied theories of cognition, in general, 
and the discourse processing realm, in particular. The interest here is to 
determine the cognitive components of emotion understanding in both real 
and fictional contexts. The former contributes to a grasp of how emotions are 
interpreted in real life situations, as an exemplar of abstract concepts; the 
latter explains how emotions are interpreted in narrative-like texts. 
 
3.2. Comprehension of emotions 
The study of emotions has occupied researchers in social (e.g., 
Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 2000), cognitive (e.g., Niedenthal, Halberstadt, & 
Setterlund, 1997), and language sciences (e.g., Gernsbacher, Hallada, & 
Robertson, 1998) principally. The consensus among these research areas is 
that cognition and emotion go hand in hand and that their interaction permits 
the mind to operate on physical and social entities encountered in 
environments, mainly by using recently-evolved brain structures (i.e., frontal 
lobes) (see Damasio, 1994). 
The processing of emotions is as yet a little understood issue, but 
nonetheless there is nowadays information about emotion-appraisal processes 
both at the cognitive and at the neuroscientific level (see Lewis, 2005). Much 
of the research has been done on emotional understanding in social contexts, 
but there is still a gap in the literature reporting emotion understanding in 
fictional contexts, above all in the discourse processing realm (Groen, Syssau, 
De la Haye, & Brouillet, 2000). 
Consequently, it is important to revise the psychological mechanisms 
underpinning emotion-cognition interaction in real-based experiences and the 
cognitive processes supporting fictional-emotion-based discourse 
comprehension. In this manner, it may be possible to highlight those main 
cognitive components that sustain emotional comprehension in general, that 
is, cognitive processes sustaining emotion understanding in real and fictional 
situations. This linkage is particularly important to determine the role that 
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emotional knowledge plays in the comprehension of emotions and how that 
knowledge is grounded in perceptual experience. 
 
3.3. Emotion comprehension in real contexts  
An emotion is generally defined as: 
 
“[…] a psychological state or process that functions in the management 
of goals. It is typically elicited by evaluating an event as relevant to a 
goal; it is positive when the goal is advanced, negative when the goal 
is impeded. The core of an emotion is readiness to act in a certain way 
(Fridja, 1986); it is an urgency, or prioritization, of some goals and 
plans rather than others. Emotions can interrupt ongoing action; also 
they prioritize certain kinds of social interaction, prompting, for 
instance, cooperation or conflict” (Oatley, 1999a, p. 273; see also 
Damasio, 1994, Kneepknes & Zwaan, 1994). 
 
From this definition it is clear that emotions bias actions, namely the 
attainment of goals. However, it must be recognized that action performance 
does influence emotional processes as well. This idea has been defended 
recently by Lewis (2005) who draws upon current developments in 
neurobiology and psychology of emotions to demonstrate how emotion 
understanding follows dynamic system principles. 
Based on a dynamic cognitive system view, Lewis’s model (2005) states 
that the bidirectional interaction between emotion and cognition happens 
under self-organization principles. This principle is the chief feature in 
dynamic (or non-linear) systems models and claims that coherent wholes 
emerge and consolidate from interacting constituents. This characterization 
of cognition is consonant with embodied theories of cognition and receives 
support from several trends in psychology (see comprehensive review in Lewis 
target article; see also Karmiloff-Smith, 1994). 
The self-organizing emotional interpretation model, as Lewis refers to 
his model, involves three steps; the trigger event, the self-amplification 
phase, and self-stabilisation phase. The trigger event influences the 
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psychological system through a perceptual stimulus (e.g., winning the lottery), 
then a self-amplification process happens to activate emotional components 
(mainly neuronal wiring) that lead to the activation of other components in 
recursive cycles of increasing magnitude, with, for example, perceptual, 
emotional, and attentional processes being activated. Finally, in the self-
stabilization phase, feedback among components stabilizes the whole system 
to establish global coherence. Most germane to this process, the self-
stabilization phase enables more elaborated emotion-appraisal states through 
stabilizing coherence among working memory, planning, and attention. The 
outcome of the three steps in Lewis’s model (2005) is a coherent mental 
representation of the situation being appraised. This idea dovetails with other 
researchers who consider the construction of mental models in emotional 
reasoning as key element to reach a complete emotional evaluation of the 
situation at stake (see Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 2002). 
 
3.3.1. Memory and emotions 
It is important to note that the Lewis model of emotion comprehension 
considers memory issues as a relevant component. Particularly, he states that 
people learn cognition-emotion associations and use them for future events. 
In fact, in his review of the place of memory in emotion understanding, he 
recognizes several memory systems in charge of assisting in this task, such as 
the hippocampus, lateral prefrontal cortex, and amygdala. However, he notes 
that the orbitofrontal cortex functions as an independent working memory 
system for emotional processing.  
The important role of memory in emotion understanding is endorsed as 
well by other investigators. Niedenthal and Halberstadt (2000) review several 
behavioural studies that demonstrate that emotion binds experiences in 
memory and action, that is to say, “the experience of an emotion entails the 
activation of the appropriate emotion unit in memory. Activation then spreads 
from the central unit to the related information, thereby potentiating the use 
of those concepts in ongoing information processing” (pp. 175-176). For 
example, Niedenthal and colleagues (Niedenthal et al., 1997) employed 
lexical decision (Experiment 1 and 2) and naming tasks (Experiment 3) to 
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determine influences of emotions on visual word recognition. By employing 
music induction, emotional states such as happiness and sadness were induced. 
Participants under the effects of “sad,” “happy,” and “neutral” classical 
music made lexical decisions about letter-strings with meanings, some of 
them related to a range of emotions. Participants had facilitation of response, 
in both tasks, to words categorically related to the emotional state that was 
induced. A central conclusion gleaned from their work is that emotions 
operate as a kind of organizing theme for objects and events in the world, in 
the sense that each emotion indexes events and information that are causally 
related to it, so that emotional appraisals become associated with memories. 
In a more applied context, Kealy, Kuiper and Klein (2006) found that 
memory for emotionally charged situations, be these real or made-up, is 
subject to event valence, individual differences, and manner of event 
recalling (e.g., guided imagery vs. journaling techniques). Researchers found 
that pleasant events (either real or made-up) were perceived as more typical, 
and more probable to have happened and be true, than unpleasant events. 
However, when the participants were depressed individuals, their recall of 
unpleasant personal events was twice that recalled by non-depressed 
individuals. These results were interpreted as biased by personal emotional 
memories. On the whole, these results corroborate the notion that memory 
processes and emotional elaborations are solidly welded (for an extensive 
review see Bower & Forgas, 2000; J. P. Forgas, personal communication, 
September 11, 2006).  
 
3.3.2. Inferences and emotions 
In emotional understanding processes, planning plays a central role as a 
reasoning procedure mediating emotional appraisal (Lewis, 2005). 
Notwithstanding, planning is known as well for being accompanied by 
inferential operations (R. Parrila, personal communication, September 5, 
2006). In accord with this line of ideas, Oatley and Johnson-Laird (2002) 
demonstrate the crucial part of inferential processes in emotional 
interpretation. These authors cite research demonstrating that emotions work 
as heuristics for cognition: for goal-plan dyads there is a planning processor 
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(Oatley, 1999) that emits an “emotion signal” to the rest of the brain once an 
event that relates to the dyad occurs. In other words, emotions aid the 
selection of the most appropriate solution of several found by alternative 
methods. This selection happens at successive stages during the thinking 
process and is used in further steps. The main method for building a plan is 
through finding consistencies between the state of the world and goals. The 
cognitive tool that assists in this process is abduction, a particular sort of 
inference. By means of inferences, hypotheses based in available knowledge 
are created and enable emotions to detect inconsistencies in order to, in the 
end, build an overall mental representation of the situation. 
Similar to these ideas, Conolly and Reb (2005) review research on 
feelings of regret, expounding the idea that decision-related regret is a 
negative emotion associated with thinking about a past or future choice. The 
thinking component is characterized by comparing options pointing to what 
actually did or will take place in relation to a better alternative - 
counterfactual thinking (which entails inferencing). The authors finally link 
this thinking mode to mental simulations of the upshots that could result from 
different choice options. In sum, a major conclusion gleaned from these works 
is that inferential operations take part in processing emotionally-charged 
information. 
 
3.3.3. Situation models and emotions 
Just recently it has been emphasized that the construction of situation 
models is the final stage in emotion understanding (see Lewis, 2005; Oatley & 
Johnson-Laird, 2002). Oatley and Johnson-Laird (2002) report a series of 
experiments wherein participants (N = 157) were asked to record any thought 
that they had about a workmate. Participants were asked to perform some 
tasks in cooperation with other colleagues, and when joint errors occurred, 
participants tended to ascribe negative personality traits to each other. The 
authors interpreted these results in terms of construction of mental models of 
the other person after the detection of inconsistencies. These results show 
that people create situation models about others according to evaluations 
made on the basis of the ongoing event where participants interact. Once 
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again, Oatley and Johnson-Laird’s work highlights how related cognition and 
emotion are and how relevant is the construction of situation models in social 
construction of emotions (see Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 2000).  
In a more practical vein, Feeney (2005) asked participants (N = 224), 
who were couples, to provide retrospective accounts of an experience of 
being hurt by a romantic partner, and their emotional reactions (Study 1). 
Their accounts were judged by experts who concluded that most hurtful 
events involved relational transgressions that indicate a deterioration of the 
relationship by threatening mutual positive mental models. Once again, the 
construction of mental models seems to play a relevant role in emotional 
interpretations.  
If emotional mental models are built through inferential processes – 
abduction -, as Oatley and Johnson-Laird (2002) argue, then planning must be 
affected somehow. This idea is has been supported by Johnson-Laird and 
Oatley (2000), who present research demonstrating that counterfactual 
thinking emerges when expected goals are not accomplished. For instance, 
when someone has to be punctual for an appointment and something impedes 
the occurrence of the meeting, the person creates two states of affairs: “if I 
had woken earlier, then I wouldn’t get there late.” This is the counterfactual 
version of the original fact “I woke up late and I got there late.” The authors 
suggest that this way of reasoning is a way to learn from mistakes (imagine 
the emotional state of the person if the appointment was with her partner!) 
and correct plans that did not work. This entails the idea that the conscious 
evaluation done on social situations refers inevitably to mental models of the 
self or others (Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 2000). 
 
3.3.4. Embodied theories and emotions 
Emotions, as an exemplar of abstract concepts, are usually recognized 
as concepts that are not grounded in perception and action, in other words, 
they do not activate perceptually based representations (see Sabsevitz et al., 
2005). However, research conducted by Clark, Bradshaw, Field, Hampson, & 
Rose (2005) demonstrates that sensory-motor interactions with the 
environment do influence the construction of emotional concepts and that the 
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interpretation of emotions also depends on the contextual properties that go 
together with them. Clark et al. examined whether people can identify the 
emotional content of behaviour from bodily postures and movements using 
point-light displays1 where pair of actors were engaged in interpersonal 
communication. Participants viewed brief clips of the point-light displays 
presented the right way up and upside down (Experiment 1). Participants had 
to rate the emotional content of the displays by moving a slider along a 
horizontal scale. Sadness, anger, joy, disgust, fear, and romantic love were 
among the emotions included – all the emotions were rated for every clip.  
Results of this first experiment showed that participants identified 
correctly the emotion implied in each upright-clip. Performance diminished 
when identifying the emotions for the inverted displays. In a second 
experiment, researchers presented only upright versions of the original dyads, 
a single actor, and a dyad composed of a single actor and his/her mirror 
image. Results still reflected that participants were able to recognize the 
implied emotions, though their performance was poor for the second and 
third condition. Clark et al. concluded that biological motion is sufficient for 
the perception of emotion, even when inverted displays reduced performance. 
The authors also claimed that emotion perception can be affected by the 
verisimilitude of social contexts within the displays. 
A test of emotional attribution using static images also corroborates 
that even through the perception of simple images, people can distinguish 
social qualities, particularly emotional states. Pavlova, Sokolov, and Sokolov 
(2005) asked participants to estimate the instability of geometric shapes 
rotated in 15° steps in the image plane, and then rate the intensity of basic 
emotions that could be assigned to the figures. Results showed that when 
figures were deviated from vertical orientation, negative emotions were 
                                         
1 Point-light displays are video sequences of body motions. People or actors (as in this 
research) wear markers (points of light) that are especially designed to be registered by a 
motion capture analysis system. These markers are attached to body parts relevant to 
evidence broad body movements, for example, ankles, forehead, hips, elbows, and the like. 
Body movements are recorded and then transferred into a computer for future presentation 
through a monitor. Examples of this interesting research can be found at 
http://www.perceptionweb.com/misc/p5203.  
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attributed to them, that is, there was a positive correlation between 
perceived instability and negative emotions. Instead, positive emotions were 
attributed to figures when they suggested more steadiness. The authors claim 
to have demonstrated for the first time that the dynamics conveyed by static 
images can support specific emotional attributions.  Most importantly, these 
results resonate with frameworks that claim that neural networks for 
production of movements and understanding the dispositions of others are 
inextricably bonded. In tandem, these studies provide evidence that emotions 
are grounded in perception and that stored internal representations of 
emotions assist in the understanding of the emotional states that accompany 
personal interactions by interpreting both verbal and non-verbal cues.  
Furthermore, the neurology of emotions indicates an association 
between brain areas involved in the perception and interpretation of bodily 
movements and emotional processing. For instance, Pavlova et al. (2005) 
acknowledge that disorders of the mirror-neuron system, the system that links 
production of body movements and perception localized in the premotor 
cortex and inferior parietal cortex, are associated with social impairments 
that result from a lack of understanding of the emotional states of others. 
Also, the insula appears to play a pivotal role in emotion processing through 
its connections with the cortical areas that represent action within the limbic 
system. This area is considered as crucial for processing somatosensory 
information involved in emotion interpretation (Lewis, 2005; Niedenthal, 
Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005; Pavlova et al., 2005). 
These brain studies show that sensory-motor responses are involved in 
emotional understanding and that there are specific brain areas whose task is 
to integrate emotion, cognition and action. 
Recently, in a thorough review of embodied theories of emotional 
understanding, Niedenthal et al. (2005) favoured an embodied approach to 
ground abstract concepts, such as emotions, in perception. According to these 
investigators, social information processing involves embodiment, where 
embodiment implies actual bodily states (on-line cognition) and simulation of 
experience (off-line cognition) in the brain’s modality-specific systems for 
perception, action, and introspection. After reviewing empirical research 
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done on social psychology and similar embodied theories, the authors recast 
an embodied framework to explain social information processing. The authors 
conclude that Barsalou’s (1999) Perceptual Symbols Systems (PSS) was the 
most suitable theory to explain the central phenomena in social cognition, 
such as attitudes (their acquisition and processing), social perception 
(mimicry and imitation, category priming and motor responding), and 
emotions. 
Niedenthal et al.’s (2005) revised version of the PSS provides 
neurological and psychological foundations regarding social information 
processing in on-line and off-line cognition. Among the new features of the 
PSS are: i) specific neuroscientific models that account for emotional 
comprehension, such as the theory of convergence zones, ii) re-enactments 
(or simulation) of modality-specific states, that is, brain areas in charge of 
processing specific information (concepts or simulators in PSS jargon) activate 
without any input from the original stimulus, and iii) a distinction between 
shallow (word-level representations) and deep processing (simulations), in 
which conceptual processing is flexible, and people do not necessarily need to 
employ simulation at all times since informational properties determine the 
better processing strategy to be used, either shallow or deep (see also Craik & 
Lockhart, 1972; Craik & Tulving, 1975). 
Finally, based on the reviewed empirical data, Niedenthal et al. (2005) 
emphasize simulation as the core process for a PSS approach to social 
information processing. The authors argue that evidence from modality 
switching costs, instructional equivalence, and perceptual effort support 
simulation as a necessary step for conceptual processing. Evidence from 
modality switching tasks indicates that that there is a switching cost when 
participants are asked to verify properties in different modalities. For 
example, if participants process concepts that require simulation in one 
modality (e.g., LEMON-sour, which involves gustatory simulation), and then 
they are asked to verify properties of a second concept which entails a 
different modality (e.g., BLENDER-loud, which requires an auditory 
simulation), verification times are slower than when people verify a second 
concept that implies the same modality as the first concept. 
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The evidence from the instructional equivalence data indicates that 
comprehension engages perceptual simulation by default. Researchers found 
similar results when participants were asked to list properties of certain 
concepts regardless of whether they were explicitly instructed to engage in 
simulation or not. These results suggest that the instruction to simulate 
concepts does not affect processing because people engage in simulation 
naturally. Finally, the evidence from perceptual effort studies indicates that 
simulation involves a perceptual effort since this must have perceptual 
properties. A clear example of this assumption was provided previously 
through Borghi et al.’s (2004) experiment when discourse processing matters 
were tackled. Recall that in their experiments, participants were asked to 
verify if a property was true of a concept, for example “gear” in “you are 
driving car”, vs. “gear” in “you are fuelling a car.” Researchers found faster 
response times for the former situation since a spatial simulation of driving a 
car affords easier perceptual access to elements that are part of that spatial 
focus. 
To sum up, it seems evident that emotion processing in real contexts 
demands the use of memory resources, and inferential and simulation 
processes. Most importantly, emotional information processing requires from 
people the use of events appraisal rooted in sensory-motor experiences with 
the context in which they took place. It seems plausible then to sustain the 
argument that emotion understanding in real contexts does require the use of 
similar cognitive systems employed in language comprehension, and that the 
use of experience-based knowledge plays a central role in this process. 
3.5. Emotion comprehension in fictional contexts  
The study of emotional comprehension in fictional situations has only 
recently begun to be researched in the discourse processing literature. As 
such, there is only a small number of studies that can be reviewed.  Because 
most of the research on fictional emotional understanding indicates that 
memory, inferencing, and situation modelling issues are interwoven, these 
issues are treated together in this section. The pioneering studies in 
emotional comprehension in texts were carried out by Gernsbacher and 
colleagues (Gernsbacher et al., 1998; Gernsbacher, Goldsmith, & Robertson, 
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1992). Gernsbacher’s main findings indicate that readers build an on-line 
representation of the emotional states of fictional characters, and that this 
inferencing process (or knowledge activation) comes about in a relatively 
automatic manner during the reading of narratives. For instance, in her 
classical experiment, Gernsbacher et al. (1992) asked participants to read 24 
experimental stories (each of them tackling a different emotional state) plus 
24 filler stories (stories emotionally neutral). After each of the emotional 
stories, participants read a target sentence that contained either matching or 
mismatching emotion words (Experiment 1). The following is one of the 
stories used by the investigators: 
 
Paul had always wanted his brother, Luke, to be good in baseball. So Paul had 
been coaching Luke after school for almost two years. In the beginning, Luke’s 
skills were very rough. But after hours and hours of coaching, Paul could see great 
improvement. In fact, the improvement had been so great that at the end of the 
season, at the Little League Awards Banquet, Luke’s name was called out to 
receive the Most Valuable Player Award. 
 
The stories were presented sentence by sentence in the centre of a computer 
screen and participants had to press a key to ask for the next sentence. In the 
emotion matching condition the target sentence for the example story was: “It 
would be weeks before Paul’s pride would subside.” The mismatching 
condition was: “It would be weeks before Paul’s guilt would subside.” The 
final target sentence was preceded by either the words “please continue the 
story,” which invited participants to write down a suitable continuation for 
the story, or “short wait,” which announced that the target sentence was 
about to appear on the screen. 
The authors measured reading time for the target sentence. 
Gernsbacher et al. hypothesised that if readers build a rich situation model 
which includes information about characters’ emotional states, then target 
sentences that contain a matching emotional state would be read faster than 
target sentences that contain a mismatching emotional state. This was 
precisely the result that the researchers found in this first experiment. 
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Later, these initial findings were extended by de Vega and colleagues 
(de Vega, Díaz, & León, 1997; de Vega, León, & Díaz, 1996; León & Hernández, 
1998) who found that readers construct updatable situation models of 
characters’ emotions and these representations remain accessible beyond the 
local context. Also, these authors found that readers can discriminate 
between characters’ and their own beliefs about an emotional narrative 
situation. In a series of experiments, de Vega et al. (1996) tested if emotional 
representations may contribute to overcoming narrative incoherencies and 
ambiguities. They manipulated incoherencies by removing explicit emotional 
labels (Experiment 2) and including characters’ external behaviours that could 
be interpreted as emotional reactions consistent or inconsistent with the 
situations depicted in the antecedent context (Experiment 3). de Vega et al. 
found that even when local context does not provide any emotional clue, 
readers’ representation of the emotion activated by the first part of the story 
is kept accessible in memory. To put it simply, the emotion primed by the 
initial narrative context persists even when following information is 
emotionally neutral.  
In Experiment 3 emotional labels were replaced with sentences that 
mirrored implicitly the main character’s emotional state. The results of this 
experiment produced further ideas with respect to emotion understanding. 
The researchers (de Vega et al., 1996) concluded that readers track emotions 
even in the absence of explicit emotional labels, thus discarding the idea that 
emotional representation is a lexical-based process used only when readers 
meet emotional labels. As regards the main character’s actions and reactions 
emotionally appropriate to the situation, de Vega et al. claimed that 
emotional representation is constructed and updated according to whether 
those reactions and actions are congruent or not with the general emotional 
situation.  
In another set of experiments de Vega et al. (1997) explored the 
temporal course of mental perspective taking in narratives (Experiments 4, 5, 
and 6). The texts used followed this structure: i) an early bias context, ii) an 
information sentence, iii) late bias context, iv) filler sentence, v) neutral 
sentence, vi) target word or sentence, vii) end of the story. The first part 
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introduced a situation favouring an emotional state in an implicit fashion, for 
example, sympathetic. The information sentence provided (informed) or not 
(ignorant) the main character with information about a following critical 
event. The late bias context was a sentence that contradicted the early 
biased emotion. The filler and neutral sentence had the purpose of continuing 
the passage. The target word or sentence then included an explicit emotional 
word that matched the early bias context. Finally, there was a wrap-up 
sentence. Below is an example of one of the texts used by the researchers: 
 
Carmen had an appointment at 10 with Carlos, her boyfriend, in the cafeteria 
where they usually meet. It was 10 and Carlos hadn’t arrived yet. She realized 
that she would probably have to wait for him for a long time. Lately, he was so 
inundated with work that she didn’t want to put pressure on him even more (i) 
(biased emotion = sympathetic) 
In any case, Carmen decided to call him at home. Carlos’ brother answered the 
phone and told her (informed condition) / but he didn’t tell her that (ignorant 
condition) (ii) 
Carlos and his friends were totally engrossed in a poker match (iii) 
When she went back to the bar, (iv) 
Carmen was thinking of her boyfriend (v) 
***SYMPATHETIC***  (vi) (the target word always matched the early biased 
emotion) 
She got her bag and took out a packet of cigarettes (vii) 
 
The researchers (de Vega et al., 1997) wanted to determine if the time course 
of emotional inferences was automatic (forward inferences) or not (backward 
inferences). The dependent variable was naming time for the target word. 
The independent variable was the condition of informed or ignorant 
protagonist. It was hypothesised that if there is an informed protagonist, then 
his or her perspective would be updated forward in an automatic manner. 
Under this situation naming latencies were expected to be faster for the 
informed condition versus the ignorant condition.  
In so doing, de Vega et al. (1997) employed a naming task which, 
according to the authors, is a direct activation measure and sensitive to 
forward inferences. The results showed that, despite target presentations 
times (SOA or Stimulus Onset Asynchrony) being extremely varied between the 
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target and the preceding sentence or word (e.g., 250ms vs 1050ms), the 
naming task did not show any significant difference between the conditions 
(Experiments 4 and 5). Even using a cross-modal naming task, where the story 
was presented auditorily over headphones and the target word visually on a 
screen, and with different time intervals, there was no evidence 
demonstrating that readers produce emotional forward inferences 
(Experiment 6). It was concluded that emotional inferences are made when 
readers reach the end of the narrative, particularly an emotional label. The 
results were consistent with the idea that the emotional representation is 
updated using backward emotional inferences and not forward emotional 
inferences. 
Recently, Gygax and colleagues (Gygax, Garnham, & Oakhill, 2004; 
Gygax, Oakhill, & Garnham, 2003) reported results that complement the 
studies of de Vega et al. and Gernsbacher et al. Specifically, their main 
argument is that emotional inferences about characters in texts are not as 
specific as proposed by previous work. Instead, emotional inferencing is 
generally done by grouping together emotional labels that are synonymous 
and similar to the overall evoked emotional state. In one of their experiments 
(Experiment 2), Gygax et al. (2003) gathered reading times for target carrier 
sentences including emotional labels that matched (e.g., depressed), were 
synonyms (e.g., miserable), were similar to (e.g., useless), or mismatched 
(e.g., happy) with the implied emotional states presented in the stories. Their 
results showed no significant differences in reading times among the matching, 
matching synonym, and matching similar conditions. Instead, significant 
differences were evident between the matching conditions and other 
mismatching emotional words for which the valence was the opposite to the 
implied emotional state. 
In a further series of experiments, Gygax et al. (2004) composed 
extended versions of the stories used in their previous experiments. The 
stories, originally used by Gernsbacher et al. (1992), were elaborated by 
adding contextual information that enhanced a specific emotional state 
(Experiments 1 and 2). The results of these experiments demonstrated that by 
lengthening the stories participants chose only a particular set of emotional 
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labels for every story. However, this was true when the task was off-line, that 
is, by asking participants to judge the stories and select from a list of 
emotional labels those that best fitted the implied emotional state for every 
passage. When reading times were taken (Experiment 2), the modified stories 
with extra contextual information did not show any effect on emotional words 
that were similar, synonym, or matched with the overall emotional state of 
the stories. This pattern of results was found for a second time even when the 
stories were altered by including ambiguous sentences at the beginning of 
every passage (Experiments 3 and 4). Despite these results, the authors stated 
that “[…] the conclusion that readers do not infer specific emotions would 
have to be revisited.” (p. 633), and that future research should examine the 
semantic elements required for readers to assign specific emotional states to 
stories. The experiments designed for the present thesis, particularly the 
episodic recognition task (see next chapter), may cast further light on this 
issue. 
 
3.5.1. The role of text features in characters’ emotion comprehension 
The comprehension of characters’ emotions can be achieved not only 
by the use of experience-based knowledge but also by the text features that 
enhance them (see Greimas & Fontanille, 1991/1994). This is a matter that 
has been overlooked in current discourse research. However, recently some 
work has emerged to demonstrate the value of linguistic devices in the 
facilitation of narrative comprehension. 
So far, in this thesis the emphasis has been on the cognitive processes 
that readers employ when comprehending texts. However the features of the 
text also influence how readers grasp what is referred to in the narratives. 
Bortolussi and Dixon (2003; Dixon & Bortolussi, 2001) carried out several 
experiments to determine the influence of text features in readers’ mental 
constructions. They referred to this research program as textual experiments. 
One of their main findings was the distinction between readers’ constructions 
and those text features that enable readers to engage with the events and 
plots of the stories, for instance literary devices. The linguistic devices found 
to aid readers in comprehending narrative rank from text coherence and 
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cohesion to content and plausibility of the narrated events. Most germane is 
that by means of using literary devices such as suspense or presence of 
characters’ emotions for example, readers can build more detailed perceptual 
information about the events and fictional scenarios in narratives, since 
textual features permit perceptually salient descriptions.  
The influence of text manipulations and features on readers’ situation 
models of the stories’ plot has been recognized as a research program in itself 
(see Haberlandt, 1981). Nevertheless, the scope here is only to emphasise the 
idea that the construction of a situation model by the reader can be altered 
according to the linguistic devices used to portray the content of the 
narrative. Indeed, it is argued that the study of text comprehension has 
developed “mini-theories” for specific components that in fact are tangled 
and interact with one another (Rapp & van den Broek, 2005). Therefore a 
proper research program in text comprehension must consider both readers’ 
cognitive processes and text features to build a comprehensive explanation of 
the mechanics of reading. 
The ideas mentioned above emphasize the influence of text features on 
text comprehension in general. However, some work has been developed as to 
the comprehension of the emotional dimension in narrative texts exclusively. 
Zwaan and colleagues (Dijkstra, Zwaan, Graesser, & Magliano, 1994; 
Kneepkens & Zwaan, 1994) tested the influence of specific stories’ aspects 
both on readers’ and characters’ emotions. Employing multiple regression 
analyses, Zwaan and colleagues (Dijkstra et al., 1994) determined the impact 
of story aspects on characters’ emotions and suspense as well as the effects 
of character emotions and suspense on reading times. One of the main 
features of their research is that they used eight original literary stories 
written by recognized authors and different literary epochs. The stories were 
around 8 to 10 book pages in length.  
In their experiments, stories were analysed by judges according to the 
presence of characters’ emotions, suspense, imaginative sentences, pragmatic 
intent, described activities in a given segment, the use of literary devices, 
attribution of information to the outcome of the story, plausibility, the 
amount of dialogue among characters, and coherence of some passages. Every 
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variable was clearly defined and rated on a four-point scale. The main result 
was that characters’ emotions and suspense were enhanced via text features. 
In the same research, the authors summarize previous research conducted to 
measure reading times for the same stories when these yielded suspense or 
characters’ emotions. Longer reading times were found for the first condition 
(suspense) than for the second condition (characters’ emotions). The 
researchers explained these results arguing that readers count on extensive 
knowledge about human emotions and thanks to that they can be updated 
easily. Zwaan and colleagues complemented this explanation, also affirming 
that a thorough narrative comprehension requires the reader to track 
characters’ goals and emotional states and that, given certain text features 
(e.g., suspense, literary devices, etc.), this processes can be impeded or 
facilitated. These ideas have been demonstrated also for readers’ feelings 
toward the structure and content of narratives (Hoeken & van Vliet, 2000) and 
particularly when the texts used in experiments resemble literary stories 
(Miall & Kuiken, 2001). 
From a psycholinguistic point of view, it is also speculated that 
emotional representation in texts may assist in resolving narrative ambiguities 
and inconsistencies in order to bring global coherence. In this respect Miall 
(1989, as cited in de Vega et al., 1996) holds that “the reader’s sensitivity to 
the protagonist’s affective states can contribute to giving unity to different 
episodes that, otherwise, may appear less coherent” (p. 306). Experiments 2 
and 3 of de Vega et al. (1996) described earlier, were designed to determine 
whether readers keep their emotional representations accessible for global 
coherence; however, as these authors affirm, global coherence establishment 
is a topic in discourse processing that needs extra investigation. This idea 
receives support also from neuropsychological work. Hamann (2001) shows 
that the enhancement of emotional memories engages specific cognitive and 
neural mechanisms. Particularly, the amygdala is in charge of encoding, 
consolidating, and retrieval of emotional stimuli. This determines then that 
the initial memory representation for emotional appraisals is used when an 
analogous emotional situation is encountered, and then this memory serves as 
a rule to appraise new incoming emotional information. This notion also 
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matches with what Lewis (2005) called the self-stabilization phase, in that an 
emotional appraisal process finally seeks to establish global coherence. Hence, 
from a psycholinguistic and neuropsychological realm it can be deduced that 
emotional memories already stored as episodic memories contribute to 
overcoming inconsistencies in incoming emotional stimuli. This is particularly 
important when the texts present incongruities that can affect their 
comprehension either at a local or global level. 
In sum, text features do influence readers’ mental representations and 
reiterate the crucial role that linguistic knowledge (e.g., experience with 
texts) has on constructing a situation model of the situations referred to in 
the narratives. In particular, it is important to determine whether the search 
for global coherence is a process that operates not only in real situations but 
also in fictional situations. By answering this question a more complete 
explanation of how characters’ emotions in narratives are understood can be 
achieved. 
 
3.5.2. The influence of embodied frameworks in discourse processing. The 
case of emotions. 
Recently some researchers have started to pay attention to the 
processing of emotions in language comprehension from an embodied point of 
view. The main prediction of these studies is the contention that symbols used 
by language reach meaning through linking them to perceptual properties. For 
example, Glenberg, Havas, Becker, & Rinck (2005) asked participants to hold 
a pen in their teeth or their lips while reading sentences describing pleasant 
or unpleasant situations (e.g., you and your lover embrace after a long 
separation / the police car rapidly pulls up behind you, siren blaring). The 
authors predicted that readers holding a pen in their teeth (which forced a 
partial smile) would read pleasant events faster than unpleasant events, and 
when participants held the pen in their lips (which forced a partial frown) 
they would show faster reading times for unpleasant situations than for 
pleasant situations. The data from their experiments supported these 
predictions. Based on an embodiment framework, Glenberg et al. argued that 
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language about situations that elicit emotions may be grounded in bodily 
states which, in turn, are reflected in behavioural features.  
In further experiments, Havas and colleagues (Havas, Glenberg, & Rinck, 
in press), used a lexical decision task to determine to what linguistic extent 
simulation is employed when processing emotional words. Participants held a 
pen either in their teeth or in their lips while reading pairs of words. For one 
of their experiments (Experiment 3a) the pair consisted of two types of prime 
words (neutral or associated word) and two types of target words (word or 
non-word) (e.g., associate-nonword combination = kiss-bermace or associate-
word = embrace-kiss). The target words used for this experiment were taken 
from the sentences used in the experiment described previously, and the 
nonwords were constructed by transposing the letters of the target words. In 
their other experiment (Experiment 3b) target words were strongly valenced 
positive or negative words taken from a word database. The authors predicted 
that readers would show faster response times for word targets preceded by 
associated primes than when preceded by neutral primes. Also, it was 
predicted that the pen conditions would prime emotion-congruent targets 
reflecting in faster RTs both in the associated word prime and neutral word 
prime conditions. 
Previous studies using brain imagery have shown that action words 
referring to face, arm, or leg action (e.g., to lick, pick, or kick) activate areas 
along the motor cortex that either are contiguous with or coincide with brain 
areas activated by real movements of those body parts (Hauk, Johnsrude, & 
Pulvermüller, 2004). Based on these results, Havas et al. (in press) expected a 
pen-to-word priming. However, contrary to those results and their predictions, 
the investigators found that there was a word-to-word priming but not pen-to-
word priming. Based on these findings, these researchers concluded that 
emotion simulation may affect language beyond the lexical level, and that 
this process operates during the comprehension of phrases or sentences. Their 
strong conclusion asserts that “different neural and bodily systems can affect 
simulation at different levels of language processing. Thus, action systems 
appear to affect processing at both the lexical and sentential levels, whereas 
simulation using emotional systems is predominantly a sentence or phrase-
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level phenomenon.” (p.12). Not only does this conclusion point out that 
simulation processes, or comprehension in general, are enhanced through 
meaningful linguistic units (such as texts), but also that emotionally-charged 
information processing requires a particular approach. 
Even though these results are consistent with embodied theories of 
language processing, they do it accordingly to the linguistic unit used in their 
experiments and the research questions in themselves. The study by Glenberg 
et al. (2005) and Havas et al. (in press) aimed to determine the effects of 
participants’ emotional states on language processing, using words or 
sentences as their main linguistic unit. Also, their tasks compelled 
participants to perform actual actions instead of requiring a solely mental 
simulation. 
Recently an interesting work from a neuropsychological framework has 
offered complementary results as to the mental processes carried out when 
understanding fictional emotions. Ferstl, Rinck, and von Cramon (2005) 
mapped the neural activity of participants (N = 18) while they listened to 32 
short stories of seven sentences each. Half of the stories contained globally 
inconsistent information. The inconsistencies were with respect to temporal 
or emotional events that affected the protagonist. The inconsistencies were 
determined by a target word, which was placed in the penultimate sentence, 
depicting either the emotional state of the character or mentioning 
information about a temporal sequence. Participants were asked to carefully 
look for any inconsistency regarding the content of the stories. Participants 
did so by pressing a “good” (consistent) or a “bad” (inconsistent) button after 
every story ended. Neuropsychological data showed that the integration of 
inconsistent emotional situations activated the dorsal frontomedial cortex, 
while the processing of inconsistent chronological situations engaged the 
lateral prefrontal cortex in both hemispheres. Based on such results the 
authors concluded that i) listening to stories requires content-specific 
processes, ii) that the updating of a situation model is a process that entails 
several components, iii) that situation model building depends on particular 
requirements of the texts, and iv) that not only the right hemisphere 
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intervenes in language processing in context, but so do the left medial and 
bilateral prefrontal cortices.  
The results of this work are not explained from an embodied framework, 
but nonetheless they are consistent with notions offered by the 
neuropsychology of narrative (Mar, 2004) and revised versions of embodied 
theories (Niedenthal et al., 2005). In particular, the processing of different 
narrative dimensions requires specific cognitive and neural processes which, 
in turn, are guided by the kind of concepts underlying them. Also, the authors 
highlight the role that text properties play in the updating of the situation 
model. This appears logical if it is recalled that not only experience-based 
knowledge influences the situation model construction, but also the linguistic 
devices used to express what is referred to in the text. 
The studies described in this section reveal interesting information 
about the relationship between emotion and language. However, as the 
researchers in this arena emphasize, further investigation is required to 
understand, for example, i) how simulation works for emotion comprehension, 
and ii) how language affects emotion processing, particularly, in narrative 
texts. More interesting is to note that these recent studies implicitly 
underscore that the main components for text comprehension match with 
those already proposed in previous chapters, namely, memory systems, 
inferential processes (or integration), and simulation (or elaborative 
processes).  
Also, an evident pattern in current research is that researchers 
emphasize the simulation process as an essential component of 
comprehension. This is true if it is assumed that a simulated mental model is 
governed by rules of coherence more than of truth, meaning that emergent 
properties arise as long as the simulation system links up fundamental 
elements. That is, without interrelating these elements understanding cannot 
be extracted (Oatley, 1999). In other words, it is viable to think of the 
simulation process as the last part of the comprehension process in that all 
the necessary memory processes and inferential elaborations have been 
performed to feed the final embodied situation model. However, recall that 
those readers’ mental representations are affected by the particular 
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requirements of the texts, particularly, the sort of linguistic devices 
supporting the events in any narrative dimension (e.g., emotional, spatial, 
temporal). 
3.6. Chapter summary and conclusions 
Several experiments have investigated how concrete concepts such as 
actions, space, and objects are mentally simulated during language 
comprehension (e.g., de Vega, Glenberg, and Zwaan’s works); however few 
studies have been devised to explain the processing of abstract concepts, 
especially emotions. Recent experiments have tapped the processing of 
emotions from an embodiment framework, but they did not require from 
participants a pure mental simulation (e.g., the experiments of Glenberg et 
al., 2005; and Havas et al., in press). As those studies were aimed to test how 
embodied theories of cognition account for language processing in general, 
their assertions need to be tested for narrative text comprehension in 
particular.  
Previous studies on the comprehension of emotions in narratives have 
advanced knowledge about how an emotional situation model is built via the 
reader’s cognitive processes (e.g., Gernsbacher, de Vega and Gygax’s work), 
but recent advances in cognitive science, particularly embodied theories of 
cognition, have not been explicitly proposed to explain this phenomenon. A 
last factor has to do with the strong emphasis of the embodied framework to 
explain language processing in general, and an underestimation of the role 
that language-based components play in the formation of a situation model. 
This is true particularly for the understanding of narrative texts wherein 
experience-based knowledge and text features are crucial for the 
construction of a situation model. 
Therefore, it is important to test how embodied theories of cognition 
explain the comprehension of narrative texts. A current challenge for the 
embodiment framework is to explain how abstract concepts are processed. 
Then, by investigating how abstract concepts are processed in narratives from 
an embodiment framework, not only is empirical evidence collected as to 
what extent those theories contribute to text comprehension, but also, as to 
how abstract concepts are understood in narratives, such as characters’ 
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emotions. As shown in the preceding review, the comprehension of emotions 
is a matter that deserves more study in the area of text comprehension, in 
particular, but also in the area of embodied theories of cognition, in general. 
Havas et al. (in press) asked in their research how participants’ 
emotional states affect language processing. The central question of the 
present work recasts that question specifically for narrative comprehension: 
how do linguistic and generic knowledge influence the understanding of 
characters’ emotional states? Also, it has been argued that emotion simulation 
goes beyond the lexical level, therefore if more meaningful linguistic units are 
employed then simulation could be readily captured. Reliable tools to do so 
are texts since they elicit fictional emotions. Finally, if participants are to 
perform mental simulations rather than physical simulations, it could be 
considered as a proper simulation task to understand emotions in fictional 
contexts, which is in fact the way readers understand texts. 
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Chapter 4: Experiment 1. Introduction and method 
4.1 Introduction 
The aim of the present study is to determine the extent to which the 
comprehension of characters’ emotional states is influenced by sensory-motor 
knowledge and linguistic knowledge provided in the narratives. As explained 
in previous chapters, this work assumes a flexible processing order among 
these components: generic knowledge and linguistic knowledge must be used 
to process the linguistic input, then, through inferential processes, implicit 
information becomes available, and finally, an embodied situation model is 
built through simulation. 
The experiment consists of a reading situation in which the congruence of a 
final critical sentence was manipulated in relation to both the emotional and 
action-based content. The emotional content could either be consistent (E+) 
or not (E-) with the emotion implied in the body of the text, and the action 
component was either physically possible (A+) or not (A-).  Thus, there were 
four experimental variations of the critical sentence as follows:  
- E+ A+: In this condition, two simultaneous actions are referred to, one 
being the performance of an actual sensory-motor action and the 
other being a mental plan for an action using the same sensory-motor 
system. In addition, two emotional adjectives qualifying an action and 
an object in the critical sentence both matched the overall emotional 
state implied in the passage (condition 1 or emotion-matching and 
action-matching). 
- E- A+: in this condition, two simultaneous actions are referred to, one 
being the performance of an actual sensory-motor action and the 
other being a mental plan for an action using the same sensory-motor 
system. In addition, two emotional adjectives qualifying an action and 
an object in the critical sentence both mismatched the overall 
emotional state implied in the passage (condition 2 or emotion-
mismatching and action-matching), 
- E+ A-: in this condition, two simultaneous actions are referred to, 
both implying the same sensory-motor systems. In addition, two 
emotional adjectives qualifying an action and an object in the critical 
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sentence both matched the overall emotional state implied in the 
passage (condition 3 or emotion-matching and action-mismatching), 
- E- A-: in this condition, two simultaneous actions are referred to, 
both implying the same sensory-motor systems. In addition, two 
emotional adjectives qualifying the action and the object in the 
critical sentence both mismatched the overall emotional state implied 
in the passage (condition 4 or emotion-mismatching and action-
mismatching), 
The effect of manipulating the emotional and action based content of the 
final sentence of each passage was then investigated using three probe tasks.  
The first was an on-line naming task, which was integrated with the reading 
task, in which participants named aloud an emotional adjective that matched 
the implied emotional content of the passage. After completing the 
reading/naming task two off-line memory tasks, lexical decision and episodic 
recognition, were used to probe the potential effect of the sentence 
manipulations on the lexical and episodic memory traces for the emotional 
words named in each of the passages. Participants’ response times served as 
the dependent variable for the naming task, while both response time and 
error data were dependent variables in the lexical decision and episodic 
recognition tasks.   
 
4.1.1. Naming task 
The first task used to investigate the effect of emotional and 
action/embodiment congruency on emotional label naming was the naming 
task. This task was chosen because it is considered a direct activation 
measure, sensitive to forward inferences (de Vega et al., 1997). Therefore, it 
is a suitable task to account for automatic processes, i.e., this task taps 
readers’ performances that are fast, do not require attention, are unconscious, 
and unavoidable. If there is any significant difference in the RTs among the 
four main conditions (see Table 1), then it could be assumed that the 
comprehension of emotions in narratives is done using emotional forward 
inferences and that either emotional adjective matching and/or 
action/embodiment matching must be present to achieve this. 
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Experimental evidence (de Vega et al., 1997) has shown that after 
manipulating several SOA (Stimulus Onset Asynchrony) conditions in naming 
tasks, an absence of forward emotional inferences was determined. Instead, 
the evidence suggested that emotional inferences update information 
backward. Then, if there are no significant differences in the RT among the 
four experimental conditions, it could support the idea that fictional emotion 
comprehension is done through backward inferences once all the linguistic 
input is processed, that it is not an automatic process, and that a post-lexical 
process is needed for a semantic integration of the text (see de Vega et al., 
1997). A contrary position would be that emotional processing is an automatic 
process and that certain conditions, according to the conditions that show 
faster or slower response times (RTs), had an effect. 
 
4.1.2. Lexical decision task 
The second task used to investigate the effect of emotional words 
related to every condition on semantic memory was the lexical decision task. 
This task was chosen because it is assumed to tap how quickly people classify 
stimuli as words or nonwords and determine for which words people have 
built a stronger mental representation. 
In this task half of the words were nonwords and the other half words. 
Half of the words were the emotional labels and the other half mental states. 
Mental states words were used since they i) are also considered abstract 
concepts, and ii) they appear frequently in narratives, either explicitly or 
implicitly. 
Previous research done on the processing of abstract vs. concrete 
concepts (e.g., Schwanenflugel, 1991), and particularly the processing of 
emotional concepts (e.g., Gernsbacher et al., 1992) has indicated that, 
seemingly, naming and lexical decision tasks are reliable methods to capture 
these processes. These same authors argue that lexical decision tasks can 
account for conceptual priming and that they assesses stimulus encoding and 
post-access decision processes, whereas the naming task is considered a more 
fine-grained indicator of word recognition (Schwanenflugel, 1991). 
Furthermore, research in this arena has stated (Niedenthal et al., 1997) that 
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future research should cover both automatic and controlled processes in 
emotion-related phenomena. It is plausible to consider that a naming task 
would account for automatic processes and that the lexical decision task 
would tap controlled ones. In particular, the lexical decision task would tap 
any residual effect that the prior processing of the experimental items in the 
reading task has had on subsequent lexical access to these words in lexical 
decision-making.  
 
4.1.3. Episodic recognition task 
The third task used in this experiment was an episodic recognition task. 
This task was used in order to investigate if readers assign a specific mental 
representation for those emotional labels with which preceding context was 
coherent (i.e., E+A+, E-A+) over those for which was not the case (i.e., E+A-, 
E-A-). 
The task consisted of the emotional words that had appeared in the 
reading task as well as a set of emotional words that had not been seen 
previously. In episodic recognition participants are asked to indicate which of 
the items appeared previously in the reading task. 
 
4.1.4. Hypotheses and analyses 
A sequence of five planned comparisons was used to investigate the 
effect of the emotional and action based manipulations for each task. These 
comparisons comprise a) the comparison of the situations that were totally 
coherent against totally incoherent, b) then situations where only actions 
were manipulated, and c) situations where only emotional adjectives were 
altered: 
a) The first comparison was an overall one which sought to check 
whether experience-based knowledge and/or language-based knowledge are 
necessary conditions for comprehension. Under this condition E+A+ vs. E-A- 
were compared.  
b) In order to index the impact of manipulating the action content of 
the critical sentence while the emotional component was held constant, 
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conditions E+A+ vs. E+ A- were compared. The comparison E-A+ vs. E-A- was 
performed in order to check this situation under an extreme incongruent case. 
c) In order to index the effect of manipulating the emotional 
component of the critical sentence while the action component was held 
constant, conditions E+A+ vs. E-A+ were compared. The comparison E+A- vs. 
E-A- was performed in order to check this situation under an extreme 
incongruent case. 
If the action based component is the main determinant for 
comprehension, no matter whether the emotional component matches or 
mismatches the implied emotional state, then it is expected E+A+ and E-A+ 
conditions to be significantly faster than E+ A- and E-A- conditions, wherein 
the action based component is incongruent and the emotional component 
supports or not the implied emotional state. If language-based knowledge is 
the source that determines comprehension, then it is expected that E+A+ and 
E+A- will show significantly faster RTs than E-A+ and E-A-.  
 
4.2. Method  
4.2.1 Participants 
Forty seven students at the University of Ballarat (28 females) 
participated in this experiment in return for partial credit towards an 
introductory psychology research requirement. All the participants were 
native English speakers. The University of Ballarat is a small regional 
university in Victoria, Australia. 
4.2.2. Materials 
4.2.2.1. Stories:  
Thirty-four short stories were developed for the experiment.  Twenty-four of 
the stories were modified versions of the long versions used by Gygax et al. 
(2004, Experiments 1 and 2) which in turn were based on the stories originally 
developed by Gernsbacher et al. (1992).2 The content of these stories was 
modified for Australian readers. For example, cricket was referred to instead 
                                         
2 I would like to thank Pascal Gygax for making these stories available. 
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of baseball, and terms such as room-mate were replaced with flat-mate. In 
order to increase the number of items in each condition an additional 10 
stories were constructed, eight of which served as experimental items, 
making a total of 32 experimental items, with the other two items serving as 
practice items. The stories described situations that invoked basic negative 
and positive emotional states as well as allied emotions.  
Four versions of each story were created defined by manipulations of 
the emotional and action-based content of a critical final sentence. Each 
passage appeared in all four experimental conditions across four 
counterbalanced versions of the experiment (i.e., 8 items in each 
experimental condition per version). The critical sentences were based on the 
materials used by de Vega et al. (2004). An example of one of the passages 
and the four critical sentences is provided in Table 1.3  
In discourse research it is also traditional to use completion tasks, 
audio recorders, and filler stories to engage participants with the task (e.g., 
de Vega et al., 1997; Gernsbacher et al., 1992). In these experiments, 
deliberately, none of these experimental procedures and materials was used 
in order to bring a more natural reading environment (see Bortolussi & Dixon, 
2003). 
 
Table 4.1. Example stories and target word. 
For two days now, the snowstorm had confined Jackie to her small house. The power was 
down and the phones were out. There was really nothing she could do except wait for the 
storm to pass. She paced from room to room.  First she went into the living room and picked 
up a book. She read two paragraphs, and then put it down. It was too hard to read in the poor 
light. She wandered into the kitchen where there was a bit more light and she flicked through 
a cook book for some ideas. She put it down when she realised that the stove wouldn’t work 
anyway. She decided to go into the lounge and water the plants. That was useful. She then 
sat on the sofa for a while and picked at her fingernails. After a couple of minutes, she got up 
and went back to the kitchen. Several times she wiped down the bench and rearranged the 
crockery. It was getting dark again. Soon she would not be able to see.  
 
Critical sentence 
Condition 1 (E+ A+): 
                                         
3 I would like to thank Manuel de Vega for making these sentences available.  
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While Jackie impatiently lit a candle in the kitchen, she thought about lighting the other 
candles throughout her confining house. 
 
Condition 2 (E- A+): 
While Jackie patiently lit a candle in the kitchen, she thought about lighting the other 
candles throughout her comforting house 
 
Condition 3 (E+ A-): 
While Jackie impatiently lit a candle in the kitchen, she lit the other candles throughout her 
confining house. 
 
Condition 4 (E- A-): 
While Jackie patiently lit a candle in the kitchen, she lit the other candles throughout her 
comforting house.  
 
Warning sentence 
Jackie felt… 
 
Emotional label 
RESTLESS 
 
4.2.2.2. Naming task 
The naming task consisted of the 32 stories described above as well as 
the 32 emotional labels implied by the situations described by the stories that 
served as target words to be read aloud by participants at the end of every 
passage. The naming response was signalled by a warning sentence which 
included the name of the main character in the preceding story followed by 
“felt…” (see Table 1). The warning sentence was then replaced by the 
appropriate target emotional label. Target words always matched the general 
emotional state implied in their preceding stories. They were presented in 14 
point courier new uppercase letters. The list of 32 emotional label target 
words is given in Appendix A.  
 
4.2.2.3. Lexical decision task 
For the lexical decision task, a total of 128 words were selected. 
Thirty-two words were the emotional states used for the naming task, 32 were 
abstract words (mental states), and 64 nonword foils. The nonwords were 
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constructed using the ARC nonword data base (Rastle, Harrington, & Coltheart, 
2002), and the abstract words were constructed using the Edinburgh 
Associative Thesaurus (Kiss, Armstrong, Milroy, & Piper, 1973) and matched as 
to their frequency with the emotional adjectives and the nonwords by using 
the software N-Watch (Davis, 2005). The criteria for constructing the 
nonsense words were that their number of letters and neighbourhood density 
had to match the range for the emotional labels (3-14), neighbourhood size 
(0-832, minimum and maximum value). The nonwords were also selected on 
the basis that they were orthographically legal and pronounceable letter 
strings.  All of the words used in the lexical decision task are provided in 
Appendix B. 
 
4.2.2.4. Episodic recognition task 
For this task 64 words were used. Thirty-two words were the emotional 
labels used both in the naming and the lexical decision task, plus another 32 
emotional words not seen previously in the experiment. These new emotional 
labels were composed by pairing every emotional word used in the previous 
tasks with new emotional labels that were considered to be either 
synonymous with or closely related in meaning to the 32 target emotional 
words. The whole set of words was matched as to their frequency and 
neighbourhood size using the N-Watch software. The additional emotional 
words used for the episodic recognition task appear in Appendix C.  
 
4.3. Apparatus 
The experimental tasks were presented in a Pentium II PC running the 
Microsoft Windows 98 operating system using the software DMDX version 
3.1.4.5 (Forster & Forster, 2003). This was installed with a PIO-DIO card 
interfacing, a two-button response box, and footswitch. The monitor was a 17 
in. CRT with 120 Hz refresh rate, yielding a refresh time of 11.763 
milliseconds. 
For the naming tasks the responses were collected and transduced 
using an Ovann (Ref. OV510MV) headset microphone, and using an Intel 
0815EEA sound card with 6-channel audio onboard (Ref. Integrated AC97). 
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4.4 Procedure 
4.4.1. Naming task 
At the beginning of the naming task, the participants were given 
written and verbal instructions about the experiment and they were asked to 
sign consent forms afterwards. Each participant was assigned to one of the 
four versions of the experiment. Participants first viewed two practice stories 
to familiarise them with the experimental procedure and equipment. Then, 
they were presented with the 32 stories in a different random order for each 
participant. The participants were asked to read for comprehension and to try 
to imagine the situation and how the protagonist should feel in it. They were 
instructed to read each passage silently at their own pace and then to name 
out loud the emotional adjective at the end of every text as quickly and as 
accurately as possible. Participants were informed both verbally and in the 
written instructions that their naming latencies and voice were being 
recorded. Also, they were told that the microphone would pick up on any 
disruptive sound; for this reason it was important to avoid making unrelated 
sounds, especially prior to the naming response. 
Participants were instructed to advance to the critical sentence by 
pressing a footswitch. After pressing the footswitch the warning sentence 
appeared for 588 ms, which was then replaced in the centre of the computer 
screen (interstimulus interval [ISI] = 0) by the emotional word for naming. The 
emotional word remained on the screen until the participant named it, but its 
maximum duration was set at 4000 ms, after which the word disappeared and 
the item accounted as “no response” from the participant. After each item 
participants requested a new passage by pressing a footswitch. After each 
target word feedback was provided regarding the naming latency.  
 
4.4.2. Lexical decision task 
After completing the naming task, participants completed the lexical 
decision task. Participants were instructed to indicate as quickly and as 
accurately as possible whether or not what they saw on the screen was a real 
word, or a nonword. The response was made by pressing one of two buttons 
on a response box. Word responses were to be made with the dominant hand.  
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The lexical decision task was preceded by seven practice items. After 
the practice items a written instruction indicated that the experiment was 
about to commence. The first 2 items were always the same for each 
participant and were not analysed.  The experimental items were then 
presented in a different random order for each participant. Every item 
appeared in 14 point courier new upper case letters for 3000 milliseconds. A 
trial terminated at a button press, or after 3000 milliseconds, whichever 
happened first. The computer recorded the response times. Feedback was 
provided after each response. For correct responses, the word “correct” was 
displayed on the screen, as well as the response time in milliseconds. For 
incorrect responses, the word “wrong” was displayed on the screen. This part 
of the experiment took approximately 10 minutes to complete. The change 
between tasks lasted approximately 2-4 minutes. 
 
4.4.3. Episodic recognition task 
In the episodic recognition task participants were asked to distinguish 
as quickly and as accurately as possible which of the displayed words had 
been encountered previously in the reading task and which had not been seen 
previously. Participants used their dominant hand to respond “yes” to 
previously seen words and “no” to new words. In all other respects, the 
procedure for the episodic recognition task was the same as that for the 
lexical decision task. It took approximately 5 minutes to complete. 
The whole session took approximately 1 hour to complete. On its 
completion, participants were debriefed, thanked, and dismissed.  
 
4.5. Design and analysis 
The data were analysed using a one-way ANOVA in which the four 
critical text manipulations served as four levels of the independent variable, 
text coherence. Both subject (F1) and item (F2) results were reported. The 
omnibus ANOVA was followed with the series of planned comparisons 
described in the introduction to this experiment. One-tailed t-tests were used 
for the comparisons and a significance level of .05 was applied to all analyses.  
Response times served as the dependent variable for the naming task. Both 
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response time and error data were analysed for the lexical decision and 
episodic recognition tasks. 
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Chapter 5. Experiment 1. Results 
 
Response times were analysed for correct responses only. Outliers were 
removed from the response time data by coding responses greater than 3000 
ms or less than 150 ms as errors. Additionally, individual subject response 
times were trimmed by correcting any response greater than 2 standard 
deviations above or below their mean to the 2 standard deviation values.  
Seven participants were removed from the analyses and replaced with 
a new participant on the basis that their mean response time was more than 2 
standard deviations above or below the group mean.  
 
5.1. Response time data for the Naming task 
The means and standard errors of means for the response time for the 
naming task are shown in Table 5.1. A one-way ANOVA was conducted using 
adjusted (correct) naming times as the dependent variable. The analysis 
revealed no significant overall effect of the experimental conditions on 
naming times for emotional labels for either a by-subjects analysis, F1 (3,117) 
= 1.188, p = .159, or a by-items analysis, F2 (3,93) = .904, p = .221. 
A series of planned comparisons was conducted to determine if 
comprehension of characters’ emotion is supported by sensory-motor 
knowledge and/or linguistic knowledge. The comparison between the extreme 
congruent and incongruent conditions (E+A+ vs. E- A-) was carried out first. 
The results indicated that naming response times were significantly faster 
when the critical sentence contained fully consistent emotional and action-
based content compared to when the critical sentence contained fully 
inconsistent information,  t (39) = -2.024, p = .025 (one-tailed). 
The means for the E+A+ and E+ A- conditions were then compared in 
order to investigate the effect of action-based content while holding the 
emotional content constant. The results indicated no significant difference in 
their RTs, t (39) = -0.341, p = .367 (one-tailed). This was also true when their 
RTs were compared under the extreme incongruent situation (E-A+ vs. E-A-), t 
(39) = -0.717, p = .239 (one-tailed). 
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The RTs of the conditions E+A+ vs. E-A+ were compared in order to 
index the effect of manipulating the emotional component of the critical 
sentence while the action component was held constant. The results indicated 
that naming RTs were not significantly different, t (39) = -0.856, p = .198 
(one-tailed). However, when the emotional content was manipulated when 
the action component was incongruent (E+A- vs. E-A-), results indicated faster 
RTs when the critical sentence was congruent at least in its emotional content 
than when neither emotional content nor action content were congruent,  t 
(39) = -1.770, p = .042 
  
Table 5.1. Mean naming times (in ms) and standard error of mean for the 
naming task in Experiment 1. 
Condition  RT Mean Standard error of mean 
E+ A+ 455  9 
E- A+ 464  9 
E+ A- 454  9 
E- A- 468  9 
 
 
5.2. Response time and error data for the lexical decision task 
The means and standard error of means for the response time and error 
data for the lexical decision task are shown in Table 5.2. A one-way ANOVA 
was conducted with adjusted (correct) response times as the dependent 
variable. There was a significant main effect of conditions on emotional words 
in both the by-subject analysis, F1 (3,117) = 2.639, p = .026, and the by-items 
analysis, F2 (3,93) = 2.740, p = .024. 
A series of planned paired sample t tests was conducted to determine if 
characters’ emotion comprehension is supported by sensory-motor knowledge 
and/or linguistic knowledge as a controlled process. The comparison between 
the extreme congruent and incongruent conditions (E+A+ vs. E- A-) was 
carried out first. The results indicated that lexical decision response times 
were significantly faster when the critical sentence contained fully consistent 
 56
emotional and action-based content compared to when the critical sentence 
contained fully inconsistent information,  t (39) = -1.714, p = .047 (one-tailed). 
The means for the E+A+ and E+ A- conditions were then compared in 
order to investigate the effect of action-based content while holding the 
emotional content constant. The results indicated no significant difference in 
their RTs, t (39) = -1.128, p = .133 (one-tailed). However, when the action 
component was manipulated while the emotional adjectives did not match 
the implied emotional state (E-A+ vs. E-A-), conditions where the action 
component matched the implied emotional state showed significantly faster 
RTs, than when both action component and emotional adjective mismatched 
the implied emotional state, t (39) = -2.434, p = .01 (one-tailed).  
The RTs of the conditions E+A+ vs. E-A+ were compared in order to 
index the effect of manipulating the emotional component of the critical 
sentence while the action component was held constant. The results indicated 
that lexical decision RTs were not significantly different, t (39) = 0.920, p 
= .181 (one-tailed). This results was true as well when the emotional content 
was manipulated and the action component held incongruent (E+A- vs. E-A-), t 
(39) = -.569, p = .286 (one-tailed). 
 
Table 5.2. Mean response times (in ms) and percentage errors for the lexical 
decision task in Experiment 1. Standard errors of means are presented in 
parentheses. 
Condition  RT Mean  Percentage error 
E+ A+ 545 (6) .03 (.01) 
E- A+ 538 (7) .03 (.01) 
E+ A- 554 (7) .03 (.01) 
E- A- 558 (7) .03 (.01) 
Mental states 609 (5) .09 (.01) 
Nonwords  629 (3) .07 (.00) 
 
Error analysis did not show a significant main effect in either the 
subject, F1 (3,117) = .077, p = .486 or item ANOVAs, F2 (3,93) = .066, p = .489. 
The same series of planned comparisons was carried out for the error data. 
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There were no significant differences between any of the experimental 
conditions, all F values < 1. 
 
5.3. Response time and error data for the episodic recognition task 
The means and standard error of means for the response time and error 
data for the episodic recognition task are shown in Table 5.3. A one-way 
ANOVA was conducted with adjusted (correct) response times as the 
dependent variable. There was no significant effect of conditions 
manipulating the coherence of the texts on emotional labels either in the by-
subject analysis, F1 (3,117) = 1.204, p = .155, or the by-items analysis, F2 
(3,93) = .851, p = .235.  
A series of planned paired sample t tests was conducted to determine if 
characters’ emotion comprehension is supported by sensory-motor knowledge 
and/or linguistic knowledge as a residual process in episodic memory. The 
comparison between the extreme congruent and incongruent conditions (E+A+ 
vs. E-A-) was carried out first. The results indicated that episodic recognition 
RTs were not significantly faster when the critical sentence contained fully 
consistent emotional and action-based content compared to when the critical 
sentence contained inconsistent information, t (39) = -1.148, p = .129 (one-
tailed). 
The means for the E+A+ and E+A- conditions were then compared in 
order to see the effect of action-based content while holding the emotional 
content constant. The results indicated no significant difference in their RTs, 
t (39) = 0.164, p = .435 (one-tailed). This was true too when the action 
component was manipulated while the emotional adjectives did not match 
the implied emotional state (E-A+ vs. E-A-), t (39) = -1.53, p = .066 (one-
tailed). 
The RTs of the conditions E+A+ vs. E-A+ were compared in order to 
index the effect of manipulating the emotional component of the critical 
sentence while the action component was held constant. The results indicated 
that episodic recognition RTs were not significantly different, t (39) = 0.642, p 
= .262 (one-tailed). This results was true as well when the emotional content 
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was manipulated and the action component held incongruent (E+A- vs. E-A-), t 
(39) = -1.387, p = .086 (one-tailed). 
 
Table 5.3. Mean response times (in ms) and percentage errors for the episodic 
recognition task in Experiment 1. Standard errors of means are presented in 
parentheses. 
Condition  RT Mean  Percentage error 
E+ A+ 705 (12) .19 (.02) 
E- A+ 694 (13) .20 (.02) 
E+ A- 700 (12) .18 (.02) 
E- A- 716 (14) .17 (.02) 
Different matching 
emotional labels 
725 (6) .22 (.01) 
 
 
The error analysis did not show a significant main effect in either the 
subject, F1 (3,117) = .270, p = .423 or item ANOVAs, F2 (3,93) = .308, p = .41. 
The same series of planned comparisons was carried out for the error data. 
There were no significant differences between any of the experimental 
conditions, all F values < 1. 
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Chapter 6. Experiment 1. Discussion 
 
The purpose of the present experiment was to examine the proposition 
that the comprehension of characters’ emotional states is influenced by 
sensory-motor knowledge and linguistic knowledge provided in the narratives.  
Specifically, it was expected that if characters perform actions 
supporting the implied emotional state in the text, and it is physically 
possible for these actions to be performed simultaneously, then 
comprehension will be facilitated, which in turn would be reflected in faster 
task response times (RTs). By contrast, it was expected that if those actions 
could not be performed at once (given actual experience constraints based on 
embodied knowledge), then comprehension would be adversely affected, 
probably because that knowledge does not permit a simulation that leads the 
reader to construct a plausible situation model. 
Additionally, language-based knowledge was expected to contribute to 
text comprehension about emotion. Therefore, a perfectly coherent text 
would depend on not only actions that can be performed simultaneously, but 
also adjectives that are compatible with the implied emotional state, whereas 
adjectives incompatible with the overall implied emotional state would 
impede comprehension.  
Three tasks were devised to assess comprehension. The naming task 
was designed to investigate the effect of linguistic emotional and 
action/embodiment congruence on the on-line comprehension of characters’ 
emotions. The lexical decision and episodic recognition tasks were designed to 
investigate the potential impact of the manipulations on emotional and 
action/embodiment content on off-line comprehension processes - lexical and 
episodic memory respectively. 
Considering the naming task as an index of comprehension, the results 
indicated that having congruence in both information sources – linguistic and 
action/embodiment - aids comprehension of emotion, compared with having 
congruence in neither. However, this comparison did not provide information 
about which of the two information sources contributes to this superiority, or 
whether both do so. Breaking this down to further understand the roles of the 
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linguistic and action/embodiment information, it was found that congruence 
in action/embodiment did not give superior comprehension over incongruence 
in this information source, whether paired with congruent or incongruent 
linguistic information. Taken alone, this suggests that the action/embodiment 
aspect did not play a role in comprehension as assessed by the naming task. 
However, considering the linguistic manipulation, while this was found to 
make no difference to comprehension when action/embodiment was 
congruent, it was found to do so when the action/embodiment information 
was incongruent. Taken together with the trends across conditions, the 
findings are suggestive of an interaction between the two types of information, 
and a stronger role for linguistic than action/embodiment information on this 
task. Although suggestive, the findings are not decisive about the roles of the 
two information sources and, as discussed later, it is possible that the task 
requirements impeded a clear demonstration of their individual roles in 
comprehension. 
Considering the lexical decision task, findings were very similar except 
that in this case it was the action/embodiment manipulation that seemed to 
have a greater effect on comprehension than the linguistic information.  
The fact that the linguistic manipulation seemed more critical for the 
naming task under more incongruent conditions suggests that this kind of 
information is the more important one for automatic on-line processing, and is 
entailed in forward inferencing. By contrast, the apparently greater role of 
action/embodiment under more incoherent conditions for the lexical decision-
making task suggests that this source of information has a greater role in off-
line controlled comprehension processes. 
By contrast with the first two tasks, the episodic recognition task did 
not produce any significant results or trends, giving no grounds for suggesting 
that either sensory-motor or language-based knowledge has a guiding role in 
this phase of comprehension. These results could be interpreted in terms of a 
repair or integration of inconsistencies step, wherein readers seek to establish 
global coherence and keep in memory an emotional representation that plays 
down inconsistencies (critical sentences) and instead plays up the logicality of 
the text (story contexts). 
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 6.1. General conclusions 
The aim of this experiment was to examine the proposition that the 
comprehension of characters’ emotional states is influenced by both sensory-
motor and language-based knowledge elicited by the narratives.  
The results of this experiment suggest that the comprehension of 
emotional states utilizes both sensory-motor and language-based knowledge. 
However, there is some indication that the first on-line processing step is 
guided in general more by the language-based components of the text which 
in turn demands that source of knowledge from the reader. Thus, the 
construction of a situation model requires tracking the linguistic devices 
employed in the texts.  
A subsequent step in comprehension comprises more controlled 
processes. In the off-line processing of emotional states, there is some 
indication that sensory-motor knowledge plays a greater role in the processing 
of narratives. During this phase, it seems that experience-based or generic 
knowledge may play a greater role since the reader can spend more time on 
further elaborations that go beyond the language-based level. Then, at this 
level simulation could have a decisive role in managing memory and 
integration processes. In other words, simulation interrelates experience-
based memories and concepts to build representations of the actions 
supporting the emotional states. 
A final stage accounts for the residual elaborations in comprehension. 
At this stage a depth of processing account could be used to interpret the 
results found herein. As a final step in the representation of fictional 
emotions, readers seem to adjust and control the final mental representation 
of the situations supporting emotions. Maybe by superimposing experience-
based knowledge on inconsistencies, readers resolve narrative ambiguities to 
establish global coherence. The knowledge stored about previous emotional 
experiences could be used to assess new incoming emotional information, 
then overcoming narrative incoherencies according to well-known past 
emotional memories.  
The major limitation of Experiment 1 comes from the naming task since 
this is the task that introduces the main experimental conditions, i.e., stories, 
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critical sentences, and emotional labels. The naming task is understood as a 
task that reflects what is currently activated in readers’ mental 
representation and not how easily a stimulus (e.g., a word or target sentence) 
can be integrated in that representation. Researchers assume that subjects do 
not try to integrate the word into their mental representation; rather, 
subjects simply pronounce the test word as fast and accurately as they can. 
Therefore, it is assumed that the pronunciation task does not reflect any type 
of “context checking” (Gernsbacher et al., 1992, 1998).  
It could be argued that as the target word remained on the screen until 
the participant named it over the microphone, then participants had some 
extra time to check the target word against the preceding context. Also, as 
stories were presented as a block, it could facilitate the reader in having a 
more accessible memory for the text, including the critical sentence. These 
conditions could account for the non-statistically-significant differences 
between the experimental conditions. A potential modification to this task 
that could provide a more sensitive measure should work on these two 
components of the task. 
Firstly, texts should be presented by parts composed of meaningful 
sentences so that the possibility of an integration process occurring during the 
reading part would be somehow reduced. Also, the presentation of the target 
word should be manipulated to avoid integration or further elaborations from 
the reader. A way of doing this could be by shortening the duration of the 
target word on the screen. By doing so, it is probable that the readers invest 
time and attention in remembering the word they just saw to name it, instead 
of using time and attention to integrate the target word with the previous 
story-context. These conditions are the basis for a follow-up experiment.  
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Chapter 7. Experiment 2. Introduction and Method. 
 
7.1. Introduction 
Although the data from the naming task in Experiment 1 were 
suggestive of a trend, they were not sensitive enough to provide strong 
statistically significant differences between the critical experimental 
conditions. The aim of the second experiment is to alter the task in an 
attempt to provide a more sensitive index of on-line processing.  
Experiment 1 provided evidence to suggest that both experience-based 
and language-based knowledge interact to reach comprehension, and that if 
there are deficiencies in one of them, the other supports comprehension. 
However, from a mere methodological point of view it could be asked if these 
results are sustainable even if experimental conditions are altered. 
The naming task was the task that included the on-line reading task 
and also proved to be moderately sensitive to RTs analysis. Recall that in that 
task participants read every text in one-block fashion, including the critical 
sentence, then a warning sentence, and finally the emotional label. As was 
argued in previous sections, the fictional contexts were presented in that 
manner in order to offer readers a more natural reading situation. This 
modification is different from typical studies in narrative comprehension in 
that texts are usually presented by parts. Also, in the previous experiment the 
emotional label remained on the screen until the participant named it into 
the microphone. 
Thus, it could be said that maybe because participants had sufficient 
time to view the target word, they could perform a complete central 
processing of the word (see Xu & Perfetti, 1999). However, if time viewing the 
word is reduced participants will necessarily operate at a more automatic 
level and more sensitive RTs and error data could be gathered. This second 
experiment seeks to find more sensitive data by altering the naming task and 
also to corroborate the predictions put forward for the first experiment. The 
interest here is to verify the results for the on-line comprehension of the 
stories when the reading and naming tasks are altered. Therefore, the lexical 
decision and the episodic recognition are not considered. 
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7.1.1. Some methodological caveats for the naming task 
The basic assumption for the naming task is that the pronunciation of 
the inferred emotional label will be facilitated if the corresponding concept 
has been previously activated when the inference was elaborated. This 
facilitation will be then reflected in the naming RTs (Gutiérrez-Calvo, 1999). 
This task has normally been employed to study phonemic activation during 
word identification (e.g., Perfetti & Bell, 1991) or the time course of 
inference generation (e.g., Calvo, Castillo, & Schmalhofer, 2006; Calvo, 
Estevez, & Dowens, 2003), but has not been extensively used in narrative 
texts situations, particularly in its backward visual masking version (C. 
Perfetti, personal communication, October 11th, 2006). To put it simply, the 
backward masking paradigm has been used to tap the use of phonemic or 
graphemic knowledge in word representation, but not to tap how semantic or 
pragmatic knowledge is used. This task therefore could be worthwhile for the 
study of how emotions are comprehended using sensory-motor and language-
based experiences. 
Some studies in characters’ emotion comprehension have employed 
naming task to determine if readers represent characters’ emotional states 
(e.g., Gernsbacher et al., 1992), and how readers take the protagonist’s 
mental perspective in stories involving conflicting beliefs about a situation 
(e.g., de Vega et al., 1997), for example. However, similar to Experiment 1 
reported previously, the target word remained on the screen until the 
participant said it over the microphone. So, as mentioned before, this 
situation could give time to the participant for some extra processing. This 
therefore raises a question about whether the naming task in Experiment 1 
did in fact indicate the occurrence of forward inferencing. 
If the presentation of the target word is reduced it could urge the 
participant to invoke more automatic processes. This variation of the naming 
task, called the backward visual masking procedure, has been used in studies 
devised to study semantic or phonological word-to-word priming. In this task 
participants view for brief time a target word that is replaced by a letter 
string, the mask, that interrupts the visual processing of the word, and finally 
a pattern mask that ends the sequence and remains on the screen until the 
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subject names the target word (Perfetti & Bell, 1991; Perfetti & Zhang, 1991). 
A typical sequence looks like this: brick-PRICK-#####. The participants’ task is 
to name the word in lower case. In these studies the masked word is the 
variable that determines the naming RTs according to its relation to the 
target word, for example, in the previous example the relation target and 
masked words share features at both the phonological and orthographic levels. 
In another variation of this task, the mask is removed. By comparing 
this unmasked presentation and the backward masking, researchers have 
demonstrated that there is higher word identification without a character 
mask (Perfetti & Zhang, 1991, Experiment 2), which demonstrates the main 
role that the mask plays according to its relation to the target word. 
Following the previous example, an unmasked presentation would look like 
this: BRICK-#####. Both the masked and the unmasked presentation have two 
properties that urge the reader to invoke more automatic processes, namely, 
the presentation time of the target word and the pattern mask. 
Previous work in this area has shown that when the target word 
exposure is approximately 30 ms subjects are able to provide accurate naming 
responses (Perfetti & Zhang, 1991). Seemingly, at this duration any sort of 
word knowledge is activated. However, if the time is set to around 55 ms 
identification of the target word becomes extremely easy (Perfetti & Bell, 
1991). Also, evidence demonstrates that when the target word is followed 
immediately by a pattern mask, the identification of the target word is more 
accurate than when using a mask (Perfetti & Zhang, 1991). If there is no mask, 
then there is no word that reinstates properties of the target word, instead 
the pattern mask has the role of simply interrupting the processing just when 
more controlled processes or further elaborations could occur, thus forcing 
more automatic responses.  
The present experiment follows this variation of the backward masking 
paradigm as a way to lead participant to process the target word without 
reaching further cognitive elaborations. The typical backward visual masking 
procedure is not employed since it includes a mask. By using a mask the task 
itself would have another purpose. Instead, it is expected that the brief 
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presentation of the target word activates some semantic-pragmatic 
information related to the preceding narrative context. 
The same predictions stated for Experiment 1 are held for this 
experiment. Nevertheless, it is expected that thanks to the variations in the 
naming task, Experiment 2 could produce more sensitive results as to the role 
of sensory-motor and language-based knowledge during the comprehension of 
characters’ emotions. 
The present experiment had several modifications in order to do so. Firstly, 
the presentation of the texts was not in blocks, as in Experiment 1, but in 
parts. This way of presenting texts is typical in discourse research. Secondly, 
following canonical experiments in discourse research, this experiment also 
included filler stories. Thirdly, reading tasks are usually accompanied by 
supplementary tasks such as writing suitable continuations for some of the 
stories or answering to yes/no questions. These tasks are devised just to 
encourage comprehension of the stories. In this experiment a similar task, a 
cloze task, was devised. In this task participants had to write down the word 
they just named for the experimental stories, and for the filler stories to 
write down a word that matched them. Fourthly, the warning sentence was 
varied. Instead of having a unique warning sentence (e.g., Melissa felt…), 
longer and linguistically richer sentences were constructed in order to 
announce that the emotional word was about to appear on the screen (e.g., 
There was no doubt that Melissa felt…). Finally, the presentation of the target 
word was done following the criteria explained above. All these modifications 
were performed in order to maximise the potential for detecting significant 
differences between the critical sentence conditions. 
 
7.2. Method  
7.2.1 Participants 
Forty students at the University of Ballarat participated in this 
experiment. Some of them received in return partial credit towards an 
introductory psychology research requirement, while others were paid $15 
AUD for a session that lasted for around the same time as Experiment 1. All 
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the participants were native English speakers. None of the participants from 
the previous experiment took part in this study. 
7.2.2. Materials 
The same materials used for the naming task in Experiment 1 were 
used for this experiment. Also, all the materials in this experiment were 
presented in Franklin gothic book font style.  
The naming task consisted of the same 32 stories and 32 emotional 
labels used in the Experiment 1 plus 10 filler stories. Emotional labels were 
named at the end of every passage.  
Forty-five stories were used: 32 experimental, 10 filler, and 3 practice. 
The experimental stories were the same used in Experiment 1. The filler 
stories were taken from those originally used by Gernsbacher et al. (1992) and 
Gygax et al. (2004).4 They simply described a character performing actions 
and describing some thoughts and they did not elicit any particular emotional 
state. Table 7.1 illustrates the general experimental materials and conditions. 
 
Table 7.1. Example stories and target word. 
For two days now, the snowstorm had confined Jackie to her small house. The power was 
down and the phones were out. There was really nothing she could do except wait for the 
storm to pass. She paced from room to room.  First she went into the living room and picked 
up a book. She read two paragraphs, and then put it down. It was too hard to read in the poor 
light. She wandered into the kitchen where there was a bit more light and she flicked through 
a cook book for some ideas. She put it down when she realised that the stove wouldn’t work 
anyway. She decided to go into the lounge and water the plants. That was useful. She then 
sat on the sofa for a while and picked at her fingernails. After a couple of minutes, she got up 
and went back to the kitchen. Several times she wiped down the bench and rearranged the 
crockery. It was getting dark again. Soon she would not be able to see.  
 
Critical sentence 
Condition 1 (E+ A+): 
While Jackie impatiently lit a candle in the kitchen, she thought about lighting the other 
                                         
4 I would like to thank Pascal Gygax for making these filler stories available. The 
Gernsbacher’s filler stories were downloaded from her research laboratory web site at 
http://psych.wisc.edu/lang/MGcover.html  
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candles throughout her confining house. 
 
Condition 2 (E- A+): 
While Jackie patiently lit a candle in the kitchen, she thought about lighting the other 
candles throughout her comforting house 
 
Condition 3 (E+ A-): 
While Jackie impatiently lit a candle in the kitchen, she lit the other candles throughout her 
confining house. 
 
Condition 4 (E- A-): 
While Jackie patiently lit a candle in the kitchen, she lit the other candles throughout her 
comforting house.  
 
Warning sentence  
It was not surprising that Jackie felt…  
 
Emotional label  
RESTLESS  
 
 
7.3. Apparatus 
The same equipment was used as for Experiment 1. The only difference 
was that the monitor yielded a refresh time of 16.66 milliseconds. 
 
7.4. Procedure 
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1 except for the following 
modifications. Participants were given three stories for practice. Two of them 
were naming tasks and the third was a filler story. For the filler stories 
participants were asked write down in the right column of an answer sheet a 
word that matched with the story; that word could be either an object or an 
action. For the naming task participants were required to write down the 
emotion they just named into the microphone in the left column of the same 
answer sheet. This cloze procedure was devised to ensure that participants 
read the stories carefully, and the written emotional labels were only taken 
into account for further error analysis. 
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These instructions were given over the computer and verbally. Also, 
participants were told to read each story sentence by sentence in a self-paced 
manner, and to avoid making unrelated sounds as far as possible when naming 
the last word on the screen.  
Again, as there were four conditions per story, four different lists of 
stories were constructed, and ten participants were assigned to each. 
Nevertheless, each condition had 42 texts because of the filler stories. As in 
Experiment 1, participants were tested individually. 
The participants were told that they would read each passage on the 
screen of a computer, and to advance each sentence they needed to press the 
footswitch. The participants first read the passage biasing a particular 
emotional state sentence by sentence, then the critical sentence, the warning 
sentence, and finally the emotional label. The passages, the critical sentences, 
and the warning sentences were presented sentence by sentence following 
classical presentation methodologies in discourse research. 
After pressing the footswitch a fixation point (plus sign “+”), appeared 
immediately after the warning sentence (interstimulus interval [ISI] = 0). This 
fixation remained on the screen for 266.56 ms. The fixation cross was then 
replaced by the emotional label for naming (ISI = 533.12 ms). The emotional 
label remained on screen for 33.32 ms, and was followed immediately (ISI = 0)  
by the pattern mask which contained the same number of characters and font 
size of the preceding emotional word. The pattern mask remained on screen 
until the participant completed their naming response, or for a maximum of 
4000 milliseconds, whichever occurred first. The naming response time was 
provided on the screen as feedback or the words “no response” appeared on 
the screen if a naming response had not been provided prior to the 4000 ms 
cut-off. 
Following the naming response, participants were instructed to write 
down the emotional word they just named. Participants proceeded to the 
next passage of text by pressing a footswitch.   
The experimental stories were presented in five parts (of two or more 
sentences), with the last parts being the critical and warning sentence. The 
filler stories were presented in two or three parts. 
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The standard presentation of the stories was modified following typical 
procedures in discourse studies (e.g., de Vega et al., 1997): i) the passage 
biasing a particular emotional state, ii) the critical sentence, iii) a warning 
sentence, and iv) the emotional label. Sections i) and ii) were presented in 
parts, except section ii) which appeared on the screen as a sentence in itself. 
The warning sentence was presented on one screen by itself and this stayed 
on until the participant pressed the footswitch. After pressing the footswitch 
participants read the emotional label and named it into the microphone.  
Different warning sentences were written to anticipate the target word. 
These were diverse so that participants did not become too accustomed to a 
particular linguistic form at the end of every story. The sentences were 
approximately the same length and included the name of the character and 
the word “felt” always at the end followed by dots.  
The session commenced with the calibration of the key voice for the 
participant. Instructions were then presented on the screen, followed by the 
training stories. Once the participant became familiar with the experimental 
environment, the experimenter switched on a video recorder and left. The 
video recorder was used to engage participants with the experiment. This task 
took around 40 minutes.  
 
7.5. Design and analysis 
The data were analysed using a one-way ANOVA in which the four 
critical text manipulations served as four levels of the independent variable, 
text coherence. Both subject (F1) and item (F2) results were reported. The 
omnibus ANOVA was followed the same series of planned comparisons outlined 
for the first experiment. One-tailed t-tests were used for the comparisons and 
a significance level of .05 was applied to all analyses.  Both response time and 
error data were analysed for the naming task. 
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Chapter 8. Experiment 2. Results 
 
Response times were analysed for correct responses only. Outliers were 
removed from the response time data by coding responses greater than 2000 
ms or less than 150 ms as errors.  
 
8.1. Response time data for the naming task 
The means and standard error of means for the response time and error 
data for the naming task are shown in Table 8.1. A one-way ANOVA was 
conducted using adjusted (correct) naming times as the dependent variable. 
The analysis revealed no significant overall effect of the experimental 
conditions on naming times for emotional labels either in the by-subjects 
analysis, F1 (3,117) = .380, p = .384, or the by-items analysis, F2 (3,93) = .603, 
p = .307. 
The same series of planned comparisons used in Experiment 1 was 
conducted to determine if characters’ emotion comprehension is supported by 
sensory-motor knowledge and/or linguistic knowledge. There were no 
significant differences between any of the experimental conditions, all F 
values < 1. 
 
Table 8.1. Mean naming times (in ms) and percentage errors for the naming 
task in Experiment 2. Standard errors of means are presented in parentheses.  
Condition  RT Mean Percentage error 
E+ A+ 553 (18) .06 (.01) 
E- A+ 565 (17) .08 (.02) 
E+ A- 542 (16) .08 (.02) 
E- A- 558 (17) .08 (.02) 
 
The ANOVA conducted on the error data also failed to show a 
significant main effect in either the subject, F1 (3,117) = .733, p = .267 or 
item ANOVAs, F2 (3,93) = .410, p = .373. The same series of planned 
comparisons was carried out for the error data. There were no significant 
differences between any of the experimental conditions, all F values < 1. 
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Chapter 9. Experiment 2. Discussion 
 
Experiment 2 aimed to find the optimal means to test the hypothesis 
that the comprehension of characters’ emotional states is influenced by 
sensory-motor knowledge and linguistic knowledge provided in the narratives. 
Results from this Experiment did not produce any significant results. Even 
though the error analysis suggested that, as in Experiment 1, readers made 
fewer errors when processing conditions in which both sensory-motor and 
language-based knowledge supported the implied emotional state, these 
results were not significant. Also, by looking at the RTs no pattern can be 
established and no significant results emerged when the experimental 
conditions were compared.  
 
9.1. Methodological considerations for the results obtained 
Nevertheless, some ideas can be raised with respect to the task in itself 
and possible causes for these results. A first factor has to do with the reading 
situation. Experiments carried out in the discourse processing field using 
naming tasks are preceded by a reading situation (e.g., de Vega et al., 1997). 
During the reading situation, texts are usually not presented as a block on the 
screen (see Experiment 1 reported here), but split into parts of two to three 
sentences so that readers can self-administer the texts at their own pace. 
This way of reading induces readers to keep in memory relevant aspects that 
have been mentioned before but that are not visually available any more. 
While in Experiment 1 participants had this visual access to the text as a 
whole, presumably they could read back to look for inconsistencies. Under the 
reading situation of Experiment 2, participants had to recall what they just 
read (or elaborated) before in order to match it with the incoming passage.  
The first reading situations (Experiment 1) enabled readers to keep a 
normal reading flow, since, by experience, when people read novels, stories 
or newspapers, they have visual access to the linguistic string previous to the 
sentence currently being read. Therefore, demands on short-term memory are 
minimized and further elaborations are reduced, since, when facing 
incongruencies, readers can track down linguistic markers that either 
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corroborate or contradict what has just been read. Under the reading 
situation presented in Experiment 2, as readers do not have visual access to 
previous passages in the story, they must rely on what they have understood 
so far and is held in short-term memory. Recall that when readers access 
previous memory traces, this episodic representation includes elaborations 
that are a product of the episodic buffer, the task of which is to bind long-
term memories to what is being read. Therefore, it is quite probable that as 
there is no visual access to linguistic marks that support or contradict what is 
being read, then readers only have access to episodic representations that are 
biased by semantic and episodic records. This first factor could explain 
differences between the reading situations devised for the experiments 
reported here, particularly regarding the accuracy of the representations kept 
in short-memory. 
A second factor has to do with the warning sentence. In Experiment 1, 
the warning sentence remained on the screen for just a few milliseconds, 
which gave the reader sufficient time to read it clearly and elicit a potential 
emotional label. Recall that this warning sentence appeared on a different 
screen after the one-block previous story was read (which included the 
critical sentence as well). In Experiment 2, the warning sentence remained on 
the screen until the participant pressed the footswitch to request the 
emotional word. This situation is similar to what was stated above regarding 
the presentation of the stories. The way this sentence was presented in 
Experiment 2 could give time to the reader for a controlled processing of 
what was read before. Therefore, readers had time to resolve text 
ambiguities and then come up with an elaborated emotional label. While in 
Experiment 1, the warning sentence was quick enough (588 ms) to elicit in 
readers an emotional label which immediately after had to be matched with 
the one that appeared on the screen. 
The third factor relates to the presentation of the emotional label. In 
Experiment 1, the emotional label was not masked in any way and remained 
on the screen until the participant named it over the microphone. This 
presentation mode is used commonly in discourse research and it is designed 
to tap automatic processes. However, the backward naming task seems to be 
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somehow more effective for capturing automatic processes. As mentioned in 
chapter 7, this task has been used in the study of phonemic or graphemic 
knowledge in word representation, but not in the study of text representation. 
Therefore, Experiment 2 sought to obtain a more sensitive measure of the 
effect of the critical sentence manipulations by forcing readers to rely on the 
expectations primed by the text to resolve the rapidly decaying visual 
memory trace of the emotional label. While in Experiment 1, the emotional 
label appeared immediately after the warning sentence (ISI = 0), in 
Experiment 2 the sequence was different. Immediately after the participant 
pressed the footswitch after reading the warning sentence, a fixation point 
appeared on the screen, followed by a blank screen, the emotional label, and 
a pattern mask. Perhaps this relatively long sequence could have created a 
sort of disruption or gap in relation to the preceding narrative context. The 
participants were perhaps more focused on trying to see the emotional label 
than relating that word to the story they just read. 
A fourth factor that could contribute to the non-significant results in 
Experiment 2, could be related to the cloze task. Participants were not only 
asked to write down the emotional label they just named into the microphone, 
but also words that matched with the filler stories. Although the use of filler 
stories and/or completion task is a common practice in discourse research, 
the results found here could suggest that those peripheral tasks be used 
carefully; they could not only influence the cognitive load in general but 
impinge on participants’ disposition to perform the experiment. On the whole, 
these sorts of tasks, if used in excess, could create extra variables that would 
influence the subjects’ performance in general. 
 
9.2. A proposed variation of the naming task 
A tentative alternative for the naming task could be proposed, mixing 
some features of this task from both experiments. As discussed above, it 
seems viable to think that when the story-context is presented as a whole, 
readers find it a more “natural” reading situation. Also, short-term memory 
issues are probably facilitated, guiding comprehension by what is linguistically 
expressed in the text more than by elaborations biased by long-term memory. 
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Therefore, this part of the reading situation seems to be effective. The same 
could be said as to the warning sentence. If the presentation time of this 
sentence is modified, then this situation would elicit in the readers’ mind a 
candidate emotional label which had to be matched with the experimental 
emotional label immediately after reading the warning sentence. Of course, 
the longer the sentence (e.g., It was a moment when Andrea felt really…), 
the longer its presentation time. This is a factor to be considered at this stage 
since the more time the sentence is on the screen, the more time for the 
reader to elaborate extra processing.  
A main feature of the naming task is the presentation of the emotional 
label; therefore modifications to this part could have a crucial role in 
obtaining sensitive RTs. An initial straightforward modification could be made 
to the time exposure of the emotional label: presenting the emotional label 
immediately after the warning sentence and keeping it on the screen for 
enough time for the participant to see it. A similar variant could be done 
using a pattern mask as the final screen, instead of a blank screen, which 
would appear right away after the emotional word. However, something that 
must be taken into account under these conditions is to set individual 
thresholds to identify reliable baseline identification rate (e.g., Xu & Perfetti, 
1999). 
A central conclusion from this experiment is that extra studies must be 
carried out to devise a task which is sensitive enough to capture the on-line 
representation of characters’ emotions from an embodied framework. It is of 
particular interest to devise further experiments to reach a better 
understanding of how sensory-motor and language-based knowledge interact 
during the on-line and off-line comprehension of narratives. 
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Chapter 10. General discussion 
 
From the results found in the experiments reported in this thesis, 
several ideas can be discussed in relation to the comprehension of characters’ 
emotions in particular and the comprehension of narrative texts in general. 
The theoretical framework outlined in earlier chapters serves as the basis to 
account for the results obtained in this thesis. Also, some methodological 
caveats can be considered in order to devise more sensitive tasks in the study 
of characters’ emotions from an embodied perspective. 
 
10.1 The comprehension of characters’ emotions in texts  
Several previous studies have been devised to understand how concrete 
concepts are supported by using sensory-motor knowledge in language 
comprehension (e.g., Barsalou, 1999) and, recently, in narrative-like texts 
(e.g., de Vega et al., 2004). On the other hand, several studies have 
attempted to explain how readers understand characters’ emotions in 
narratives based on discourse models but not on embodied frameworks. 
Therefore, there are no previous studies trying to check if i) sensory-motor 
knowledge, in conjunction with language-based knowledge, supports the 
comprehension of abstract concepts, such as emotions, and if ii) that would 
be the case during the comprehension of fictional emotions.  This work could 
be considered as one of the first attempts at testing embodied theories of 
cognition in the comprehension of abstract concepts, particularly the 
comprehension of narrative texts.  
Previous studies on how people understand characters’ emotions in 
narratives have shown that the representation of emotional states happens in 
an automatic manner (e.g., Gernsbacher et al., 1992), and that that 
emotional representation is constructed if the actions described in narratives 
are congruent with the implied emotional state (e.g., de Vega et al., 1996). 
This study is consonant with those results in that readers could match 
emotional labels to stories in the naming task – automatic processing - based 
on the congruence of the emotional and action components of the critical 
sentences – congruence of actions. 
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Finally, this work supports an embodied framework in the 
comprehension of abstract concepts. Emotions are considered abstract 
concepts and as such they lack perceptual-based representations (see 
Sabsevitz et al., 2005). However, work developed in emotion studies has 
demonstrated that sensory-motor interaction with the environment does aid 
in the construction of emotional contexts (Clark et al., 2005). The first 
experiment suggests that sensory-motor knowledge does influence the 
comprehension of emotions in texts. However, given that the emotional 
situations are constrained by a fictional linguistic context, language-based 
knowledge also seems to have an important role in comprehension.  
 
10.2. General considerations for the comprehension of narrative texts 
According to the theoretical framework presented in this thesis, 
comprehension entails the use of memory, and integration (or inferential) and 
simulation processes. Recall that the memory system is basically composed of 
short-term (STM) and long-term memory (LTM). The former is in charge of 
processing incoming information, while the latter is in charge of bringing forth 
memories about personal experiences and general knowledge. Via inferencing, 
concepts are linked to each other to produce new information. Also, 
inferential processes assist with the coordination and organization of 
information stored in memory. Simulation processes refer to the linkage 
between cognition and perception in order to build multimodal, grounded, 
and concrete representations of meaning. At this level sensory-motor 
knowledge is considered to have a central role. This could suggest some ideas 
as to how those cognitive systems operate during the comprehension of 
emotions in texts. 
 Also, recall that when people read texts, they start to decode the 
linguistic information, e.g., anaphoric resolutions and subject-verb-object 
structures. Then, they start to create groups of ideas or scenarios so that they 
can keep track of the events and situations described in the text. To do this, 
the reader must keep some information only for a short time and some 
information throughout the reading of the text. Finally, to fully understand 
the situation referred to in the text, the reader must resort to knowledge 
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about the world and then elaborate inferences to build a coherent situation 
model. 
Experiment 1 suggested that in its early on-line stages, comprehension 
is guided by language-based knowledge. If so, low level inferences must occur 
to establish local coherence. During this processes, the proposed theoretical 
framework suggests that STM has a particular role in keeping the incoming 
linguistic information for a brief period of time to be processed. However, 
LTM may also be activated during this process. As the sort of knowledge 
implied in the texts refers in some way to experiences with the world and 
sensory-motor experience in particular, stored in the LTM, then simulation 
must operate to relate that knowledge to the linguistic flow. As mentioned in 
the discussion for Experiment 1, this on-line processing of the text seems to 
be mainly guided by language-based knowledge in order to keep track of the 
linguistic input which guides simulation. 
During the off-line processing of texts readers seem to rely more on 
experience-based knowledge than language-based knowledge to reach 
comprehension. Results from Experiment 1 suggested that sensory-motor 
knowledge seems to play the main role at this stage. Then high-level 
inferences must be performed to account not for the linguistic strings but for 
what they are referring to and then establish global coherence. STM could aid 
by chunking in an emotional label a set of the main features which accompany 
it, according to what was mentioned in each story. However, the workings of 
the LTM seem to be more decisive in that personal experiences and general 
knowledge serve to explain the series of situations referred to in the stories. 
Here, simulation may play a central role in interrelating the linguistic 
instructions and the specific knowledge from the LTM to build a situation 
model of the story plot.  
A final residual product of the comprehension process would aim to 
correct inconsistencies and anomalies based on previous emotional 
experiences. The results of the final task devised in Experiment 1 could be 
interpreted as suggesting that readers have filled up the emotional label for 
the story with enough experience-based knowledge as to play down any 
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anomaly and instead play up a global coherent representation. This would be 
a conscious, intentional, and controlled process. 
The preceding theoretical analysis echoes current conceptual 
frameworks that recast the construction-integration model of comprehension 
and the role that prior or experience-based knowledge plays in comprehension 
(see Calvo et al., 2006) - in particular, that sensory-motor (or prior world) 
knowledge is accessed early during text reading, and then it would facilitate 
an early construction of an embodied situation model. 
 Also, this work is congruent with experiments devised to determine 
how the properties of actions influence the comprehension of texts. Results 
indicate that the comprehension of concrete concepts (actions) is guided by 
syntax and embodied constraints (de Vega et al., 2004). This study 
complements those results for the study of abstract concepts, suggesting that 
the comprehension of emotions is indeed influenced by syntax, but by 
sensory-motor knowledge as well. 
In 1999 Rickheit & Sichelschmidt put forward twelve research questions 
regarding how a proper study of mental models should be designed. One of 
their questions was specifically aimed at the discourse processing realm. They 
asked “How do text and knowledge interact in the development of a discourse 
model?” The results from Experiment 1 cast some light on this. However, 
future research should aim to answer “How is an embodied situation model 
constructed?” This question implies that it is important to understand how a 
mental representation of what is referred to in texts emerges from the 
interaction among memory systems, integration, and elaborative process. 
 
10.3. Methodological considerations for future research  
While the results of the first experiment were suggestive, they were 
not decisive, and the attempt to produce a more sensitive test of on-line 
processing of characters’ emotions was not successful. From Experiment 2 
several ideas regarding why the results were not significant were discussed. 
Also, a provisional naming task that could overcome those results was 
proposed. However, it would be interesting to consider some extra ideas with 
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respect to potential avenues for exploring how embodied theories of cognition 
can be tested for the comprehension of narrative discourse. 
In principle, the naming task is devised to account for shallow 
processing, or word-level processing. However researchers in discourse 
comprehension usually present stories or meaningful linguistic units as a 
context previous to the naming task. Those contexts serve to create priming 
on the words to be named, depending on the relation of the words to the 
context and the modifications to the content of the stories. Many studies have 
used this paradigm and important results have emerged. Nevertheless, this 
task has not been modified as to account for the comprehension of narrative 
from an embodied framework. The two experiments carried out here had that 
aim. 
The lexical decision task is a task that accounts for post-access decision 
processes, conceptual priming, but not for activation levels (see de Vega et 
al., 1997; Niedenthal et al., 1997). Then, this task could be effective in 
determining the cognitive process that are not automatic and that are guided 
by high-level processes. Experiment 1 reported here seems to account for this 
in that the use of sensory-motor knowledge and simulation was suggested to 
play a central role during the off-line understanding of narratives. In fact, 
Havas et al. (in press) implicitly assume that simulation is a controlled process 
that can be tackled using a lexical decision task. The same authors affirm that 
emotion simulation could affect language beyond the lexical level, which 
supports the idea of using more meaningful linguistic units as contexts 
preceding a lexical decision task. 
The contexts used in the experiments here were narrative-like texts. 
Results therefore suggest that there was a context-to-word priming, which in 
turn suggests that texts proved to be effective in eliciting understanding of 
emotional states. Then, future studies in the study of characters’ emotions 
from an embodied view should pay particular attention to the texts used. This 
is true not only because the way texts are written influences the specification 
or not of emotional states, but because texts provide the set of linguistic 
instructions that guide mental simulations. Then, in would be expected that 
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the better the text mimics literary novels and narratives, the better results 
would be found as to the effects of text properties on readers’ constructions. 
The tasks described herein are behavioural tasks typical in discourse 
research; nevertheless tasks developed in other areas could contribute to 
understanding how narrative abstract dimensions are processed in texts. 
Recall the experiment carried out by Borghi et al. (2004). In that experiment 
researchers employed a task termed a property verification task to determine 
how people use conceptual knowledge, specifically sensorimotor knowledge, 
to simulate action in the world. In that task participants are presented with a 
word for a concept (e.g., horse), or a sentence as in the Borghi et al. 
experiments, followed by a word for a property (e.g., mane), then subjects 
are to verify if the property is true of the concept as fast and accurately as 
they can (Solomon & Barsalou, 2004). Even though this method has been 
useful to tap concrete concepts (see Pecher et al., 2003), it has not yet been 
used to determine how abstract concepts are processed, either in language 
processing in general or in text comprehension in particular. In the case of 
text comprehension, this technique could contribute, for instance, to 
understanding how sensorimotor knowledge is used when readers comprehend 
characters’ emotions or chronological shifts in stories.  
Also, neuroscientific and computational methods must be considered 
for the study of characters’ emotions. The experiment of Ferstl et al. (2005) 
described in Chapter 3 is a good example of the use of neuroscience in 
explaining the brain activity underpinning comprehension of narratives. 
Computational models of cognition regarding how readers process texts have 
been developed as well. For example, the Construction-Integration model was 
one of the first attempts to do so (Kintsch, 1988). However, newer models 
attempt to improve knowledge representation (e.g., LSA of Landauer & 
Dumais, 1997) and implement analogical and logical inference (e.g., 
Syntagmatic-Paradigmatic model of Dennis, 2005). A challenge for future 
studies using brain techniques and computational modelling could be to unveil 
the neuronal substratum supporting the understanding of fictional emotions 
and then to model the construction of embodied situation models in 
narratives. A worthwhile addition would be to test populations whose 
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linguistic background is different. In particular, by carrying out cross-linguistic 
studies some generalizations could be put forward. For example, it would be 
possible to compare performances of readers whose linguistic background 
differs in complexity (e.g., Spanish-English-Japanese; see Komeda & Kusumi, 
2006, for a recent study in the Japanese language). 
All in all, a proper study of characters’ emotions from an embodied 
perspective requires a mix of behavioural, neuroscience, and computational 
techniques. Once enough results are obtained, then a comprehensive and 
solid explanation could be offered as to how readers process characters’ 
emotions in narratives and how sensory-motor and linguistic knowledge 
participate in it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 83
References 
 
Baddeley, A. D. (2005). The psychology of memory. In A. D. Baddeley, M. A. 
Kopelman, & B. A. Wilson (Eds.), The essential handbook of memory 
disorders for clinicians (pp. 1-13). New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons. 
Baddeley, A.D. (2000). The episodic buffer: A new component of working 
memory? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4 (11), 417-423.  
Barsalou, L. W. (1999). Perceptual symbol systems. Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences, 22, 577-660. 
Belinchón, M., Rivière, A. & Igoa, J. M. (1992). Psicología del lenguaje. 
Investigación y teoría. Madrid: Editorial Trotta, S. A. 
Binder, J. R., Westbury, C. F., McKiernan, K. A., Possing, E. T., & Medler, D. 
A. (2005). Distinct brain systems for processing concrete and abstract 
concepts. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 17 (6), 1-13. 
Black, A., Freeman, P. & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1986). Plausibility and the 
comprehension of text. British Journal of Psychology, 77, 51-62. 
Borghi, A. M., Glenberg, A. M., & Kaschak, M. P. (2004). Putting words in 
perspective. Memory & Cognition, 32 (6), 863-873. 
Bortolussi, M. & Dixon, P. (2003). Psychonarratology. Foundations for the 
empirical study of literary response. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Bower, G. H. & Morrow, D. G. (1990). Mental models in narrative 
comprehension. Science, 247 (4938), 44-48. 
Bower, G. H., & Forgas, J. P. (2000). Affect, memory, and social cognition. In 
E. Eich, J. F. Kihlstrom, G. H. Bower, J. P. Forgas, & P. M. Niedenthal 
(Eds.), Cognition and emotion (pp. 87-168). New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Calvo, M. G., Castillo, D., & Schmalhofer, F. (2006). Strategic influence on 
the time course of predictive inferences in reading. Memory & 
Cognition, 34 (1), 68-77. 
Calvo, M. G., Estevez, A., & Dowens, M. G. (2003). Time course of elaborative 
inferences in reading as a function of prior vocabulary knowledge. 
Learning and Instruction, 13, 611-631. 
 84
Clarke, T. J., Bradshaw, M. F., Field, D. T., Hampson, S. E., & Rose, D. (2005). 
The perception of emotion from body movement in point-light displays 
of interpersonal dialogue. Perception, 34, 1171-1180. 
Connolly, T., & Reb, J. (2005). Regret in cancer-related decisions. Health 
Psychology, 24 (4), S29-S34. 
Craik, F. I. M., & Lockhart, R. S. (1972). Levels of processing: A framework for 
memory research. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 11, 
671-684. 
Craik, F. I. M., & Tulving, E. (1975). Depth of processing and the retention of 
words in episodic memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General, 104 (3), 268-294. 
Damasio, A. R. (1994). Descartes error: Emotion, reason, and the human 
brain. New York: Avon Books. 
Davis, C. J. (2005). N-Watch: A program for deriving neighbourhood size and 
other psycholinguistic statistics. Behavior Research Methods, 37, 65-70. 
de Vega, M., Díaz, J. M. & León, I. (1999). Procesamiento del discurso. In M. 
De Vega & F. Cuetos (Coords.), Psicolingüística del español (pp. 271-
305). Madrid: Editorial Trotta, S. A. 
de Vega, M., Díaz, J. M., & León, I. (1997). To know or not to know: 
Comprehending protagonists’ beliefs and their emotional consequences. 
Discourse Process, 23, 169-192. 
de Vega, M., León, I., & Díaz, J. M. (1996). The representation of changing 
emotions in reading comprehension. Cognition and Emotion, 10 (3), 
303-321. 
de Vega, M., Robertson, D. A., Glenberg, A. M., Kaschak, M. P., & Rinck, M. 
(2004). On doing two things at once: Temporal constraints on actions in 
language comprehension.  Memory & Cognition, 32 (7), 1033-1043. 
Dennis, S. (2005). A memory-based theory of verbal cognition. Cognitive 
Science, 29, 145-193. 
Dijkstra, K., Zwaan, R. A., Graesser, A. C. & Magliano, J. P. (1994). Character 
and reader emotions in literary texts. Poetics, 23, 139-157. 
Dixon, P. & Bortolussi, M. (2001). Prolegomena for a science of 
psychonarratology. In W. van Peer & S. Chatman (Eds.), New 
 85
perspectives on narrative perspective (pp. 275-287). Albany, N. Y.: S. U. 
N. Y. Press. 
Elosúa, M. R. (2000). Procesos de la comprensión, memoria y aprendizaje de 
textos. Madrid: Editorial Sanz y Torres, S. L. 
Elosúa, M. R., & Martínez, R. M. (2002). El entrenamiento en la generación de 
inferencias temáticas durante la lectura. In J. Nicasio García Sánchez 
(Ed.), Aplicaciones de Intervención Psicopedagógica (pp. 77-85). 
Madrid: Pirámide. 
Elosúa, M. R., García-Madruga, J. A., Gutiérrez, F., Luque, J. L. & Gárate, M. 
(2002). Effects of an intervention in active strategies for text 
comprehension and recall. The Spanish Journal of Psychology, 5(2), 90-
101. 
Feeney, J. A. (2005). Hurt feelings in couple relationships: Exploring the role 
of attachment and perceptions of personal injury. Personal 
Relationships, 12, 253-271. 
Ferstl, E. C., Rinck, M., & von Cramon, Y. (2005). Emotional and temporal 
aspects of situation model processing during text comprehension: An 
event-related fMRI study. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 17 (5), 
724-739. 
Forster, K. I., & Forster, J. C. (2003). DMDX: A windows display program with 
millisecond accuracy. Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & 
Computers, 35 (1), 116-124. 
Gárate Larrea, M. (1994). Comprensión de cuentos en los niños. Un enfoque 
cognitivo y sociocultural. Madrid: Siglo XXI de España Editores, S. A. 
García-Madruga, J. A., Elosúa, M. R., Gutiérrez, F., Luque, J. L. & Gárate, M. 
(1999). Comprensión lectora y memoria operativa. Aspectos evolutivos 
e instruccionales. Barcelona: Ediciones Paidós Ibérica, S. A.  
Garrido Domínguez, A. (1993). El texto narrativo. Madrid: Síntesis. 
Garrod, S., & Pickering, M. J. (2004). Why conversation is so easy? Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 8 (1), 8-11. 
Gernsbacher, M. A., Goldsmith, H. H., & Robertson, R. R. W. (1992). Do 
readers mentally represent characters’ emotional states? Cognition and 
Emotion, 6 (2), 89-111. 
 86
Gernsbacher, M. A., Hallada, B. M., & Robertson, R. R. W. (1998). How 
automatically do readers infer fictional characters’ emotional states? 
Scientific Studies of Reading, 2 (3), 271-300. 
Gibson, E. J., Adolph, K., & Eppler, M. (1999). Affordances. In R.A. Wilson & 
F.C. Keil (Eds.), The MIT encyclopedia of the cognitive sciences (pp. 4-
6). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Glenberg, A. M. (1997). What memory is for? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 
20, 1-55. 
Glenberg, A., Havas, D., Becker, R., & Rinck, M. (2005). Grounding language 
in bodily states. The case for emotions. In D. Pecher & R. Zwaan (Eds.), 
Grounding cognition. The role of perception and action in memory, 
language, and thinking (pp. 115-128). Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Graesser, A. C., & Wiemer-Hastings, K. (1999). Situation models and concepts 
in story comprehension. In S. R. Goldman, A. C. Graesser & P. van den 
Broek (Eds.), Narrative comprehension, causality, and coherence: 
Essays in honor of Tom Trabasso (pp. 77-92). Mahwah, N. J.: Erlbaum. 
Graesser, A. C., Millis, K. K., & Zwaan, R. A. (1997). Discourse comprehension. 
Annual Review of Psychology, 48, 163-189. 
Graesser, A. C., Olde, B. A. & Klettke, B. (2002). How does the mind 
construct and represent stories?. In M. Green, J. Strange & T. Brock 
(Eds.), Narrative impact: Social and cognitive foundations (pp. 231-
263). Mahwah, N. J.: Erlbaum. 
Greimas, A. J., & Fontanille, J. (1994). Semiótica de las pasiones. De los 
estados de cosas a los estados de ánimo. Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno de 
España editores, S. A. (Original work published 1991).  
Groen, S., Syssau, F., De la Haye, F., & Brouillet, D. (2000, July). Emotional 
inferences, course of activation in the Landscape Model. Paper 
presented at the Tenth Annual Meeting of the Society for Text and 
Discourse, Lyon, France. 
Gutiérrez-Calvo, M. (1999). Inferencias en la comprensión del lenguaje. In M. 
de Vega & F. Cuetos (Coords.), Psicolingüística del español (pp. 231-
270). Madrid: Editorial Trotta, S. A. 
 87
Gygax, P., Garnham, A. & Oakhill, J. (2004). Inferring characters’ emotional 
states: Can readers infer specific emotions? Language and Cognitive 
Processes, 19 (5), 613-638. 
Gygax, P., Oakhill, J. & Garnham, A. (2003). The representation of characters' 
emotional responses: Do readers infer specific emotions? Cognition and 
Emotion, 17 (3), 413-428.  
Haberlandt K. (1981). Les expectations du lecteur dans la comprehension du 
texte. Bulletin de Psychologie, 35 (11-16), 733-740. 
Hamann, S. (2001). Cognitive and neural mechanisms of emotional memory. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 5 (9), 394-400. 
Hauk, O., Johnsrude, I., & Pulvermüller, F. (2004). Somatotopic 
representation of action words in human motor and premotor cortex. 
Neuron, 41, 301-307. 
Havas, D. A., Glenberg, A. M., & Rinck, M. (in press). Emotion simulation 
during language comprehension. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review. 
Hesslow, G. (2002). Conscious thought as simulation of behaviour and 
perception. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6 (6), 242-247. 
Hoeken, H., & van Vliet, M. (2000). Suspense, curiosity, and surprise: How 
discourse structure influences the affective and cognitive processing of 
a story. Poetics, 26, 277-286. 
Holliday, R., Hamilton, S., Luthra, A., Oddy, M., & Weekes, B. S. (2005). Text 
comprehension after traumatic brain injury: Missing the gist? Brain and 
Language, 95, 74-75. 
Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1980). Mental models in cognitive science. Cognitive 
Science, 4, 71-115. 
Johnson-Laird, P. N., & Oatley, K. (2000). Cognitive and social construction in 
emotions. In M. Lewis & J. M. Haviland-Jones (Eds.), Handbook of 
emotions (2nd ed., pp. 458-475). New York: The Guilford Press. 
Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1994). Précis of Beyond Modularity: A developmental 
perspective on cognitive science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 17 (4), 
693-745. 
 88
Kaup, B., Lüdtke, J., & Zwaan, R. (2006). Processing negated sentences with 
contradictory predicates: Is a door that is not open mentally closed? 
Journal of Pragmatics, 38, 1033-1050. 
Kealy, K. L. K., Kuiper, N. A., & Klein, D. N. (2006). Characteristics associated 
with real and made-up events: The effects of event valence, event 
elaboration, and individual differences. Canadian Journal of 
Behavioural Science, 38 (2), 158-175. 
Kelter, S., Kaup, B. & Claus, B. (2004). Representing a described sequence of 
events: A dynamic view of narrative comprehension. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 30 (2), 
451–464. 
Kintsch, W. (1988). The role of knowledge in discourse comprehension: A 
Construction-Integration model. Psychological Review, 95 (2), 163-182. 
Kintsch, W., & Rawson, K. A. (2005). Comprehension. In J. Snowling & C. 
Hume (Eds.), The science of reading: A handbook (pp. 209-226). Malden, 
MA: Blackwell publishing. 
Kiss, G.R., Armstrong, C., Milroy, R., and Piper, J. (1973) An associative 
thesaurus of English and its computer analysis. In Aitken, A.J., Bailey, 
R.W. and Hamilton-Smith, N. (Eds.), The Computer and Literary Studies. 
Edinburgh: University Press. 
Kneepkens, E. W. E. M. & Zwaan, R. A. (1994). Emotions and literary text 
comprehension. Poetics, 23, 125-138. 
Komeda, H., & Kusumi, T. (2006). The effect of a protagonist’s emotional 
shift on situation model construction. Memory & Cognition, 34 (7), 
1545-1556. 
Landauer, T. K., & Dumais, S. T. (1997). A solution to Plato’s problem: The 
Latent Semantic Analysis theory of acquisition, induction, and 
representation of knowledge. Psychological Review, 104 (2), 211-240. 
León, I., & Hernández, J. A. (1998). Testing the role of attribution and 
appraisal in predicting own and other’s emotions. Cognition and 
Emotion, 12 (1), 27-43. 
Lewis, M. D. (2005). Bridging emotion theory and neurobiology through 
dynamic systems modelling. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28, 169-245. 
 89
Mar, R. A. (2004). The neuropsychology of narrative: Story comprehension, 
story production and their interrelation. Neuropsychologia, 42, 1414-
1434. 
Marmolejo-Ramos, F. (2006). Nuevos avances en el estudio científico de la 
comprensión de textos. Manuscript submitted for publication. 
Marmolejo-Ramos, F., & Jiménez, A. T. (2006a). How preschoolers 
comprehend the emotional dimension in narrative texts [Abstract]. 
Australian Journal of Psychology, 58 (Suppl.1), 9. 
Marmolejo-Ramos, F., & Jiménez, A. T. (2006b). Inferencias, modelos de 
situación y emociones en textos narrativos: El caso de los niños de edad 
preescolar. Revista Intercontinental de Psicología y Educación, 8 (2), 
93-138. 
Miall, D. S., & Kuiken, D. (2001). Shifting perspectives: Readers' feelings and 
literary response. In W. van Peer & S. B. Chatman (Eds.), New 
perspectives on narrative perspective (pp. 289-301). Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press. 
Miller, G. (2006). A better view of brain disorders. Science, 313 (5792), 1376-
1379. 
Naccache, L. (2006). Is she conscious? Science, 313 (5792), 1395-1396. 
Nelson, K. (1999). Event representations, narrative development and internal 
working models. Attachment & Human Development, 1 (3), 239-252. 
Niedenthal, P. M., & Halberstadt, J. B. (2000). Emotional response as 
conceptual coherence. In E. Eich, J. F. Kihlstrom, G. H. Bower, J. P. 
Forgas, & P. M. Niedenthal (Eds.), Cognition and emotion (pp. 169-203). 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Niedenthal, P. M., Barsalou, L. W., Winkielman, P., Krauth-Gruber, S., & Ric, 
F. (2005). Embodiment in attitudes, social perception, and emotion. 
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 9 (3), 184-211. 
Niedenthal, P. M., Halberstadt, J. B., & Setterlund, M. B. (1997). Being 
“happy” and seeing “happy”: Emotional state mediates visual word 
recognition. Cognition and Emotion, 11 (4), 403-432. 
 90
Oately, K. (1999a). Emotions. In R.A. Wilson & F.C. Keil (Eds.), The MIT 
encyclopedia of the cognitive sciences (pp. 273-275). Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press.  
Oatley, K. (1999). Why fiction may be twice as true as fact: Fiction as 
cognitive and emotional simulation. Review of General Psychology, 3 
(2), 101-117.  
Oatley, K., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2002). Emotion and reasoning to 
consistency. The case of abductive inference. In S. C. More & M. 
Oaksford (Eds.), Emotional cognition. From brain to behavior (pp. 157-
182). Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company. 
Owen, A. M., Coleman, M. R., Boly, M., Davis, M. H., Laureys, S., & Pickard, J. 
D. (2006). Detecting awareness in the vegetative state. Science, 313 
(5792), 1402. 
Pavlova, M., Sokolov, A. A., & Sokolov, A. (2005). Perceived dynamics of 
static images enables emotional attribution. Perception, 34, 1107-1116. 
Pecher, D., Zeelenberg, R., & Barsalou, L. W. (2003). Verifying different-
modality properties for concepts produces switching costs. 
Psychological Science, 14 (2), 119-124. 
Perfetti, C., & Bell, L. (1991). Phonemic activation during the first 40 ms of 
word identification: Evidence from backward masking and priming. 
Journal of Memory and Language, 30, 473-485. 
Perfetti, C., & Zhang, S. (1991). Phonological processes in reading Chinese 
characters. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, 
and Cognition, 17 (4), 633-643. 
Radvansky, G. & Copeland, D. E. (2004). Reasoning, integration, inference 
alteration, and text comprehension. Canadian Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 58 (2), 133-141. 
Rapp, D. N., & van den Broek, P. (2005). Dynamic text comprehension. 
Current Directions in Psychological Science, 14 (5), 276-279. 
Rastle, K., Harrington, J., & Coltheart, M. (2002). 358,534 nonwords: The ARC 
Nonword Database. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 55A 
(4), 1339-1362. 
 91
Rickheit, G., & Sichelschmidt, L. (1999). Mental models: Some answers, some 
questions, some suggestions. In G. Rickheit & C. Habel (Eds.), Mental 
models in discourse processing and reasoning (pp. 9-40). Amsterdam: 
Elsevier 
Sabsevitz, D. S., Medler, D.A., Seidenberg, M., & Binder, J. R. (2005). 
Modulation of the semantic system by word imageability. NeuroImage, 
27, 188-200. 
Schwanenflugel, P. J. (1991). Why are abstract concepts hard to understand? 
In P. J. Schwanenflugel (Ed.), The psychology of word meanings (pp. 
223-250). Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Sebanz, N., Bekkering, H., & Knoblich, G. (2006). Joint action: Bodies and 
minds moving together. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10 (2), 70-76. 
Solomon, K. O., & Barsalou, L. W. (2004). Perceptual simulation in property 
verification. Memory & Cognition, 32 (2), 244-259. 
Thorndyke, P. W. (1977). Cognitive structures in comprehension and memory 
of narrative discourse. Cognitive Psychology, 9, 77-110. 
Tulving, E. (1999). Episodic vs. semantic memory. In R.A. Wilson & F.C. Keil 
(Eds.), The MIT encyclopedia of the cognitive sciences (pp. 278-280). 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Xu, B., & Perfetti, C. (1999). Nonstrategic subjective threshold effects in 
phonemic masking. Memory & Cognition, 27 (1), 26-36. 
Zwaan, R. & Radvansky, G. (1998). Situation models in language 
comprehension and memory. Psychological Bulletin, 123 (2), 162-185. 
Zwaan, R. A. & Madden, C. J. (2004). Updating situation models. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 30 (1), 
283-288. 
Zwaan, R. A. (1999). Situation models: The mental leap into imagined worlds. 
Current Directions in Psychological Science, 8, 15-18. 
Zwaan, R. A., Madden, C. J., Yaxley, R. H., & Aveyard, M. E. (2004). Moving 
words: Dynamic representations in language comprehension. Cognitive 
Science, 28, 611-619. 
 
 
 
 92
Appendix A: Experimental stories, critical sentences, warning sentences, 
filler stories and emotional labels used in Experiment 1 and 2. 
 
Story 1 
 
Andrea was awakened by a ray of sunshine coming in through her window. She 
rose and looked out to find a beautiful day. Because last week had been so 
productive, she knew that there was nothing urgent that needed to be done 
today. Her essay due in next week was already finished and the presentation 
she gave yesterday had gone really well. She knew she could take the day off. 
The weather was beautiful and warm. You could hear the birds singing. She 
made herself a cup of herbal tea and went out onto her back porch to simply 
soak in the sun.  
 
Critical sentence 
Condition 1 (E+ A+): 
While Andrea merrily whistled a tune, she thought about sipping her relaxing 
cup of tea. 
 
Condition 2 (E- A+): 
While Andrea mournfully whistled a tune, she thought about sipping her 
nauseating cup of tea. 
 
Condition 3 (E+ A-): 
While Andrea merrily whistled a tune, she sipped her relaxing cup of tea. 
 
Condition 4 (E- A-): 
While Andrea mournfully whistled a tune, she sipped her nauseating cup of 
tea. 
 
Warning sentence (Exp 1) (Exp 2) 
Andrea felt…                        It was a moment when Andrea felt 
really… 
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 Emotional label 
HAPPY 
 
Story 2 
 
Paul had always wanted his brother, Luke, to be good at cricket. So Paul had 
been coaching Luke after school for almost two years. In the beginning, Luke's 
skills were very rough. But after many hours of coaching, Paul could see great 
improvement. Their many hours of hard work together had paid off. Paul’s 
brother was now a highly skilled all-rounder and was a valued player in his 
team. In fact, Luke’s improvement had been so great that he had received the 
Most Valuable Player Award at the end of season award ceremony. Not 
content to rest on their laurels, Paul and Luke kept training hard. Indeed, the 
very next day they went off to train hard again.  
 
Critical sentence 
Condition 1 (E+ A+): 
While Paul enthusiastically strapped on his pads, he thought about writing a 
glowing tribute to Luke’s achievements. 
 
Condition 2 (E- A+): 
While Paul reluctantly strapped on his pads, he thought about writing a 
sarcastic tribute to Luke’s achievements. 
 
Condition 3 (E+ A-): 
While Paul enthusiastically strapped on his pads, he wrote a glowing tribute to 
Luke’s achievements. 
 
Condition 4 (E- A-): 
While Paul reluctantly strapped on his pads, he wrote a sarcastic tribute to 
Luke’s achievements. 
 
 94
Warning sentence (Exp 1) (Exp 2) 
Paul felt…                        It was a moment when Paul felt 
really… 
 
Emotional label 
PROUD 
 
Story 3 
 
Ron entered the building. ‘I just know I'll get this job’, he thought to himself, 
as he walked up the stairs to the interviewer's office. ‘How could they not 
hire me? I got first class honours and was president of the Student Union for 
two years.’ As he opened the door and was greeted by the interviewer, he 
immediately extended his hand and said, ‘Hello, I'm Ron Miller’. Ron had all 
the qualifications that were needed for the job. His year abroad in a similar 
company was also a great advantage. He really wanted to work in that 
company and he knew that the other person applying for the job didn’t have 
much experience.  The interviewer ushered Ron to sit down.  
 
Critical sentence 
Condition 1 (E+ A+): 
While Ron firmly pulled up his chair, he thought about adjusting his stunning 
tie. 
 
Condition 2 (E- A+): 
While Ron awkwardly pulled up his chair, he thought about adjusting his 
unfashionable tie. 
 
Condition 3 (E+ A-): 
While Ron firmly pulled up his chair, he adjusted his stunning tie. 
 
Condition 4 (E- A-): 
While Ron awkwardly pulled up his chair, he adjusted his unfashionable tie. 
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 Warning sentence (Exp 1) (Exp 2) 
Ron felt…                        It was a moment when Ron felt 
really… 
 
Emotional label 
CONFIDENT 
 
Story 4 
 
It was the end of the year. At last, the semester was over and Sara's best 
friends gathered at her house for an impromptu party. It was one of those 
parties where everything went just right. Everybody was laughing and having 
fun. All the people at the party had just handed their last assessment task in. 
It had been a difficult piece of work and the party was a perfect excuse to 
celebrate. The weather was warm and beautiful and everybody was in the 
garden around the swimming pool. There was music, food and drink. Sarah 
and her friends were dancing and chatting. The party was a success. Her best 
friend hugged her and said, ‘the party is going great’.  
 
Critical sentence 
Condition 1 (E+ A+): 
While Sara eagerly poured her best friend a drink, she thought about diving 
into the clear water. 
 
Condition 2 (E- A+): 
While Sara regretfully poured her best friend a drink, she thought about diving 
into the murky water. 
 
Condition 3 (E+ A-): 
While Sara eagerly poured her best friend a drink, she dived into the clear 
water. 
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Condition 4 (E- A-): 
While Sara regretfully poured her best friend a drink, she dived into the 
murky water. 
 
Warning sentence (Exp 1) (Exp 2) 
Sara felt…                        It was a moment when Sara felt 
really… 
 
Emotional label 
JOYFUL 
 
Story 5 
 
Michelle now knew the true meaning of friendship. Her flatmate, Carol, had 
stayed in town for two days after finishing her own exams just to help 
Michelle with hers. Michelle still had to study for the psychology exam. To 
allow Michelle to concentrate on studying psychology, Carol had done all the 
cooking and cleaning. Carol offered all of this without even being asked. 
Michelle did not know how she would have coped without Carol’s help. So, the 
evening after she finished her exam, Michelle decided to make a special 
dinner for Carol.  
 
Critical sentence 
Condition 1 (E+ A+): 
While Michelle thoughtfully chopped some vegetables, she thought about 
wrapping up the expensive perfume she had bought as gift. 
 
Condition 2 (E- A+): 
While Michelle haphazardly chopped some vegetables, she thought about 
wrapping up the cheap perfume she had bought as gift. 
 
Condition 3 (E+ A-): 
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While Michelle thoughtfully chopped some vegetables, she wrapped up the 
expensive perfume she had bought as gift. 
 
Condition 4 (E- A-): 
While Michelle haphazardly chopped some vegetables, she wrapped up the 
cheap perfume she had bought as gift. 
 
Warning sentence (Exp 1) (Exp 2) 
Michelle felt…                        It was a moment when Michelle felt 
really… 
 
Emotional label 
GRATEFUL 
 
Story 6 
 
It was Friday night at home. This had been the best week of Trevor’s life. 
Tomorrow he would be graduating first in his undergraduate course. Just 
yesterday he had received a formal acceptance letter from Monash University 
for post-graduate study. Monash had been Trevor's first choice. He had worked 
very hard for it and finally he'd been accepted. The acceptance letter also 
offered him a scholarship. Without the scholarship he would not have been 
able to consider further study. To top it all off he had just spoken to the girl 
he wanted to go out with and she had agreed to go with him to the graduation 
ceremony.  
 
Critical sentence 
Condition 1 (E+ A+): 
While Trevor ecstatically texted his mother to pass on the news, he thought 
about trying on his best suit to wear to the graduation. 
 
Condition 2 (E- A+): 
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While Trevor dutifully texted his mother to pass on the news, he thought 
about trying on his worst suit to wear to the graduation. 
 
Condition 3 (E+ A-): 
While Trevor ecstatically texted his mother to pass on the news, he tried on 
his best suit to wear to the graduation. 
 
Condition 4 (E- A-): 
While Trevor dutifully texted his mother to pass on the news, he tried on his 
worst suit to wear to the graduation. 
 
Warning sentence (Exp 1) (Exp 2) 
Trevor felt…                        It was a moment when Trevor felt 
really… 
 
Emotional label 
EXCITED 
 
Story 7 
 
Pam had just returned from her regular Tuesday visit to the nursing home. 
When she arrived she learned that one of her favourite patients had fallen 
and broken her hip. When Pam had asked to see the patient with the broken 
hip, she was told that the patient had been transferred to the city hospital for 
emergency surgery. Pam knew that the anaesthetic alone might be enough to 
kill this woman. Then, she learned that another of her elderly patients had 
died suddenly overnight. Pam entered the empty room. She had known this 
patient well. She used to enjoy their weekly chats over a cup of tea. Now, 
back home, Pam was sitting on her bed. 
 
Critical sentence 
Condition 1 (E+ A+): 
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While Pam painfully wrote down her memories of her friend in her diary, she 
thought about writing a letter of condolence to the woman’s family. 
 
Condition 2 (E- A+): 
While Pam joyfully wrote down her memories of her friend in her diary, she 
thought about writing a letter of celebration to the woman’s family. 
 
Condition 3 (E+ A-): 
While Pam painfully wrote down her memories of her friend in her diary, she 
wrote a letter of condolence to the woman’s family. 
 
Condition 4 (E- A-): 
While Pam joyfully wrote down her memories of her friend in her diary, she 
wrote a letter of celebration to the woman’s family. 
 
Warning sentence (Exp 1) (Exp 2) 
Pam felt…                        It was a moment when Pam felt 
really… 
 
Emotional label 
SAD 
 
Story 8 
 
John, who always got good marks, had just transferred to a new university. He 
didn’t know anyone there and had found it hard to meet new people in the 
large lecture groups he attended. The course he had enrolled in was not very 
challenging for a student of his ability and he found he had a lot of time on his 
hands between classes. Today was no different. When the lectures finished, 
John took his bag and walked slowly home with his hands in his pockets, 
kicking stones on the path. The weather was quite warm, but John didn’t 
really know what to do with himself. He wished he had a hobby to occupy his 
time, or something to keep him busy in the afternoons until he made more 
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friends. He wished that he could find something to make time pass quicker. 
When he got home he took a can of beer from the fridge and switched on the 
TV.  
 
Critical sentence 
Condition 1 (E+ A+): 
While John lazily opened the can of beer, he thought about typing up his 
notes from the day’s tedious lecture. 
 
Condition 2 (E- A+): 
While John enthusiastically opened the can of beer, he thought about typing 
up his notes from the day’s fascinating lecture. 
 
Condition 3 (E+ A-): 
While John lazily opened the can of beer, he typed up his notes from the 
day’s tedious lecture. 
 
Condition 4 (E- A-): 
While John enthusiastically opened the can of beer, he typed up his notes 
from the day’s fascinating lecture. 
 
Warning sentence (Exp 1) (Exp 2) 
John felt…                        It was a moment when John felt 
really… 
 
Emotional label 
BORED 
 
Story 9 
 
‘How many things like this can happen in one day?’ Chris asked himself.  First, 
he was beaten out of a new job by a younger man. If that wasn't enough, on 
the way home he wrecked his car. Then, when he got home, he found out his 
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wife wanted a divorce. She had already started to pack her things. When his 
wife left, Chris slowly walked through the empty flat. He sat on the floor and 
thought about his life. He'd never had much luck. Everything he did always 
seemed to go wrong. All he could do was sit in his living room and stare into 
space for a while.  
 
Critical sentence 
Condition 1 (E+ A+): 
While Chris slumped in his chair, he thought about walking down to the 
miserable local pub. 
 
Condition 2 (E- A+): 
While Chris relaxed in his chair, he thought about walking down to the cheery 
local pub. 
 
Condition 3 (E+ A-): 
While Chris slumped in his chair, he walked down to the miserable local pub. 
 
Condition 4 (E- A-): 
While Chris relaxed in his chair, he walked down to the cheery local pub. 
 
Warning sentence (Exp 1) (Exp 2) 
Chris felt…                        It was a moment when Chris felt 
really… 
 
Emotional label 
DEPRESSED 
 
Story 10 
 
Joe worked at the local bottle shop to earn some money while he studied. 
One night, his best friend Tom came in to buy a case of beer. Joe needed to 
go back to the storage room to get the last case. While he was away, Tom 
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noticed the cash register was open. He couldn't resist the open drawer and 
quickly took a couple of fifty dollar notes. After he left the shop, he thought 
about what he was going to buy with the money. He didn’t think that Joe 
might be blamed for the missing cash. But, at closing time, when the manager 
noticed the missing money he demanded an explanation from Joe. Joe could 
not explain it. He hadn’t seen Tom take the money. Later that week, Tom 
learned that Joe had been fired over the missing money. Tom was now in his 
room thinking about the situation.  
 
Critical sentence 
Condition 1 (E+ A+): 
While Tom critically stared at himself in the mirror, he thought about writing 
an apologetic letter to his friend. 
 
Condition 2 (E- A+): 
While Tom proudly stared at himself in the mirror, he thought about writing a 
defiant letter to his friend. 
 
Condition 3 (E+ A-): 
While Tom critically stared at himself in the mirror, he wrote an apologetic 
letter to his friend. 
 
Condition 4 (E- A-): 
While Tom proudly stared at himself in the mirror, he wrote a defiant letter 
to his friend. 
 
Warning sentence (Exp 1) (Exp 2) 
Tom felt…                        It was a moment when Tom felt 
really… 
 
Emotional label 
GUILTY 
 
 103
Story 11 
 
Jeff arrived at the hospital on Saturday at 7:00 am as usual. All summer he 
had been a volunteer clown working with terminally ill children. Dressed in his 
costume, he would begin each day by bringing the children their breakfast, 
always with a small surprise on each tray. He would entertain them with his 
antics and tricks and sometimes he would stay and listen to their stories of 
hope and fear. Jeff really loved children, and his heart really went out to 
these kids as they bravely made the most of what time they had left. But he 
couldn’t help but be struck by the fact that every week one of the children 
would be gone and another terminally ill child would have taken their place. 
He began to wonder what use he really was to these children. After a heart 
wrenching conversation with a child who had cancer, he retreated to the tea 
room to take some time out.  
 
Critical sentence 
Condition 1 (E+ A+): 
While Jeff listlessly opened a carton of milk, he thought about taking off his 
pathetic clown hat. 
 
Condition 2 (E- A+): 
While Jeff purposefully opened a carton of milk, he thought about taking off 
his wonderful clown hat. 
 
Condition 3 (E+ A-): 
While Jeff listlessly opened a carton of milk, he took off his pathetic clown 
hat. 
 
Condition 4 (E- A-): 
While Jeff purposefully opened a carton of milk, he took off his wonderful 
clown hat. 
 
Warning sentence (Exp 1) (Exp 2) 
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Jeff felt…                        It was a moment when Jeff felt 
really… 
 
Emotional label 
HELPLESS 
 
Story 12 
 
Maggie was driving down the freeway without a care in the world. Her best 
friend Laura was in the passenger seat beside her and they were both singing 
along enthusiastically to the radio. Then, out of nowhere, another car sped 
past them. It side-swiped their car and sent them careering off road. The car 
came to rest in a ditch. Maggie was bruised and shaken, but Laura was badly 
injured. Maggie quickly phoned 000 for an ambulance. They asked her if she 
had first aid training as she would need to do what she could for Laura while 
they waited for the paramedics to arrive. Maggie remembered how she had 
consistently put off doing her first aid training even though work had offered 
to pay. She had no idea what to do and could not concentrate on the 
instructions that were being provided to her over her mobile phone. The 
mobile reception was not good in this area and she was missing every other 
word. To top matters off, the charge on the phone was fading. 
 
Critical sentence 
Condition 1 (E+ A+): 
While Maggie frantically walked up and down the road trying to get a better 
signal, she thought about trying to pull Laura free from the wrecked car. 
 
Condition 2 (E- A+): 
While Maggie calmly walked up and down the road trying to get a better signal, 
she thought about trying to pull Laura free from the intact car. 
 
Condition 3 (E+ A-): 
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While Maggie frantically walked up and down the road trying to get a better 
signal, she tried to pull Laura free from the wrecked car. 
 
Condition 4 (E- A-): 
While Maggie calmly walked up and down the road trying to get a better signal, 
she tried to pull Laura free from the intact car. 
 
Warning sentence (Exp 1) (Exp 2) 
Maggie felt…                        There could be no doubt that Maggie 
felt… 
 
Emotional label 
USELESS 
 
Story 13 
 
Ever since she had been mugged, Alice had avoided going out at night. The 
city seemed just too dangerous after dark. It seemed that she would read 
about another crime in her area nearly every day. But tonight she had to go 
out because she had promised to go to a play that her friend was performing 
in. As Alice left her flat, night was just falling and she could see a storm was 
blowing in from the west. As she stepped out onto the footpath, she listened 
closely to make sure no one was following her. She heard a noise coming from 
the bushes beside the path. It was getting difficult to see clearly. She hurried 
past the bushes as fast as she could. She was sure something was moving in 
there. As she looked back, she saw a cat scurry out. Alice carried on walking, 
faster than before, continually looking around her and listening closely. The 
first cold raindrops began to hit her cheeks.  
 
Critical sentence 
Condition 1 (E+ A+): 
While Alice shakily pulled on her rain coat, she thought about opening her 
rickety old umbrella. 
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 Condition 2 (E- A+): 
While Alice firmly pulled on her rain coat, she thought about opening her 
trusty old umbrella. 
 
Condition 3 (E+ A-): 
While Alice shakily pulled on her rain coat, she opened her rickety old 
umbrella. 
 
Condition 4 (E- A-): 
While Alice firmly pulled on her rain coat, she opened her trusty old umbrella. 
 
Warning sentence (Exp 1) (Exp 2) 
Alice felt…                        There could be no doubt that Alice 
felt… 
 
Emotional label 
AFRAID 
 
Story 14 
 
Emily and Angela were best friends and attended the same university. They 
had grown up together and were almost like sisters to one another. They had 
always had a strong rivalry between them as far as academic performance was 
concerned. But it seemed to Emily that Angela was always the one who was 
just that bit better. Angela always won the awards, got the highest marks, 
and got on best with the teachers. University was shaping up no differently. 
Although both had made it into Law, Angela was clearly the strongest and 
more confident student. Today, they had to do a role-play together in class, a 
test-case in which one of them would have to put the arguments for the 
defence, the other for the prosecution. Emily knew her defence case was not 
strong and that Angela would have thought up many clever lines of argument 
for the prosecution. She also new that Angela generally presented much 
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better in these kinds of oral assessment tasks than she did. Angela was not 
worried at all by an audience and always seemed to dominate the room.  
 
Critical sentence 
Condition 1 (E+ A+): 
While Emily shakily unfolded her notes on the lectern, she thought about 
adjusting the direction of the intimidating microphone in front of her. 
 
Condition 2 (E- A+): 
While Emily steadily unfolded her notes on the lectern, she thought about 
adjusting the direction of the reassuring microphone in front of her. 
 
Condition 3 (E+ A-): 
While Emily shakily unfolded her notes on the lectern, she adjusted the 
direction of the intimidating microphone in front of her. 
 
Condition 4 (E- A-): 
While Emily steadily unfolded her notes on the lectern, she adjusted the 
direction of the reassuring microphone in front of her. 
 
Warning sentence (Exp 1) (Exp 2) 
Emily felt…                        There could be no doubt that Emily 
felt… 
 
Emotional label 
INSECURE 
 
Story 15 
 
Eric really wanted to go to the end of semester ball, but he didn't have a date. 
He was thinking of asking Shelly, a girl in his history class. Chances are she'd 
actually consider going with him, but he hadn't been able to ask her. He'd 
talked to her once in class when she’d asked if she could borrow his pencil. 
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Eric had blushed. When she thanked him, Eric had looked at his feet and had 
only just managed to mumble: ‘You're welcome…’. He'd been wanting to talk 
to her again ever since, but he was not really confident in talking to girls. The 
next day, while Eric was sitting in the café by himself, Shelly came over and 
asked if she could join him.  
 
Critical sentence 
Condition 1 (E+ A+): 
While Eric tremulously took a sip of his coffee, he thought about asking this 
beautiful looking girl out to the ball. 
 
Condition 2 (E- A+): 
While Eric coolly took a sip of his coffee, he thought about asking this 
ordinary looking girl out to the ball. 
 
Condition 3 (E+ A-): 
While Eric tremulously took a sip of his coffee, he asked this beautiful looking 
girl out to the ball.  
 
Condition 4 (E- A-): 
While Eric coolly took a sip of his coffee, he asked this ordinary looking girl 
out to the ball. 
 
Warning sentence (Exp 1) (Exp 2) 
Eric felt…                        There could be no doubt that Eric 
felt… 
 
Emotional label 
NERVOUS 
 
Story 16 
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Jennifer was at home waiting for her husband Peter to return from work. 
Peter was often a little bit late, but tonight he was much later than she could 
ever recall. Besides, Peter usually called her from his office if he thought he 
was going to be late. Jennifer rang his mobile, but it went straight through to 
the message bank. It was unusual for him not to answer. They lived in the 
country and Jennifer had always been concerned about the quality of the 
roads that they drove on every day. Many of them were poorly surfaced and 
very narrow. There were a lot of blind corners. It was a wonder that there 
had not been more accidents. It was a wet day today too, so the roads would 
be especially treacherous. Jennifer sat in the lounge room staring at the 
minutes tick by on the clock.  
 
Critical sentence 
Condition 1 (E+ A+): 
While Jennifer agitatedly picked up the phone and dialled Peter’s office, she 
thought about trying his unreliable mobile again. 
 
Condition 2 (E- A+): 
While Jennifer calmly picked up the phone and dialled Peter’s office, she 
thought about trying his reliable mobile again. 
 
Condition 3 (E+ A-): 
While Jennifer agitatedly picked up the phone and dialled Peter’s office, she 
tried his unreliable mobile again. 
 
Condition 4 (E- A-): 
While Jennifer calmly picked up the phone and dialled Peter’s office, she 
tried his reliable mobile again. 
 
Warning sentence (Exp 1) (Exp 2) 
Jennifer felt…                        There could be no doubt that 
Jennifer felt… 
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Emotional label 
WORRIED 
 
Story 17 
 
Hannah was living on campus. Despite the fact that two women had recently 
been attacked walking back to their flats, Hannah continued to walk through 
the campus alone at night. She always carried a can of mace in case anyone 
tried to attack her. She had noticed an unfamiliar man hanging around the 
flats earlier that evening but had not taken much notice of him. Later, as she 
was walking back to her flat from the library, she was grabbed from behind. A 
man’s voice told her not to struggle and everything would be alright. He had 
his hand over her mouth and her head in a tight grip.  She bit into his hand as 
hard as she could and managed to break free, losing one of her high-heeled 
shoes in the struggle. Her attacker clutched his bleeding hand and looked at 
her enraged.  
 
Critical sentence 
Condition 1 (E+ A+): 
While Hannah frantically picked up her shoe ready to strike him, she thought 
about spraying the mace in his cruel eyes. 
 
Condition 2 (E- A+): 
While Hannah casually picked up her shoe ready to strike him, she thought 
about spraying the mace in his kind eyes. 
 
Condition 3 (E+ A-): 
While Hannah frantically picked up her shoe ready to strike him, she sprayed 
the mace in his cruel eyes. 
 
Condition 4 (E- A-): 
While Hannah casually picked up her shoe ready to strike him, she sprayed the 
mace in his kind eyes. 
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 Warning sentence (Exp 1) (Exp 2) 
Hannah felt…                        There could be no doubt that Hannah 
felt… 
 
Emotional label 
TERRIFIED 
 
Story 18 
 
Tracey and Abbey were living in the same block of flats on campus. The two 
young women had got to know each other well in the short time they had 
been at uni and Tracey had shared a number of her private thoughts and 
feelings with Abbey. But now it seemed that everyone on campus knew all of 
Tracey’s secrets. When Abbey arrived on Tracey’s doorstep that afternoon for 
their usual study session, Tracey confronted her about it. Abbey replied, ‘I’m 
sorry, but some of the stuff you told me was just too funny to keep secret’. 
Tracey wanted to slap Abbey in the face. She had confided in Abbey, believing 
that she was someone she could trust. Now, Abbey was standing there 
laughing. ‘Tracey, you just don't realise what a nerd you really are, don’t take 
yourself so seriously’.  
 
Critical sentence 
Condition 1 (E+ A+): 
While Tracy slammed the door in Abbey’s face, she thought about asking 
Abbey in to explain her thoughtless actions. 
 
Condition 2 (E- A+): 
While Tracy gently shut the door in Abbey’s face, she thought about asking 
Abbey in to explain her thoughtful actions.  
 
Condition 3 (E+ A-): 
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While Tracy slammed the door in Abbey’s face, she asked Abbey in to explain 
her thoughtless actions. 
 
Condition 4 (E- A-): 
While Tracy gently shut the door in Abbey’s face, she asked Abbey in to 
explain her thoughtful actions. 
 
Warning sentence (Exp 1) (Exp 2) 
Tracy felt…                        There could be no doubt that Tracy 
felt… 
 
Emotional label 
BETRAYED 
 
Story 19 
 
Driving through the suburbs, Kevin saw a garage sale sign. He dropped in 
because he was looking for a new dining room table. After browsing for a 
while, he found a pine table that was very cheap. The table seemed to be in 
very good condition, with strong legs and no dents. Kevin guessed that the 
owners had not used it much. It seemed a bargain. The only problem was that 
he would need some help to tie it onto the roof racks of his car. The owner 
agreed to help Kevin carry the table out to his car and tie it on.  
 
Critical sentence 
Condition 1 (E+ A+): 
While Kevin appreciatively counted out the notes to pay, he thought about 
tightening the sturdy straps a little more. 
 
Condition 2 (E- A+): 
While Kevin unwillingly counted out the notes to pay, he thought about 
tightening the flimsy straps a little more. 
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Condition 3 (E+ A-): 
While Kevin appreciatively counted out the notes to pay, he tightened the 
sturdy straps a little more. 
 
Condition 4 (E- A-): 
While Kevin unwillingly counted out the notes to pay, he tightened the flimsy 
straps a little more. 
 
Warning sentence (Exp 1) (Exp 2) 
Kevin felt…                        There could be no doubt that Kevin 
felt… 
 
Emotional label 
GOOD 
 
Story 20 
 
Rob woke up feeling really energetic and wanting to do something good 
outdoors. He rang his best friend Jason and asked him if he felt like kicking 
the footy in the park. Footy was Rob’s favourite game and he and Jason often 
played together. In fact, he and Jason had been playing kick-to-kick in the 
park together since they were boys. So Rob grabbed the Footy, filled his 
backpack with some snacks and some cans of Coke and headed off to the park. 
It was great to be out and about on such a perfect summer’s day.  
 
Critical sentence 
Condition 1 (E+ A+): 
While Bob skilfully kicked the footy to his friend, he thought about opening 
one of the cool cans of Coke. 
 
Condition 2 (E- A+): 
While Bob awkwardly kicked the footy to his friend, he thought about opening 
one of the warm cans of Coke. 
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 Condition 3 (E+ A-): 
While Bob skilfully kicked the footy to his friend, he opened one of the cool 
cans of Coke. 
 
Condition 4 (E- A-): 
While Bob awkwardly kicked the footy to his friend, he opened one of the 
warm cans of Coke. 
 
Warning sentence (Exp 1) (Exp 2) 
Bob felt…                        There could be no doubt that Bob 
felt… 
 
Emotional label 
GREAT 
 
Story 21 
 
Gary was an Australian student who was spending a year on an exchange 
programme in Italy. He was living by himself in a small flat in the industrial 
area of a main city. He hadn’t coped well with the new environment so far. 
One day he received a package for his birthday. It had been some time 
without news from home and he was really missing his friends, family and 
girlfriend. When he read the label on the package, he saw it was from his 
girlfriend. He opened the package and found a nice jumper and a letter inside. 
He read the letter. His girlfriend said she was missing him and so were his 
family and friends. Gary looked across at the photo of his girlfriend on his 
desk and thought about how much he missed her.  
 
Critical sentence 
Condition 1 (E+ A+): 
While Gary thoughtfully tried on the jumper, he thought about writing her a 
heartfelt reply. 
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 Condition 2 (E- A+): 
While Gary impatiently tried on the jumper, he thought about writing her a 
cheerful reply. 
 
Condition 3 (E+ A-): 
While Gary thoughtfully tried on the jumper, he wrote her a heartfelt reply. 
 
Condition 4 (E- A-): 
While Gary impatiently tried on the jumper, he wrote her a cheerful reply. 
 
Warning sentence (Exp 1) (Exp 2) 
Gary felt…                        There could be no doubt that Gary 
felt… 
 
Emotional label 
LONELY 
 
Story 22 
 
Terry’s best mate Pete had asthma. The doctors had told him that his 
condition was so bad that he would not be able to play any sports. Despite 
that, Pete had battled and trained very hard to become an elite athlete and 
Terry had always trained alongside him for support. Now the Commonwealth 
Games were about to commence and Pete was training harder than ever for 
his favourite 100 metres hurdle event. Just one week before the games, Terry 
and his friend were training at the stadium. They ran quickly together and 
jumped almost all the hurdles on the track. However, just before the last 
hurdle, Pete began to stagger and wheeze and then collapsed on the track.  
 
Critical sentence 
Condition 1 (E+ A+): 
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While Terry half-heartedly cleared the final hurdle, he thought about carrying 
his ailing friend from the track. 
 
Condition 2 (E- A+): 
While Terry ecstatically cleared the final hurdle, he thought about carrying 
his healthy friend from the track. 
 
Condition 3 (E+ A-): 
While Terry half-heartedly cleared the final hurdle, he carried his ailing friend 
from the track. 
 
Condition 4 (E- A-): 
While Terry ecstatically cleared the final hurdle, he carried his healthy friend 
from the track. 
 
Warning sentence (Exp 1) (Exp 2) 
Terry felt…                        There could be no doubt that Terry 
felt… 
 
Emotional label 
DESPONDENT 
 
Story 23 
 
Roger had always been very shy. He had never really travelled much, mainly 
because he was uncertain about travelling alone and meeting new people. 
This summer, he had resolved to go on an overseas package tour of Colombia 
to broaden his horizons and meet people. When Roger arrived at the airport, 
there were already about twenty of his fellow travellers standing in the queue, 
many of whom were practising conversing in Spanish. Roger was aware that 
his Spanish was not very good, so he didn't try to engage in a conversation 
with anybody. To avoid conversation, he pretended to be very busy reading a 
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magazine. However, one of the passengers came up to him and asked him 
something in Spanish.  
 
Critical sentence 
Condition 1 (E+ A+): 
While Roger confusedly opened his suitcase to put away the magazine, he 
thought about tearing up his expensive ticket and heading home. 
 
Condition 2 (E- A+): 
While Roger confidently opened his suitcase to put away the magazine, he 
thought about tearing up his cheap ticket and heading home. 
 
Condition 3 (E+ A-): 
While Roger confusedly opened his suitcase to put away the magazine, he tore 
up his expensive ticket and headed home. 
 
Condition 4 (E- A-): 
While Roger confidently opened his suitcase to put away the magazine, he 
tore up his cheap ticket and headed home. 
 
Warning sentence (Exp 1) (Exp 2) 
Roger felt…                        It was not surprising that Roger felt… 
 
Emotional label 
UPSET 
 
Story 24 
 
Colin had a passion for gardening. Every Saturday, he would put on his 
gardening clothes and get out into the garden, no matter what the weather 
was like. Although it was only a small garden, it was probably the best in 
Colin's street. There were two beautiful mature magnolia trees and many rare 
species of flowering plants. Colin loved getting up in the morning and looking 
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out at his garden while he had his coffee. However, this morning when he 
looked out, all he could see was devastation. Overnight there had been a 
violent electrical storm with gale-force winds. His precious magnolias had lost 
several branches and there were plants uprooted everywhere. He went 
outside to survey the damage.  
 
Critical sentence 
Condition 1 (E+ A+): 
While Colin frantically began to clear the strewn branches, he thought about 
hammering in a stake to support what was left of his now wretched magnolia. 
 
Condition 2 (E- A+): 
While Colin calmly began to clear the strewn branches, he thought about 
hammering in a stake to support what was left of his now beautiful magnolia. 
 
Condition 3 (E+ A-): 
While Colin frantically began to clear the strewn branches, he hammered in a 
stake to support what was left of his now wretched magnolia. 
 
Condition 4 (E- A-): 
While Colin calmly began to clear the strewn branches, he hammered in a 
stake to support what was left of his now beautiful magnolia. 
 
Warning sentence (Exp 1) (Exp 2) 
Colin felt…                        It was not surprising that Colin felt… 
 
Emotional label 
DESPAIR 
 
Story 25 
 
Trish arrived at the airport very early before her flight. It was the first time 
that Trish had taken a plane and she was nervous about flying. As she walked 
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to the departure lounge, her legs were shaking. She decided to get a brandy 
to settle her nerves before getting on the plane. She took a chair at the bar 
and asked the barman for a glass of his best brandy. She soon found that one 
glass wasn’t enough, so she drank several more. Just as she finished paying 
for her drinks, her flight was called. Trish ran to join the queue, but fell over. 
She tried to get up inconspicuously, but dropped her bag noisily as she did so, 
attracting further attention. A flight attendant pulled her aside and put in a 
call to the airport police. Everybody in the queue was staring at her and she 
hung her head. Then someone said, ‘she must be an alcoholic!’  
 
Critical sentence 
Condition 1 (E+ A+): 
While Tricia nervously blew into the breathalyser, she thought about 
explaining herself to the suspicious officer. 
 
Condition 2 (E- A+): 
While Tricia confidently blew into the breathalyser, she thought about 
explaining herself to the helpful officer. 
 
Condition 3 (E+ A-): 
While Tricia nervously blew into the breathalyser, she explained herself to the 
suspicious officer. 
 
Condition 4 (E- A-): 
While Tricia confidently blew into the breathalyser, she explained herself to 
the helpful officer. 
 
Warning sentence (Exp 1) (Exp 2) 
Tricia felt…                        It was not surprising that Tricia felt… 
 
Emotional label 
EMBARRASSED 
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Story 26 
 
Stephanie had decided to take a pottery class this semester as a way to relax. 
The class met two nights a week. Tonight, she thought she would make a vase 
for her boyfriend. Jim. Lately, she and Jim had been having serious problems 
because of her short temper. She realised that controlling her anger had been 
a problem for her since childhood. She thought that if she could make 
something beautiful for him, it would ease things between them a bit and 
show him how much she really loved him. She put a lot of work into the vase 
and it was very beautiful. However, when she finally took it home and gave it 
to Jim, he threw it down and said, ‘Do you think this will fix things? First fix 
your mind!’ Then he stormed out of the house.  
 
Critical sentence 
Condition 1 (E+ A+): 
While Stephanie reluctantly picked up the pieces of the broken vase, she 
thought about packing up her pathetic belongings and moving out. 
 
Condition 2 (E- A+): 
While Stephanie enthusiastically picked up the pieces of the broken vase, she 
thought about packing up her valuable belongings and moving out. 
 
Condition 3 (E+ A-): 
While Stephanie reluctantly picked up the pieces of the broken vase, she 
packed up her pathetic belongings and moved out. 
 
Condition 4 (E- A-): 
While Stephanie enthusiastically picked up the pieces of the broken vase, she 
packed up her valuable belongings and moved out. 
 
Warning sentence (Exp 1) (Exp 2) 
Stephanie felt…                        It was not surprising that Stephanie 
felt… 
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 Emotional label 
MISERABLE 
 
Story 27 
 
Cindy had parachuted once before, but things had not gone well. She had 
made a very heavy landing, shattering her arm. Her helmet had saved her 
from a serious head injury. Despite this, she was keen to jump again. In fact 
her experience had just made her more determined. She had spent many 
hours in rehabilitation and had trained hard for this jump. She was looking 
forward to the challenge of landing safely this time. Several of her friends had 
decided to take the challenge with her. But now, as they all sat in the plane, 
Cindy began to wish they weren’t there. Her friends hadn’t jumped before 
and a couple of them were very anxious. Cindy tried to keep their worries out 
of her mind. She was determined to jump. Besides she was wearing her lucky 
helmet. Cindy was to be first out of the plane, but just as she was ready to 
jump one of her friends held her back, screaming at her not to do it. The 
instructor decided to abort the jump and directed the pilot to land the plane.  
 
Critical sentence 
Condition 1 (E+ A+): 
While Cindy roughly unfastened the parachute, she thought about taking off 
her stupid helmet. 
 
Condition 2 (E- A+): 
While Cindy calmly unfastened the parachute, she thought about taking off 
her lucky helmet. 
 
Condition 3 (E+ A-): 
While Cindy roughly unfastened the parachute, she took off her stupid helmet. 
 
Condition 4 (E- A-): 
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While Cindy calmly unfastened the parachute, she took off her lucky helmet. 
 
Warning sentence (Exp 1) (Exp 2) 
Cindy felt…                        It was not surprising that Cindy felt… 
 
Emotional label 
FRUSTRATED 
 
Story 28 
 
Jane got up early and was getting ready to head off to uni, when she suddenly 
remembered that she had forgotten to write an essay for her Sociology class. 
‘I have to do something now!’ she thought. She pulled out her text books and 
began searching desperately through them, trying to think about what she 
could write in such a short time. Jane thought that handing something in 
would be better than nothing, but she really didn't know anything about the 
topic. She wished she had paid much more attention in her lectures. After 15 
minutes of fruitless searching and thinking, the page was still blank. Nothing 
would come to mind. She soon realised that there was nothing she could do. It 
was simply too late. 
 
Critical sentence 
Condition 1 (E+ A+): 
While Jane tearfully ripped up the sheet of paper, she thought about packing 
up her stupid books. 
 
Condition 2 (E- A+): 
While Jane eagerly ripped up the sheet of paper, she thought about packing 
up her treasured books. 
 
Condition 3 (E+ A-): 
While Jane tearfully ripped up the sheet of paper, she packed up her stupid 
books. 
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 Condition 4 (E- A-): 
While Jane eagerly ripped up the sheet of paper, she packed up her treasured 
books. 
 
Warning sentence (Exp 1) (Exp 2) 
Jane felt…                        It was not surprising that Jane felt… 
 
Emotional label 
HOPELESS 
 
Story 29 
 
Julia was paddling along a river in her old canoe when she heard an unusual 
bird call. She was a keen bird watcher, so she stopped paddling to listen more 
closely. Everything was silent as she waited patiently. Then she heard it again. 
It was definitely not like any call she had heard before. She decided to paddle 
over to the bank to see what bird was making such an unusual call. She 
paddled as quietly as she could towards the edge, keeping a keen eye out for 
any movement in the trees above. As she approached the bank she heard 
some rustling in the leaves and strained her eyes to see where it was coming 
from.  
 
Critical sentence 
Condition 1 (E+ A+): 
While Julia delicately manoeuvred the canoe onto the bank, she thought 
about fumbling through her pack to get her trusty binoculars. 
 
Condition 2 (E- A+): 
While Julia roughly manoeuvred the canoe onto the bank, she thought about 
fumbling through her pack to get her useless binoculars. 
 
Condition 3 (E+ A-): 
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While Julia delicately manoeuvred the canoe onto the bank, she fumbled 
through her pack to get her trusty binoculars. 
 
Condition 4 (E- A-): 
While Julia roughly manoeuvred the canoe onto the bank, she fumbled 
through her pack to get her useless binoculars. 
 
Warning sentence (Exp 1) (Exp 2) 
Julia felt…                        It was not surprising that Julia felt… 
 
Emotional label 
INTRIGUED 
 
Story 30 
 
Amy was on her way to visit her parents. Today was her birthday and she was 
looking forward to spending some time with her family. She didn’t get much 
time to see them these days, between study and work. Nevertheless, Amy 
could not help but feel a bit torn between seeing them and giving up the 
party that her friends had wanted to throw for her. When she arrived, her 
parents were at the front door waiting for her and they welcomed her into the 
house. Amy thought it was strange that they hadn’t mentioned her birthday 
and the environment at home seemed to be unusually quiet. But before she 
had time to say anything, her mother opened the doors to the lounge room. It 
was decorated with balloons, cakes, and bottles of wine, and her friends burst 
out from behind the furniture.  
 
Critical sentence 
Condition 1 (E+ A+): 
While Amy enthusiastically hugged and kissed everyone, she thought about 
opening one of the bottles of the expensive champagne. 
 
Condition 2 (E- A+): 
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While Amy reluctantly hugged and kissed everyone, she thought about opening 
one of the bottles of the cheap champagne. 
 
Condition 3 (E+ A-): 
While Amy enthusiastically hugged and kissed everyone, she opened one of 
the bottles of the expensive champagne. 
 
Condition 4 (E- A-): 
While Amy reluctantly hugged and kissed everyone, she opened one of the 
bottles of the cheap champagne. 
 
Warning sentence (Exp 1) (Exp 2) 
Amy felt…                        It was not surprising that Amy felt… 
 
Emotional label 
SURPRISED 
 
Story 31 
 
Frank woke up and looked at the clock. It was 10:30 a.m. and he was on 
holidays. Lately, he had been working long hours. But now, with all his work 
finished and nothing pressing to be done, it was simply time to take care of 
himself. All he needed to do was make the most of the beautiful sunny day. 
After a leisurely breakfast he decided he would sit out in the garden by the 
pool. He took with him the book he had been given for his birthday but had 
not had time to read and a glass of freshly made juice. Now he could just 
enjoy the day sitting in the garden. He was looking at the small waves made 
by the wind on the surface of the pool. The water looked inviting. 
 
Critical sentence 
Condition 1 (E+ A+): 
While Frank luxuriously sipped on his juice, he thought about diving into the 
glistening pool. 
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 Condition 2 (E- A+): 
While Frank hurriedly sipped on his juice, he thought about diving into the 
dirty pool. 
 
Condition 3 (E+ A-): 
While Frank luxuriously sipped on his juice, he dived into the glistening pool. 
 
Condition 4 (E- A-): 
While Frank hurriedly sipped on his juice, he dived into the dirty pool. 
 
Warning sentence (Exp 1) (Exp 2) 
Frank felt…                        It was not surprising that Frank felt… 
 
Emotional label 
RELAXED 
 
Story 32 
 
Mark had spent a long time perfecting his assignment and was rushing into uni 
to make the final submission time. The traffic was slow and he kept looking at 
his watch to see how much longer he had. He was really worried that he 
would not get there in time. He reached the university just on time. He still 
had five minutes before the assignment box would be cleared for the day. He 
grabbed his bag and ran across the campus as fast as he could. When he 
reached the assignment box, he rummaged frantically through his bag to find 
his assignment. But it wasn’t there. He realised that he must have left it in 
the car. He would have to run back and get it. Just then, one of the 
administrative staff came to clear the box. Mark pleaded with her to wait a 
few minutes while he retrieved the paper from his car. She told him he had 
five minutes to get it before she closed the box for the day. Mark ran there 
and back as fast as he could. Finally, out of breath he arrived back at the box. 
He had made it.  
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 Critical sentence 
Condition 1 (E+ A+): 
While Mark thankfully signed his name on the cover sheet, he thought about 
stapling it to the front of his excellent essay. 
 
Condition 2 (E- A+): 
While Mark regretfully signed his name on the cover sheet, he thought about 
stapling it to the front of his hopeless essay. 
 
Condition 3 (E+ A-): 
While Mark thankfully signed his name on the cover sheet, he stapled it to the 
front of his excellent essay. 
 
Condition 4 (E- A-): 
While Mark regretfully signed his name on the cover sheet, he stapled it to 
the front of his hopeless essay. 
 
Warning sentence (Exp 1) (Exp 2) 
Mark felt…                        It was not surprising that Mark felt… 
 
Emotional label 
RELIEVED 
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Filler stories for Experiment 2 
 
Story 1 
 
Shane was at the local hardware store waiting in line at the checkout. The 
saleswoman looked up at him. She said, ‘That comes to $60 AUD and we only 
accept cash’. Shane checked his wallet to see how much cash he had. There 
were only a few dollars. He had forgotten to go to the bank to get some 
money out. He had also left his credit cards at home. The only way for him to 
pay was by cheque. If he wouldn't be able to do that, he would have to leave 
all the food he was trying to buy. There were tins of tomatoes, three wine 
bottles, pasta and bread. Shane was having friends over for dinner. ‘Would 
you mind if I pay by cheque?’ Shane asked. ‘OK, I'll make an exception’, 
replied the saleswoman. 
 
Story 2 
Strobe's alarm clock went off at 6:15 a.m. He immediately went down to the 
basement to turn on the furnace. His wife was adamant about turning it off 
overnight. Every morning, the temperature was about 45 degrees in the house. 
But he had to admit, it saved a lot of money on the gas bill. Next, Strobe 
walked to the end of the driveway and picked up the newspaper. He always 
took time to read the paper before work. 
Story 3 
Max was writing and preparing to go on a lecture tour in the East. He liked to 
take advantage of his travels, so he planned several visits with friends and 
acquaintances on the way. Since Spring, preparing for this trip had consumed 
Max's time. The schedule he had prepared would be very busy. 
Story 4 
 
Nancy and Dorothy were visiting London for the first time. The first thing they 
decided to do was shopping. Nancy saw a beautiful silk scarf and decide to 
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buy it. The scarf was not very expensive. Nancy thought it was a bargain. She 
tried it on. The scarf suited her quite well. When Dorothy saw Nancy's scarf, 
she wished she'd seen it first. 
 
Story 5 
 
Sean was telling Marie, his best friend, that he had just failed his spoken oral 
exam. He had worked very hard for it. He was telling Marie how he suddenly 
panicked and couldn't remember anything. Marie was listening carefully. She 
also had an exam. Fortunately for her, things did go well. She knew Sean's 
exam had been difficult. ‘I suddenly didn't know what to say, I just kept 
quiet’ said Sean. 
 
Story 6 
Charles and Sandra were having a discussion about American cuisine. ‘Some 
chefs include a number of continental dishes in their menu.’ ‘Their dishes 
include traditional Cajun concoctions,’ Charles commented. ‘They also 
include more familiar preparations, such as prime rib.’ ‘Others simply prefer 
to emphasize ethnic foods,’ Sandra added, ‘For example, Tex-Mex, Mesquite, 
and Ozark rabbit and quail.’ 
Story 7 
 
Arthur was ten years old. He was having tennis lessons every Wednesday 
afternoon. Today, his coach was having trouble explaining the exercises to 
him. The exercises were not difficult though. Today's lesson was on serving. 
Arthur's coach was trying to show him how to serve with spin. Arthur had 
never learned spin serves. Arthur listened for ten seconds, then played with 
his racket for a while, then played with a ball, but did not listen to his coach 
for more than a few seconds. 
 
Story 8 
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Sally walked outside to get the mail. She glanced at her car and noticed that 
the front window was broken. She also noticed that her radio was missing. She 
had bought that car a week ago. When she came home with her new car, Sally 
parked it in front of her house. It was where she used to park her old car. 
She'd never had any problems with it. But someone had smashed the front 
window to steal her radio. 
 
Story 9 
 
Ann came home after two weeks holiday. When she entered her flat, she 
could smell something strange coming from the kitchen. She walked in and 
opened the fridge. Ann saw a mouldy green piece of cheese. She had 
forgotten to throw it away when she left. The day she left, she had to hurry 
to finish packing. If that hadn't been enough, Ann had been unable to find her 
passport. She hadn't been much concerned about tidying her flat. As a result, 
she'd left some food in the fridge. At the sight and smell of the cheese, Ann 
had to shut the fridge immediately. 
 
Story 10 
 
Patrick was a very tall man. He was usually always asked to play basketball 
for the University team. He had always really liked it. Patrick had played 
basketball since primary school. Basketball was his favourite game. He even 
collected pictures of his favourite players. Some of them were quite valuable. 
But the coach thought he wasn't good enough this time, so he dropped Patrick 
from the team. 
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Appendix B: Words used in Experiment 1 for lexical decision task. 
 
Practice items 
 
FOUND 
SCLAFF 
SPURL 
TRUCK 
DRENCH 
PRUTE 
SCRAPE 
THROAP 
FRAME 
 
 
Emotional labels 
 
HAPPY 
PROUD 
CONFIDENT 
JOYFUL 
GRATEFUL 
EXCITED 
SAD 
BORED 
DEPRESSED 
GUILTY 
HELPLESS 
USELESS 
AFRAID 
INSECURE 
NERVOUS 
WORRIED 
Non words 
 
SWENTHS 
PRULCH 
KLYPED 
KWILES 
STIEF 
CWYBE 
SHRITH 
GHLYNC 
CWOARDS 
SCWILNS 
DWYE 
PHREMED 
PROLFED 
PEMP 
HEVS 
YENT 
GHREX 
THREMPTS 
WRANGE 
SCKRISTS 
TWUINT 
SKRYM 
SKRUTCHED 
SHREAPED 
SHREBBED 
WHAIMS 
PSYM 
GLOOLS 
TRIFT 
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TERRIFIED 
BETRAYED 
GOOD 
GREAT 
LONELY 
DESPONDENT 
UPSET 
DESPAIR 
EMBARRASSED 
MISERABLE 
FRUSTRATED 
HOPELESS 
INTRIGUED 
SURPRISED 
RELAXED 
RELIEVED 
 
Abstract words 
 
SMOOTH 
DANGEROUS 
ROUGH 
SOFT 
TRUE 
REAL 
EASY 
DARK 
RELIABLE 
COSY 
BROAD 
SPACIOUS 
STABLE 
AVAILABLE 
SMINCH 
WRONZED 
DRARCHED 
SPLED 
BLURN 
GOWDS 
SNULK 
JEACE 
TWIGH 
STRITS 
WRUNGE 
YEIGHTH 
106 DRISHED 
TEFTS 
BLALBS 
THWUBS 
CRALMED 
GHOOTHED 
PHRUIN 
SPILE 
FOYS 
DWOBBED 
SCIRMS 
SHOGGED 
KWORCE 
FREUM 
CWIPES 
SCINCH 
SPRIRST 
CORGUES 
GHLOAK 
STREFT 
KROALS 
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POLITICAL 
POTENTIAL 
BELIEVABLE 
THINKING 
FORGIVING 
REMEMBERING 
TRUSTED 
CONVINCING 
FORGETTABLE 
WILLING 
PONDERABLE 
ARGUABLE 
FORGETTABLE 
COMPREHENSIBLE 
CONCENTRATED 
LEARNABLE 
SOLVABLE 
WANDERING 
STRIMP 
SKERSED 
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Appendix C: Words used in Experiment 1 for episodic recognition task. 
 
Practice items 
 
COGITATIVE 
WORKABLE 
RADIANT 
SILLY 
PRAYERFUL 
DOUBTABLE 
SIMPLE 
FAVOURED 
CONTROLLED 
 
Emotional labels  
 
HAPPY 
PROUD 
CONFIDENT 
JOYFUL 
GRATEFUL 
EXCITED 
SAD 
BORED 
DEPRESSED 
GUILTY 
HELPLESS 
USELESS 
AFRAID 
INSECURE 
NERVOUS 
WORRIED 
TERRIFIED 
New emotional labels 
 
CONTENT 
SATISFIED 
POSITIVE 
PLEASED 
THANKFUL 
THRILLED 
GLOOMY 
JADED 
LOW 
CULPABLE 
FEEBLE 
WORTHLESS 
FRIGHTENED 
TIMID 
JUMPY 
CONCERNED 
SCARED 
FURIOUS 
FINE 
AWESOME 
ALONE 
PESSIMISTIC 
DISAPPOINTED 
HUMBLED 
HUMILIATED 
GLUM 
ANNOYED 
BLEAK 
INTERESTED 
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BETRAYED 
GOOD 
GREAT 
LONELY 
DESPONDENT 
UPSET 
DESPAIR 
EMBARRASSED 
MISERABLE 
FRUSTRATED 
HOPELESS 
INTRIGUED 
SURPRISED 
RELAXED 
RELIEVED 
 
AMAZED 
COSY 
GRATIFIED 
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